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The term ‘bioprospecting’ was only coined within the past few decades.  Today, it is still 
difficult to find consensus on its legal meaning.  What it appears to represent is the range of 
activities associated with searching for, discovering and researching unique biodiversity for 
any potential commercial applications.  The polar regions are likely sources of such 
uniqueness.  This is what attracts bioprospectors, as polar biodiversity often contain genes, 
molecules or compounds, that once isolated and assessed, can be developed into a product or 
process of commercial value in the fields of agriculture, medicine, aquiculture, cosmetics, 
and pharmacy to name only a few.   
 
Bioprospecting in the Antarctic presents similar challenges to bioprospecting carried out 
anywhere else in the world. It also, however, carries with it unique challenges and 
implications specific to the Antarctic region. Bioprospecting has been underway in the 
Antarctic since the mid 1980s, within the context of National Antarctic programmes. Little 
formal debate, however, has taken place within the Antarctic Treaty System, the legal regime 
which governs the region. This thesis investigates the unique legal implications that 
bioprospecting has for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Antarctic bioprospecting also 
carries with it environmental and ethical implications. These will only be briefly discussed, 
but they too, carry with them legal obligations which are important in the context of the 
Antarctic.  
 
The principle legal obligations are contained within the Antarctic Treaty; being the use of the 
area for peaceful purposes only, freedom of scientific investigation including the free 
availability of scientific observations and results, and the ‘frozen’ but unresolved sovereignty 
situation that prevails while the Antarctic Treaty is in force. Sovereignty considerations are 
particularly important when considering resource utilization and benefit-sharing from such 
utilization. Beyond the Antarctic Treaty, there exist international legal instruments which 
carry with them other obligations that cannot be ignored.  Avoiding conflicts with these 
international instruments must also be a fundamental consideration in any Antarctic 
bioprospecting regulation. The extent of these legal obligations, and their implications for 
bioprospecting, is the focus of this thesis. 
 
The thesis will explore these obligations and then investigate the possible future of 
bioprospecting in the Antarctic. Bioprospecting appears to be the latest challenge to the half 
century old Antarctic Treaty System.  Each new challenge seems to prompt a call to 
investigate the system itself.  So that every challenge has the possibility of altering or 
collapsing the system that appears to have worked extremely well in the past. 
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‘There are still areas of this planet where opportunities remain for constructive 
and peaceful cooperation on the part of the international community for the 
common good of all rather than for the benefit of a few.  Such an area is the 
Antarctic continent.  While we would refrain at this stage from commenting on 
the attitudes of States regarding the legal status of this last dark continent, or 
portions of it, there can be no doubt that there are vast possibilities for a new 
initiative that would rebound to the benefit of all mankind.  Antarctica is an area 
where the now widely accepted ideas and concepts relating to international 
economic cooperation, with their special stress on the principle of equitable 
benefit sharing of the world’s resources, can find ample scope for application, 
given the cooperation and goodwill of those who have so far been active in that 
area.’ 
 
Statement by Sri Lanka Delegate 
In a speech to the UN General Assembly 




   




Antarctica is an enigma.  Often described as the land of superlatives, including 
‘highest’, ‘driest’, ‘coldest’ and ‘windiest’, it is actually incapable of adequate 
description simply by those general adjectives.  It is a diverse continent supporting a 
range of environments covering both terrestrial and marine ecosystems. The region is 
also the scene of diverse efforts controlled by a legal system which seeks to find a 
balance among the differing goals freedom of scientific investigation, commercial 
exploitation and environmental preservation. 
 
Antarctica has no permanent human population and no legally recognised sovereign. 
Seven states claim territory in Antarctica and two other states reserve the right to 
make a future claim, but none of these claims is formally recognised by the 
international community. There is therefore no ‘Antarctic government’ as such. 
Instead the region is governed by an international system known as the Antarctic 
Treaty System that currently has 47 participating states, 45 of which have ratified the 
Antarctic Treaty.1 
 
This system has functioned effectively for the past 45 years.  But that is not to say that 
it has not had to weather both internal and external challenges.   These challenges 
have even led some to argue that the system should be replaced by an international 
institution, such as the United Nations. However, this threat to the system has yet to 
eventuate. 
 
New challenges to the system always seem to be emerging. This thesis looks at the 
response of the Antarctic Treaty System to its latest challenge, bioprospecting. 
Bioprospecting efforts are those which involve the search for novel biodiversity, 
whose component parts may then be utilised in a product or process and developed for 
commercialisation.  Scientists’ recent realisation of Antarctica’s potential as a source 
of unique biodiversity has aroused growing interest in the continent and its 
                                                 
1 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 
June 1961) (‘Antarctic Treaty’). 
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surrounding marine environment. This interest has reawakened Antarctic challenges 
similar to those presented in the days of sealing and whaling, in the negotiations of a 
fisheries conservation and management agreement, in the management of the tourism 
industry and in the negotiations of a minerals extraction regime.  
 
It appears that this latest challenge will not simply go away, as global 
commercialisation as a result of bioprospecting supports a lucrative industry. As a 
commercial enterprise, pharmaceutical products developed from globally sourced 
natural products for the cancer market alone were worth $US16 billion in 1998.2 In 
2005, it is estimated that this market will be worth a staggering $US24 billion.3 Not 
since the late 1970s debate on Antarctic mineral resource extraction have the 
commercial stakes been so high.  Even the fishing and tourism industry may pale in 
comparison to the commercial and therefore economic potential of a bioprospecting 
industry developing from Antarctic-derived natural products and processes. 
 
The real legal challenge to the system then, stems from the obligations as stated in the 
Antarctic Treaty, the lack of a recognised sovereign for the region and the current 
global debates surrounding benefit-sharing from and access to the world’s natural 
resources. The issue is further complicated because of the conflicting uses for 
Antarctica and multiple threats to this unique environment.  These include the value 
of the region for scientific research; the increasing value of the region in economic 
terms; and the value of Antarctica, including its intrinsic value and wilderness value,4 
as recognised in the Protocol for Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
1991.5  This presents the Antarctic Treaty state parties with a complicated issue for a 
region with conflicting uses and multiple threats.   
 
Bioprospecting-related research associated with National Antarctic Programmes has 
been undertaken since the late 1980s and are currently taking place there. Already, 
                                                 
2 Murray Munro, ‘Biodiversity and Bioprospecting in Antarctica’ (Presentation delivered at the 
Graduate Certificate in Antarctic Studies Programme, Christchurch, 9 December 2003). 
3 Ibid. 
4 See generally, David Leary, ‘Bioprospecting and the genetic resources of hydrothermal vents on the 
high seas: What is the existing legal position, where are we heading and what are our options?’ (Paper 
presented at the High Seas Conference, Dunedin, 28-29 November 2003). 
5 The Protocol for Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 
1991, 30 ILM 1991 (entered into force 14 January 1998) (‘Protocol’). 
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some 92 patents referring to Antarctic organisms, or to molecules extracted from 
them, have been filed in the US and a further 62 patents have been filed in Europe.6 
Discussion of bioprospecting, however, has only been formally, and briefly, discussed 
in the context of the Antarctic Treaty System since 2001.  
 
Bioprospecting in the Antarctic is the single most urgent issue that has challenged the 
effective operation of the Antarctic Treaty System since the adoption (and subsequent 
abandonment) of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources7 
(CRAMRA) in the late 1980s.  Understanding the legal implications of allowing this 
activity to continue in the region is of critical importance to the Antarctic Treaty 
System.  It is the goal of this thesis to contribute to and encourage formal debate of 
the issue and to provide a basic structure for that debate.  The thesis will also propose 
legal solutions to the problems presented based on interpretation of Antarctic Treaty 
law and current international law principles. 
 
1 Legal Questions to be Considered 
 
This thesis will examine the legal implications of bioprospecting in the Antarctic. The 
issues can be broadly addressed within three questions.  
 
The first question is: ‘Is bioprospecting a legitimate activity within the Antarctic 
Treaty area?’  While bioprospecting is already taking place in the Antarctic Treaty 
area, there is no agreed definition of the activity and there has been little formal 
debate concerning its legality within the confines of the Antarctic Treaty System.  
Bioprospecting has at times been labelled as a commercial activity that is outside the 
boundaries of scientific research and which therefore is in breach of one of the two 
primary objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. For this reason it is important to examine 
the Article II and III Antarctic Treaty obligations regarding cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica; and Article I obligations regarding peaceful purposes. 
While these objectives have been relatively easy to maintain under the control of 
national Antarctic research programmes, the obligation becomes more difficult to 
                                                 
6 Ian Sample, ‘Cold rush threatens pristine Antarctic’, The Guardian (UK), 2 February 2004, The 
Week, 1. 
7 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources, opened for signature on 25 November 
1988, 27 ILM (1988) (not entered into force) (‘CRAMRA’). 
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regulate or enforce if private expeditions are launched. Cooperation under the 
Antarctic Treaty calls for the free availability of information, something which 
intellectual property right protection (compensation for an activity such as 
bioprospecting) may breach. Bioprospecting acts and activities may also cause harm 
to the environment or may have an environmental impact that is inconsistent with 
strict environmental protection mechanisms that are currently in place in the Antarctic 
Treaty area.  
 
Answering this first question involves an examination of the Antarctic Treaty System, 
consideration of the definition of bioprospecting itself, a review of intellectual 
property rights and their function, and a review of the discussions regarding 
bioprospecting to date within the Antarctic Treaty fora.  These are explored primarily 
in Part I and Part II of this thesis. 
 
The second question is: ‘What are the significant legal challenges that the Antarctic 
Treaty System would face if it allowed bioprospecting to continue in the Antarctic 
Treaty area?’ This question is complicated by the disputed sovereignty situation 
which exists in the Antarctic, including the Southern Ocean marine region covered by 
the high seas exception in Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty.  Thus, an exploration of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in Antarctica is important, including an examination of 
the effects of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and the impact of developing 
international principles on the utilisation of global natural resources.  
 
The issues regarding this second question are primarily presented in Part III of this 
thesis. 
 
The final question is: ‘If bioprospecting in the Antarctic is deemed a legitimate 
activity, how might issues such as access to, and benefit-sharing from, exploitation of 
resources be regulated?’ While the access question clearly overlaps with the 
discussions on sovereignty, both access and benefit-sharing also raise questions about 
the internationalisation of Antarctica, the debates regarding Antarctica as a global 
commons and the institutions and legal instruments that may be required to regulate 
any commercial activity in the Antarctic region.  This may require the negotiation of a 
new convention or measure within the Antarctic Treaty System, or regulation may be 
  5
   
possible within the context of, or by amendment to, one of the current legal 
instruments.  
 
The issues related to the third question posed are explored in Parts III and IV of this 
thesis. 
 
One may ask ‘Why bother?’ That is, why should there be any debate or legal 
discussion surrounding bioprospecting in the Antarctic? After all, the activity is 
already taking place in the region. The answer to the ‘Why bother’ question is easy; it 
is that, while an unlikely possibility, bioprospecting could arguably bring down the 
Antarctic Treaty System and may involve regulation from organisations outside of the 
system. This is an echo of the problems surrounding minerals exploitation from the 
1980s and once again challenges the robustness8 of the Antarctic Treaty System.   
 
Bioprospecting is just the latest example of, at times, many conflicting uses of the 
area. Other uses include scientific research, tourism, and marine fisheries.  These 
activities and their associated impacts in turn pose an as yet unquantified threat to the 
region, including its biodiversity.  Utilizing Antarctic resources is complicated and 
consideration of the issue involves legal, political, environmental and ethical 
discussions and decisions that will require open, formal discussion within the 
Antarctic Treaty System. 
 
B Defining ‘Antarctica’ 
 
This thesis begins by reviewing the development and current content of the Antarctic 
Treaty System, the governing regime for the Antarctic region. 
 
Difficulties immediately arise even as one begins to consider what is meant by 
‘Antarctica’. There appears to be no universally accepted definition of ‘Antarctica’ or 
‘Antarctic’9; even at the Washington Conference10 of 1959 there was no agreement on 
                                                 
8 Cornelis van der Lugt, ‘An international environmental regime for the Antarctic: critical 
investigations’ (1997) 33 (186) Polar Record 223, 224. 
9 See William M Bush, Antarctica and International Law (1982) vol 1, 64-65. 
10 Conference on Antarctica (Washington, DC) 15 October 1959 – 1 December 1959. 
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the definition of these two terms.11  For the purposes of this thesis ‘Antarctic’ and the 
‘Antarctic region’ are both defined utilising the Antarctic Treaty limits – [therefore 
the Antarctic is the area defined by the Antarctic Treaty as] ‘the area south of 60o 
South Latitude, including all ice shelves…’12 
 
The term ‘Antarctica’ on the other hand is usually used when referring to the 
continent itself.  This would include ‘the continent, together with the islands rising 
from the continental block…lying almost wholly within the Antarctic Circle.’13 For 
the purposes of this thesis, an attempt has been made to confine the term ‘Antarctica’ 
to the Antarctic continent, off-shore islands and the Antarctic ice shelves. 
 
The Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR) defines ‘Antarctic’ simply 
as the area bounded by the Antarctic Convergence.14  The Convergence is a biological 
boundary which is constantly shifting, making it an impractical legal boundary. 
However, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
198015 (CCAMLR) establishes as its territorial scope the area south of coordinates 
which roughly approximate to the Antarctic Convergence.16  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the area referred to as the ‘Southern Ocean’ will be defined as the marine area 
south of the Antarctic Convergence and/or the coordinates, as listed in CCAMLR 
which roughly approximate it. It therefore consists of a conglomeration of large parts 
of the South Pacific, South Atlantic, and South Indian oceans each with its own 
distinct attributes.17  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, all areas including the islands of the Sub-Antarctic 
region which are not the subject of disputed sovereignty are excluded from these 
discussions unless specifically referred to otherwise. 
 
                                                 
11 See, eg, comments by the United Kingdom in document UK0511955B and Argentina in document 
AR30071940 in Bush, above n 9. 
12 Antarctic Treaty, art VI. 
13 Mary Trewby (ed), Antarctica: an Encyclopedia from Abbott Ice Shelf to zooplankton (2002) 19. 
14 SCAR, Constitution, Procedures and Structure of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
(1958) s 1. 
15 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for signature on 20 
May 1980, 19 ILM (1980) (entered into force 7 April 1982) (‘CCAMLR’). 
16 CCAMLR, art I (4). 
17 Trewby, above n 13, 176. 
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C Defining ‘Bioprospecting’ 
 
1 No agreed definition 
 
Internationally there is no universally agreed definition of ‘bioprospecting’. While the 
activity builds on traditional techniques employed by humans since civilization began, 
advancements in technology have raised the activity to a new level over a relatively 
short period of time. At present there are no international legal agreements that 
specifically define or use the term ‘bioprospecting’.18 Even the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 199219 (CBD) and The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit-sharing20 (Bonn Guidelines), recently created legal instruments 
whose objectives involve the protection of biological diversity and regulation of 
access to and benefits derived from living resources, do not use the term. Arguably 
the lack of international agreement on a definition has done little to assist the 
Antarctic Treaty System in composing a comprehensive definition of bioprospecting.  
 
A clear definition of the activity is important to Antarctic Treaty parties for a number 
of reasons. First, without an adequate definition there is difficulty understanding the 
breath and extent of the activity currently being carried out in the Antarctic. This 
makes adequate regulation of the activity and development of robust policy 
impossible. Second, any definition of the activity should clarify questions surrounding 
whether the activity can primarily be viewed as falling within the category of 
scientific research or within the context of commercialization. This distinction is 
critical within the Antarctic Treaty System, as the system prioritises activities for the 
benefit of scientific cooperation in the Antarctic region and not for the promotion or 
advancement of commercial opportunities. While commercialization is generally 
defined as ‘to exploit for profit’,21 in the Antarctic, commercialisation is also 
synonymous with non-governmental activities. Such activities within the Antarctic 
Treaty System are generally deemed inferior to those associated with scientific 
research carried out as part of National Antarctic programmes.  
                                                 
18 See Donald Rothwell, ‘Bioprospecting in Antarctica under the Antarctic Treaty System’ in Alan 
Hemmings and Michelle Rogan-Finnemore (eds), Antarctic Bioprospecting (2005) (In press). 
19 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature on 5 June 1992, 31 ILM (1992) (entered 
into force 29 December 1993) (‘CBD’). 
20 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization, COP VI Decision VI/24  (‘Bonn Guidelines’). 
21 Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1995. 
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Recently, bioprospecting is being viewed as ‘a broad concept embracing a number of 
phases to investigate a region’s biodiversity and to collect samples of biological 
organisms’.22 An exploration of the term and the activity, and a survey of the level of 
activity currently undertaken in the Antarctic, is therefore necessary to understanding 
the legal implications of bioprospecting there.  
 
2 Bioprospecting versus Biodiscovery 
 
While there is no agreed universal definition for the term bioprospecting, some have 
suggested that since the activity can be broken down into a number of phases, the 
definition and nomenclature should also be broken down into component parts.  The 
suggestion has been made that the activity be characterised by two distinct terms: 
‘biodiscovery’ and ‘bioprospecting’.23  
 
Biodiscovery would encompass phase one, which is the phase of scientific research 
into a region’s biodiversity including sample collection, where generally the initial 
size of any collected sample is small, and the environmental impact is minimal.  In 
some cases, this phase may utilise ex-situ samples that were collected from a region 
for another purpose and are no longer needed for that purpose, or have been described 
and archived. This type of ex-situ utilisation would therefore only include the initial 
collection in Antarctica or the Southern Ocean (for the initial purpose), and it poses no 
new threat as to environmental impact being there is no return trip to Antarctica for 
sample collection. The exception could be unless any isolated natural chemical cannot 
be synthesised in a laboratory. 
 
                                                 
22 Julia Jabour-Green, ‘Bioprospecting in the High Seas’, (Report from the Bioprospecting in the High 
Seas Conference, Dunedin) 28-29 November 2003, 7. 
23 See, eg, Julia Jabour-Green and Dianne Nicol, ‘Bioprospecting in Areas outside of National 
Jurisdiction: Antarctica and the Southern Ocean’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 76, 
78. 
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Bioprospecting would cover the second and subsequent phases, including the 
recollection if required, of the biological organism for the purpose of further 
investigation. Jabour-Green and Nicol24 describe subsequent phases along the lines of:  
 
 Isolation, Characterisation and Culture;  
 Screening for…Activity; and  
 [Commercialisation including] Development of Product, Patenting, Trials, Sales and 
Marketing.  
 
Bioprospecting projects require many years lead-in time before any commercialisation 
can be realised, the initial phase of the activity (phase one) is simply the start of any 
process that may produce a commercial outcome.25 The distinction into the two 
categories of phases, implies that each phase has different objectives, different 
outcomes, and different requirements attached to them.26 
 
For convenience and because there are legal implications of all phases of the activity, 
the term bioprospecting is used throughout this thesis to include all stages in the 
process unless specifically stated otherwise.  It should be noted however, that 
currently, only the search and discovery phase is undertaken in the Antarctic region 
itself.  Any subsequent phases of the activity are carried out, usually in the home 
country of the researcher. 
 
3 Relationship with Biodiversity 
 
The initial target of bioprospecting is the biodiversity of a region, including plants, 
animals and micro-organisms, in a range of environments. The likelihood of isolating 
a novel or useful biochemical compound increases with biodiversity.  That is, the 
greater the biodiversity studied the more likelihood of a ‘hit’.27  Therefore 
bioprospecting efforts are often linked with efforts to understand the biodiversity of 
                                                 
24 Ibid, 85-87; Jabour-Green and Nicol define four phases in the process: 1 Sample Collection; 2 
Isolation, Characterisation and Culture; 3 Screening for Pharmaceutical Activity; 4 Development of 
Product, Patenting, Trials, Sales and Marketing. 
25 Roberta Farrell and Shona Duncan, ‘Uniqueness of Antarctica and Potential for Commercial 
Success’ (Paper presented at the Bioprospecting in Antarctica Workshop, Christchurch, 7 - 8 April 
2003) 8. 
26 Jabour-Green, above n 22, 7. 
27 Munro, above n 2.   
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an area.28  While Antarctica’s known biodiversity is low, it is predicted that at least 
the waters of the Southern Ocean contain a diverse range of micro-organisms and 
recently the Antarctic ice sheet has been shown to contain living micro-organisms.  
Also hot spots around volcanic areas such as Mount Erebus are likely to be biodiverse 
regions.   
 
Of particular importance to bioprospectors are organisms that survive in extreme 
environments. The organisms that thrive in the often frozen ground and brackish 
internal waters of Antarctica and in the surrounding marine environment of the 
Southern Ocean, do so because they have developed ‘unique biological coping 
strategies’.29 Often it is these unique coping strategies that may be isolated and 
developed to address a specific target or purpose. 
 
Biodiversity then is important for bioprospecting. 
‘Biological diversity’ (or biodiversity) for the purposes of the CBD is defined as 
meaning:  
‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of 
which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems.’30 
Researchers have yet to fully investigate this uniqueness for the Antarctic region. 
Because it is poorly known, the biota and especially the micro-organisms of 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean hold an interest to biologists and chemists but also 
interest the biotechnology industry.31  Biotechnology is also defined in the CBD as 
meaning ‘any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, 
or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.’32  
                                                 
28See generally Farrell and Duncan, above n  25; See also, ibid. 
29 Sample, above n 6, 1. 
30 CBD, art 2. 
31 See John Bowman, ‘Antarctica a Global “Hot Spot”: Biodiversity and Biotechnology” (Paper 
presented at Looking South-Managing Technology, Opportunities and the Global Environment, The 
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering Symposium, Australia, November 
2001). 
32 CBD, art 2. 
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For biotechnology companies the probability of a ‘hit’, that is, the probability that a 
natural product sample contains a compound that can be commercially developed into 
a useful product is wholly dependent on the number of samples obtained and, most 
importantly, the biodiversity of the samples and the biochemical diversity within.  As 
stated above, the more novel the biodiversity investigated the more likely that 
something useful will be found.   
 
4 Biota of the Antarctic 
 
The Antarctic region constitutes a large part of the world, nearly 10% in surface area. 
The continent itself hosts little avifauna and no terrestrial mammals.33  Nevertheless, 
the organisms that do survive on the continent and in the Southern Ocean are among 
the most highly adapted animals on Earth, making it an important location for 
bioprospectors.34  
 
It is not the goal of this thesis to investigate each and every individual species that 
occurs on Antarctica and in the Southern Ocean, but a brief summary as to the flora 
and fauna of the region will be a useful guide as to the likely bioprospecting targets 
and the impact that bioprospecting may have throughout the region. 
 
Although the words ‘Antarctica’ and ‘Southern Ocean’ may generate images of two 
broad distinct environments and convey the idea that they contain little to no range of 
conditions or diversity, both Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are themselves 
environments which reflect a range of conditions. 
 
Of particular importance for biodiversity and therefore for bioprospecting is the 
Southern Ocean. While supporting a relatively short food chain the marine ecosystem 
includes eight species of whales, six species of seals, numerous species of fish, krill, a 
diverse range of benthic creatures and hundreds maybe thousands of micro-
organisms.35 These marine animals consists of creatures capable of living in 
                                                 
33 Hadoram Shirihai, et al, The complete guide to Antarctic wildlife: birds and marine mammals of the 
Antarctic continent and the Southern Ocean (2002) 7. 
34 Ibid. 
35 SCAR, Constitution, Procedures and Structure of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
(1958) s 1. 
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conditions where temperatures are actually below freezing but the high salinity of the 
water prevents it from freezing solid. In response to these environmental conditions 
some fish have livers that are capable of producing a protein-carbohydrate that has the 
characteristics of an anti-freeze protein. This protein has already by isolated and 
patented (WO 01/44275) and is used in ice cream to make it smoother.36 
 
Antarctica itself provides several differing environments and is not simply one solid 
block of ice with a few exposed rocks.  Hot vent areas have already been found to be 
rich areas of biodiversity include Mount Erebus and Mount Melbourne both in the 
Ross Dependency Region.37 The largest area of Antarctic exposed rocks is in the Dry 
Valleys (also within the Ross Dependency Region), while glaciers, fresh and brackish 
lakes, seasonal streams, and ice covered deep lakes, such as Lake Vostok, provide a 
range of diverse environments. Even the sewage outfall at the Amundsen-Scott South 
Pole Station has been a prospecting target.38  
 
The Sub-Antarctic Island region may also provide a highly biodiverse and unique 
zone. However, as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, this research will not 
include those Islands for two important reasons: First, most of the Sub-Antarctic 
Islands are by definition above the 60 degrees south latitude line and therefore, legally 
defined as outside of the Antarctic region; and second, all of the Sub-Antarctic Islands 
are claimed by states whose claims are undisputed and therefore there is no argument 
as to the sovereignty of the island or island group. Thus the permitting or the 
regulation of bioprospecting activities in the Sub-Antarctic Islands is an issue which 





                                                 
36 Barry Fox, ‘Cold smoothie’, New Scientist (England), 1 Sept 2001, 23. 
37 The Ross Dependency Region was established by New Zealand Order in Council, 30 July 1923, 
which defines its boundaries as ‘all the islands and territories in Antarctica between the 160th degree of 
east longitude and the 150th degree of west longitude and south of 60 degrees south 
latitude…therefore, comprises the Ross Ice Shelf, the Balleny Islands, Scott Island and adjacent islands 
and the landmass within these longitudes to the point of their convergence at the South Pole.’  
38 See, eg, Report from the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP IV), July 9-13, (2001) St. 
Petersburg, Russia; The prospecting was for meteorites but it does provide another environment where 
micro-organisms are found. 
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D State-level definitions: Australia, New Zealand and the United States  
 
Discussion regarding regulation of bioprospecting is not only a recent phenomenon 
for the Antarctic, but also worldwide.  Therefore, it is difficult to rely on any state’s 
national policy, guidelines or legislation to assist in providing an adequate definition 
for use within the Antarctic Treaty System.  Here, the current level of national 
discussions for Australia, New Zealand and the United States are presented as 
examples of the stages of development of bioprospecting policy at a national level 




Australia has recently finalised documentation39 specifically dealing with 
bioprospecting in Australian territory. While the report includes reference to 
Australian Antarctic Territory, it does not specifically address bioprospecting in the 
Antarctic.  It is noted in the report that there is no standard definition and ‘there are 
different views on how far bioprospecting extends down the commercialisation 
path.’40 Their policy document defines bioprospecting in its broader sense to reflect 
what it called common usage as: 
 
‘The search for valuable chemical compounds and genetic materials from plants, 
animals and micro-organisms. The term is sometimes used more narrowly to refer only 
to the initial collection of biological material for subsequent use for biodiscovery’.41   
 
The term biodiscovery is then defined in the Australian document as: ‘The extraction 
and testing of molecules for biological activity, identification of compounds with 
promise for further development, and research on the molecular basis for the 
biological activity.’42  
 
                                                 
39 Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, House of Representatives 
Parliament of Australia, Bioprospecting: Discoveries changing the future (2001). 
40 Ibid, para 1.7. 
41 Ibid, para 1.8. 
42 Ibid, glossary. 
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The Australian document, in its discussion regarding ownership of biological 
materials, points out that ownership of biological resources is unclear and particularly 
complex in both the marine and Antarctic environments.43 
 
Complicated issues in Australia include issues involving compensation for traditional 
knowledge, benefit-sharing with indigenous people and ownership or stewardship of 
native flora and fauna.  
 
2 New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has only in within the past two years begun formal discussions on 
bioprospecting in New Zealand territory and has recently produced a discussion 
document.44 That discussion document defines bioprospecting generally as: ‘the 
examination of biological resources for features that may be of value for commercial 
development.’45 This is a broad definition, encompassing all biological resources 
whether in-situ or ex-situ, however limiting the search to biological resources rather 
than simply all biological materials. The document does not however define 
biological resources and unlike the Australian document, it does not include any 
reference to Antarctica, nor to the Southern Ocean, the Sub-Antarctic Islands or the 
Ross Dependency Region. 
 
Today government discussions of bioprospecting in New Zealand are in hiatus.  It is 
believed the government has been too occupied with seabed and foreshore discussions 
and others have noted that the Waitangi Claim 262 concerning indigenous flora and 
fauna may be a stumbling block to bioprospecting policy, especially as regards access 
and benefit-sharing.  After considerable discussion of the document which included a 
public consultation meeting in Wellington in February 2003, a representative of the 
Ministry of Economic Development (the government ministry leading the 
bioprospecting discussions for New Zealand) notes, ‘the Ministry has consulted on 
and considered the bioprospecting policy.  Policy advice is currently with Ministers 
                                                 
43 Ibid, para 3.32. 
44 New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, Bioprospecting in New Zealand: Discussing the 
Options (2002). 
45 Ibid, 3. 
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for consideration.’46  This is how the situation stands even almost two years later, so 
that it appears that New Zealand will not have a domestic bioprospecting policy or 
guidelines any time soon; should there even be one, it does not appear from the 
current draft that the final document will include reference to the Antarctic or 
specifically the Ross Dependency Region. 
 
3 United States 
 
There is agreed policy in the United States concerning domestic bioprospecting. The 
US National Park Service in a document concerning Yellowstone National Park 
geothermal prospecting defined bioprospecting as ‘scientific research that looks for a 
useful application, process or product in nature.’47 Yellowstone is an area where 
researchers have been collecting biological samples from the park’s hot springs since 
1898 and it is the world’s first area designated as a national park.  
 
The United States definition is very broad and although appearing to be grounded in 
science and the quest for knowledge, the use of the phrase ‘useful application, product 
or process’ is verbatim from United States Intellectual Property and Patenting 
legislation48 and clearly conveys a wish to capitalise on a valuable commercial 
activity. 
 
In the case of Yellowstone National Park, a contract49 was prepared and signed 
between the US Federal Government and Diversa Corporation, a San Diego, 
California, biotechnology company.  The contract gave Diversa the right to 
bioprospect Yellowstone National Park in exchange for an agreement to share in any 
potential financial returns.  The contract sparked a lawsuit50 which proposed that any 
such contract would be contrary to proper management of such public resources. The 
US Federal Court upheld the contract agreement. 
 
                                                 
46 Email from Daniel Brass to Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, 1 Dec 2003. 
47 Diversa-Yellowstone Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, United States, 17 August 
1997. 
48 United States Code 35, ss101-103; See also, United States Constitution, art 1, s 8.  
49 Diversa, above n 47.  
50 Edmonds Institute v Babbitt, Civil Action 98-561 (RCL), United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, 2000. 
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E The Antarctic Treaty System  
 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) refers to ‘the whole complex of international 
legal instruments and arrangements made for the purpose of coordinating relations 
among states with respect to Antarctica’.51  The genesis of the phrase is credited to the 
Argentine United Nations Ambassador who first introduced it in 1973,52 the phrase 
has since been codified.53 Today this phrase is commonly used and is legally defined 
in the most recent ATS instrument, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty 199154 (Protocol). The Protocol provides that Antarctic Treaty 
System means ‘the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under that Treaty, its 
associated separate international instruments in force and the measures in effect under 
those instruments’.55 The Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System, although not a 
legal document as such, also includes within the ATS ‘the results of Meetings of 
Experts, the decisions of Special Consultative Meetings and, at a non-governmental 
level, reflects the work of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).’56  
 
While the component parts of the Antarctic Treaty System cover a range of Antarctic 
issues, the ‘three pillars’57 of the ATS are often said to be: 
 
1. Safeguarding peace; 
2. Ensuring freedom of scientific research; and 
3. Protection of the Antarctic environment. 
 
The first two pillars were proposed at the genesis of the Antarctic Treaty System in 
1959, while the third pillar is reflected in subsequent Antarctic legal instruments 
beginning in 1964. 
 
                                                 
51 Harlan Cohan (ed), Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (9th ed, 2002) 1. 
52 See generally, A Jackson, et al, On the Antarctic Horizon: proceedings of the International 
Symposium on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty System (1996). 
53 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting X, Recommendation X-1, 1979. 
54 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature on 4 October 
1991, 30 ILM (1991) (entered into force 14 January 1998) (‘Protocol’). 
55 Protocol, art 1(e). 
56 Cohen, above n 51, 1. 
57 Cornelis Johannes Bastmeijer, The Antarctic environmental protocol and its domestic legal 
implementation (2003) 12. 
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Central to the Antarctic Treaty System is the Antarctic Treaty 195958 (Antarctic 
Treaty) which was negotiated in under two years and signed at the Washington 
Conference. The Treaty is the core legal instrument which provides the foundation for 
the development and evolution of the system.  The Treaty’s primary purpose was to 
establish rules and procedures for the Antarctic region, so that scientific cooperation 
that was established and demonstrated as part of the International Geophysical Year 
(IGY, 1957-58) could continue without discord amongst interested states.  The 
Antarctic Treaty allowed for continued cooperation amongst states and has been a 
successful foundation instrument for the management of Antarctic affairs.  Even at the 
time of its negotiation however, it was not envisaged that the Treaty would be the 
only basis for the management of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, it is the 
Antarctic Treaty System which has allowed the Treaty to have a much greater role 
than its original terms allowed.  The Treaty was merely the start of an evolving 
regime that would be established to cope with a variety of management issues which 
the Antarctic Treaty itself was unable to deal with, or which, at the time of its signing, 
had not been foreseen or contemplated.  According to Watts, the system’s ‘hallmarks 
appear to be institutional caution, coupled with institutional accretion.’59 
 
The component parts of the Antarctic Treaty System are discussed in the next 
sections. 
 
1 The Antarctic Treaty 195960 
 
Much has been written about the Antarctic Treaty (Appendix 1) itself since its 
negotiation and subsequent ratification by the twelve61 original signatory states.  In 
the 1950s the backdrop of the Cold War, the success of the IGY and the recognition of 
the strategic value of the Antarctic region led to the negotiation of the Antarctic 
Treaty.  
 
                                                 
58 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 
June 1961) (‘Antarctic Treaty’). 
59 Sir Arthur Watts, International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (1992) 12. 
60 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 
June 1961) (‘Antarctic Treaty’). 
61 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United 
Kingdom, United States and (former) USSR.  
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The Antarctic Treaty has been called ‘unique’62 referring in part to its relative 
simplicity.  Fourteen articles and a preamble have managed effectively to control a 
geographic region which occupies one tenth of the Earth’s surface. The Treaty’s two 
key objectives are stated initially in the preamble as: One, the use of Antarctica 
exclusively for peaceful purposes; and Two, support for international cooperation in 
scientific investigation in Antarctica. The original parties to the Antarctic Treaty 
agreed in the preamble statements that these objectives were in the interest of all 
mankind. These objectives are directly supported in the Antarctic Treaty in Articles I, 
II, and III.  They are indirectly supported primarily by Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII. 
All of these Articles are discussed in more detail below.  
 
The Treaty’s area of operation is stated as being ‘the area south of 60o south latitude, 
including all ice shelves…’63 The article also presents a specific exclusion with regard 
to the high seas enclosed by the 60o south latitude line saying ‘nothing in the present 
Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of 
any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area.’64 
 
Other articles of the Treaty set up important administrative functions, including 
Article IX which outlines the designation of contracting party status primarily for the 
purpose of the yearly Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs).    
 
The Antarctic Treaty is by virtue of its Article XIII (1) open for accession by any 
member state of the United Nations, or by any other state which may be invited to 
accede. Today, forty-five states have ratified the Antarctic Treaty (Appendix 2).  The 
Treaty is often called successful, especially for maintaining non-militarization and 
denuclearization of the Antarctic region, as well as promoting scientific cooperation.65  
The Antarctic Treaty confers no rights and consists only of obligations;66 it also 
contains little more than moral sanctions to ensure compliance and observance to its 
                                                 
62 Gerald Schatz, ‘Transnational Science and Technology in the absence of Defined Sovereignty: 
Development in the Polar Regions and in Legally Similar Situations’ in Gerald Schatz (ed), Science 
Technology and Sovereignty in the Polar Regions (1974), 1. 
63 Antarctic Treaty, art VI. 
64 Ibid. 
65 John Heap (ed), Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (8th ed, 1994) 107; See also, Christopher 
Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: the Antarctic regime and environmental protection (1998) 
21. 
66 See generally, FM Auburn, The Ross Dependency (1972) 33. 
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principles. In addition it also lacks effective arbitration procedures and provisions for 
economic exploitation.67 
 
(a) Important Articles of the Antarctic Treaty for the Purposes of Bioprospecting 
Discussions 
 
For the purposes of any discussions regarding resource exploitation in the Antarctic 
and specifically to provide background to any discussion surrounding bioprospecting 
activities in the region, attention is drawn to a key articles of the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
(i) Article I  
 
Article I is obvious in its initial statement that ‘Antarctica shall be used for peaceful 
purposes only.’  While no definition of peaceful purposes is given, the article lists 
prohibitions as examples in support of the peaceful purposes objective.  These include 
prohibition of any measures of a military nature such as the establishment of armed 
forces bases and related fortifications, the prohibition of carrying out of military 
manoeuvres and the prohibition of the testing of any type of weapons (in Antarctica).  
This was an important objective for the original 12 signatory parties given the 
political situation at the time of signing in 1959. 
 
Article V directly supports the Article I objective, specifically prohibiting nuclear 
explosions in the Antarctic Treaty area, an activity of primary concern to the two 
superpowers at the time and clearly an activity that would breach the peaceful 
purposes objective.  
 
(ii) Articles II and III  
 
Articles II and III are here considered together, as while Article II succinctly states the 
second objective of the Antarctic Treaty, it is Article III which directly supports this 
objective by defining ways in which the objective can be effectively promoted.  At the 
time of the negotiations of the Antarctic Treaty, Articles II and III were viewed as 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
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being the minimum the parties could ‘get away with and still end up with a credible 
Treaty’.68  
 
Article II states ‘Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and co-operation 
toward that end, as applied in the International Geophysical Year, shall continue…’ 
The reference to ‘as applied in the International Geophysical Year’ (IGY) are 
important for at least two reasons.  First, the IGY allowed for the valid participation of 
the Soviet Union in the Antarctic for the first time in the legitimate name of science.69 
Inclusion on this basis was critical and it was an affirmation of the apolitical nature of 
IGY activities.  Second, there were obvious mutual benefits of closing the Antarctic to 
a Soviet military presence,70 even while continuing to provide access for research 
purposes for all participants. 
 
The success of the IGY presented a possibility that political disputes could be 
removed from the region by devoting the area exclusively to peaceful purposes. It also 
presented at least a temporary solution to the Antarctic territory problem, in that 
promotion of scientific investigation and research in the region could be used to 
underline the international value and significance of the region.  In the United States 
government’s opinion this would ‘diminish the status of national territorial 
pretensions and also illustrate the limited nature of the contribution any one nation 
could make towards the solution of most Antarctic problems.’71   
 
Freedom of scientific investigation therefore was, and continues to be, a principal 
object of the Antarctic Treaty which is also evidenced by other articles of the 
Antarctic Treaty and its preamble. The scientific community seized a unique 
opportunity when the political community recognized the advantages of scientific 
cooperation in the region as a way of avoiding political conflicts and perhaps 
violence.72 
 
                                                 
68 John Heap, ‘Cooperation in the Antarctic: a quarter of a century’s experience’ in Vicuna (ed) 
Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, legal and political issues (1983) 103, 105. 
69 Robert Swan, Australia in the Antarctic: interest, activity and endeavour (1961) 275. 
70 See Susan Buck, The Global Commons: an introduction (1998) 57. 
71 Swan, above n 69. 
72 See Buck, above n 70, 56-58. 
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Article III directly supports the Article II objective by providing examples of how this 
objective could be promoted, stating: 
 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting 
Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable: 
 
a. information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be 
exchanged to permit maximum economy of and efficiency of operations;   
 
b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions 
and stations; 
 
c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and 
made freely available. 
 
 
The success of the IGY meant that parties envisioned that these requirements would 
be easy to maintain. It was not envisioned however, that the proviso for the free 
availability and exchange of scientific observations and results would prove 
problematic in any commercial era if one was ever to develop. In fact, little to no 
attention was directed towards the prospect of commercial operations in the region. It 
is ‘section c’ that requires the greatest level of consideration in the context of the legal 
implications of bioprospecting in the Antarctic, as it is believed that the commercial 
nature of that activity prevents observations and results from being exchanged and 
made freely available. Further consideration of this issue is therefore discussed in Part 
II of this thesis. 
 
(iii) Article IV 
 
While the two key objectives of the Antarctic Treaty as discussed above are often 
cited as critical to the success of the Antarctic Treaty, it is Article IV which deals with 
territorial claims to Antarctica that was undoubtedly ‘the political key’73 which was 
critical to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in the first place. Article IV was 
essential to appease all signatory parties each with a varying view of the Antarctic 
territorial claims. Therefore while it only indirectly supported the two key objectives 
of the Treaty, the absence of this Article would arguably have resulted in no treaty at 
all. 
                                                 
73 Christopher Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty (1972) 10. 
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Article IV is, therefore, the critical element in the Antarctic Treaty, often called the 
‘cornerstone’74 of the Treaty because it addresses the conundrum of disputed 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.  Article IV was, initially, and today remains, 
critical to the success of the Antarctic Treaty and therefore the Antarctic Treaty 
System. Joyner calls it the legal ‘flexi-glue that allows the Treaty to work for 
governments who hold diametrically opposed positions on the contentious question of 
territorial sovereignty over the continent’.75   
 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty begins by addressing the situation negotiators to 
that Treaty were presented with in 1959, namely the status of the territorial claims and 
the views and positions of the non-claimant states at that point in time.  Article IV (1) 
reads: 
 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:  
 
a. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or 
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;  
 
b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of 
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a 
result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;  
 
c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition 
or non-recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.  
 
This is a complex provision, once criticised as a ‘purgatory of ambiguity’.76  But this 
criticism, according to Joyner, ignores the chief purpose of Article IV, namely to 
provide a politically workable arrangement for all states involved. 77    
 
The complexity arises from the need to provide protection for varying views and 
positions on sovereignty in Antarctica. For those seven states which asserted a 
territorial claim before 1959 the Article’s section (a) protects their respective claims 
and does not require them to abandon their claim. Section (b) protects the basis of any 
                                                 
74 FM Auburn, Antarctic law and politics (1982) 104. 
75 Joyner, above n 65, 58. 
76 Gillian Triggs, International law and Australian sovereignty in Antarctica (1986) 137. 
77 See generally, Joyner, above n 65, 56-58.  
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claim (without comment as to legitimacy or otherwise) thus protecting not only the 
position of the basis for the territorial claimants, but also those states who have stated 
that they too have a basis of claim and reserve the right to make a future claim.  While 
providing additional protection for the position of the seven claimant states, this 
provision was inserted primarily for the protection of the two states, which while 
saying that they each have a basis for a territorial claim to Antarctica, do not formally 
assert any claim to territory. Finally section (c) allows states that do not recognise any 
or all of the claims, or basis for claims, to become a party to the Treaty without 
jeopardising their position as regards sovereignty in Antarctica. This applied not only 
to non-claimant states but also to those states with overlapping territorial claims.   
 
Article IV was also important to those states that participated in the Washington 
negotiations which, at the time of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, had neither 
territorial claim nor basis of claim to any portion of Antarctica.  Originally there were 
three such states-clearly a minority among the twelve original signatories.78  Today, 
the seven claimant states represent the minority among the 45 states that are now 
party to the Antarctic Treaty. For every decision made in the Antarctic Treaty forum, 
an internal accommodation must always be made to appease the varying views of this 
diverse group of states. 
 
Article IV, paragraph 2 then goes on to establish rules for the future, that is, beyond 
the condition that existed in 1959, by stating that: 
 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No 
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
 
This makes it clear that the positions of the signatory states with an interest in territory 
in Antarctica, can neither be made worse nor improved by any acts or activities 
undertaken in Antarctica during the currency of the Antarctic Treaty, except in the 
                                                 
78 The seven claimant states are: Argentine, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the 
United Kingdom; In addition the United States and (former) USSR maintain they have a basis of claim, 
but do not make a claim to territory; the three additional original signatories were Japan, South Africa 
and Belgium all of whom had participated in the IGY by carrying out scientific research in Antarctica. 
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case as against any third party state. It also makes it plain that no new assertions to 
territory or extensions can be made by any of the signatories. 
 
This leaves little doubt that the territorial claims to Antarctica continue to persist 
today.  While the issue as to sovereignty remains unresolved the legal operation of the 
territorial claims are held in abeyance by Article IV and the position as it existed in 
1959 has not been legally challenged. The question as to whether the claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica are valid has never been decided upon by 
international arbitration or adjudication. It is within this context that any discussion 
regarding living or non-living resources in the Antarctic must be addressed.  This 
creates complicated issues surrounding access to and ownership of resources which 
will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
(iv) Article VIII 
 
Jurisdiction is a manifestation of state sovereignty, defined as ‘the capacity of a state 
to prescribe, adjudicate and to enforce a rule of law’.79 As a general rule, jurisdiction 
has a territorial basis. Because of the unresolved nature of Antarctic territorial claims, 
issues surrounding jurisdiction are complex, the problem being how to allocate 
jurisdictional powers among the Antarctic Treaty states.  Only Article VIII of the 
Antarctic Treaty makes mention of jurisdiction in Antarctica stating:  
 
‘without prejudice to the respective positions of Contracting Parties relating to 
jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 
1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged…and members of staff 
accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the 
Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions 
occurring while they are in Antarctica…’80 
 
This provision fails to address jurisdictional issues related to persons who are not 
part of a National Antarctic Programme, so that individuals who are part of 
private expeditions to the Antarctic are not covered by this provision.  While 
initially this was not a problem, as all expeditions to Antarctica were state-led 
                                                 
79 The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (2nd ed) (1993) 95. 
80 Antarctic Treaty, art VIII. 
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expeditions, the increase in private expeditions has led to states implementing 
domestic legislation closing the gap and covering these individuals while in the 
region.81  Any application of the general principle of jurisdiction, that is, giving 
claimant states jurisdiction over all persons in their Antarctic claimed territory 
could well ‘give rise immediately and directly to disputes about sovereignty’.82 
 
(v) Article IX 
 
The Antarctic Treaty contained little in the way of institutional provisions when it was 
negotiated and signed.  For example, it deliberately ignored the creation of a treaty 
secretariat. The Antarctic Treaty’s Article IX is the sole crucial provision of an 
institutional nature, providing for the holding of periodic meetings but not being 
prescriptive as to when and, except initially, where they should occur.  Article IX (1) 
simply states that representatives of the ‘Contracting Parties…shall meet at the City of 
Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and 
thereafter at suitable intervals and places…’  After the first meeting in Canberra and 
until 1994 the parties met every second year, rotating among contracting state venues.  
However, since 1994 the parties have met annually, the increase in frequency of 
meetings reflecting the increase in the number of issues of substance that are now 
discussed in the Antarctic Treaty forum.   
 
Article IX (1) stipulates three purposes for the meetings:  
 
1. exchanging information; 
2. consulting together; 
3. formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures in 
furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty. 
 
It is the second purpose that has served as the basis for the accepted title for these now 
annual meetings, referred to as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs).  
Final Reports from each ATCM become the documents that support the evolution of 
                                                 
81 See, eg, for New Zealand, Antarctica Act 1960. 
82 Beeby, above n 73, 11. 
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the system and add to that system.83 Membership and participation at ATCMs are a 
representation of ‘supranational tribunals as a way to accommodate differences but 
acknowledge and reinforce common values.’84 
 
Paragraph 2 of Article IX goes on to establish each contracting parties’ level of 
participation at these meetings, allowing for the plenary body of the institution 
comprising the membership as a whole, but also creating a limited membership 
comprised of contracting parties who will exercise certain important functions central 
to the work of the system.  For the Antarctic Treaty parties this distinction is 
represented by the designation as either a ‘Consultative State’ or a ‘Non-Consultative 
State’.    
 
In order to obtain the ‘higher’ Consultative State status, an Antarctic Treaty signatory 
state must meet certain activity criteria. Specifically the state must ‘demonstrate its 
interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there…’85  
No definition of what ‘substantial scientific research activity’ means is provided, 
however the paragraph lists two illustrative examples: One, establishment of a 
Antarctic scientific station or two, dispatch of a scientific expedition in Antarctica.  
This requirement for substantial scientific research activity only applies to acceding 
states, the original twelve Antarctic Treaty signatories automatically acquiring and 
unqualifiedly retaining Consultative State status regardless of their level of Antarctic 
activity. 
 
In addition to the Antarctic Treaty requirements for obtaining Consultative State 
status, a further qualification has now been established by the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991,86 (Protocol) whereby in order 
for a state to obtain Consultative State status, a signatory state must meet the criteria 
as laid down in the Antarctic Treaty and must also have ratified, accepted and 
approved the Protocol.87 
                                                 
83 Reports from Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings can be found through the Antarctic Treaty 
Secretariat web page at www.ats.org.ar.  
84 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The real new world order’ (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 183, 187. 
85 Antarctic Treaty, art IX (2). 
86 The Protocol for Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 
1991, 30 ILM 1991 (entered into force 14 January 1998) (‘Protocol’). 
87 Protocol, art 22 (4). 
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For those states with a genuine interest in Antarctica, Consultative State status is 
important, as only Consultative States have voting rights and full participation rights 
at ATCMs, this higher status also gives the state an opportunity to host Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meetings.  New signatory states to the Antarctic Treaty System 
have to take the system as they find it, but by obtaining Consultative State status they 
can then seek to change and influence its development. 
 
All other states which have acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, initially have Non-
Consultative State status.  They have observer status at all ATCMs, have the ability to 
prepare and present Information Papers, but do not have voting privileges.  Should a 
Non-Consultative State wish to acquire Consultative State status it must ratify the 
Protocol, meet the requirements of Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty and apply for 
Consultative State status at an ATCM.  It is only then, by consensus of all Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative States, that its higher status may be approved. 
 
2 Recommendations  
 
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty set up the mandate for the formulation and 
implementation of ‘measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the 
Treaty…’88 Paragraph 1 then goes on to list six subjects that may be dealt with by 
way of these measures; these subjects have been divided into four broad categories: 
Operations; Environment; Science; Treaty.  Since the Antarctic Treaty came into 
force in 1961 the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties have agreed to 228 
Recommendations.89  By far the largest number of Antarctic Treaty 
Recommendations fall into the environment category, commencing with The Agreed 
Measures for Flora and Fauna 196490 (Agreed Measures) adopted through 
Recommendation III-8 at ATCM III in Brussels.  
 
                                                 
88 Antarctic Treaty, art IX para 1. 
89 Since 1995 recommendations have been broken down into measures, decisions and resolutions; See 
discussion below. 
90 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Misc. 23 (1965) Cmnd.  
(‘Agreed Measures’). 
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The Antarctic Treaty is relatively silent on the subject of natural resources, because in 
1959 resource issues were not the focus of the parties; the region was more important 
to them from a strategic standpoint. Nevertheless, the non-exhaustive list of 
Consultative State party responsibilities as contained in Article IX of the Antarctic 
Treaty, does include ‘measures regarding the preservation and conservation of living 
resources in Antarctica’.91 The Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties have used 
this Article to support their argument that they have a right to regulate Antarctic living  
resources, more commonly referred to now as natural resources. 
 
On balance, it has been noted that the process of adopting recommended measures has 
worked sufficiently well.92 In the past, however, there was been some debate 
surrounding the legally binding nature of the Recommendations.  Article IX (1) 
Antarctic Treaty refers to representatives of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties 
‘recommending to their governments certain measures…’  Rothwell93 believes that 
this may seem to indicate that such recommendations have no legally binding effect. 
Article IX (4) states that ‘the measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall become 
effective when approved by all the contracting parties’ implying that the 
recommendation itself is not legally binding, but that the measure, once approved, is.   
 
Since 1995 the situation regarding the legal nature of recommendations has been 
clarified, with the Antarctic Treaty parties introducing a hierarchy of importance.  
Recommendations are now broken down into three categories: measures, decisions 
and resolutions.94 Measures are defined as: ‘A text which contains provisions intended 
to be legally binding once it has been approved by all Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties.’95 While a decision is ‘taken by an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting as 
an internal organizational matter…which will be operative at adoption or at such other 
time which may be specified.’96 Finally a resolution is defined as ‘hortatory text 
adopted at an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting’97 The distinction reflected the 
                                                 
91 Antarctic Treaty, art IX (1)(f). 
92 See Christopher Joyner, ‘Recommended measures under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening 
Compliance with Soft International Law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 401. 
93 Donald Rothwell, The Polar regions and the development of international law (1996) 94.  
94 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XIX: Decision 1 (1995). 
95 Ibid, para 1(a). 
96 Ibid, para 2(a). 
97 Ibid, para 3(1). 
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need for clarity, including the need of the parties to better understand the 
Recommendations in light of the ever-increasing number of decisions of various kinds 
made over the years by the Consultative State parties.98 Once a measure becomes 
effective it is an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty System; Article X of the 
Antarctic Treaty applies and Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties are bound by 
it.  They are arguably99 not independent or individual treaties nor should they be 
accorded such status, even though there is little doubt that instruments like the Agreed 
Measures have the necessary requirements to be classified as a treaty, even though it 
was not the intention of the parties that they be given such status.   
 
3 Associated Instruments 
 
While the primary component of the Antarctic Treaty System is the Antarctic Treaty, 
other components of the system have been developed over the past 40 years which 
have made their separate contributions to the structure of the system.  These are 
discussed below. 
 
(a) Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora 1964100 
 
Article IX (1) (f) of the Antarctic Treaty states that recommendations may include 
‘measures regarding preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.’  
This option was taken up during the inaugural ATCM in 1961 when negotiations 
began regarding the conservation of Antarctic flora and fauna.  By 1964, the 
Consultative Parties adopted Recommendation III-VIII entitled The Agreed Measures 
for Antarctic Fauna and Flora (The Agreed Measures), which established a means for 
designating protected areas in Antarctica and specially protected species.  The Agreed 
Measures also included a permit requirement for harmful interference with native 
mammals and birds, and for the introduction of non-indigenous species. However the 
Agreed Measures have now largely been superseded by the Protocol. In due course, it 
is expected that the Antarctic Treaty Parties will confirm that the Agreed Measures 
                                                 
98 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XXIV: Resolution 1 (2001). 
99 See Rothwell, above n 93 and Watts, above n 59; Cf Bush, above n 9. 
100 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Misc. 23 (1965) Cmnd.  
(‘Agreed Measures’). 
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are redundant101 and can be repealed. The Agreed Measures remain an important 
document in the evolution of the ATS, reflecting the recognition of the Antarctic 
Treaty parties of the need to protect components of the Antarctic ecosystem. 
 
(b) Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972102 
 
The first attempt at protecting an Antarctic resource by way of a freestanding 
convention was to deal with the plight of Antarctic seals.  The major fur seal 
populations of the South Atlantic were virtually wiped out by the 1820s. The Agreed 
Measures protected seals that were on land but did not cover those that were in the 
water, nor those that were resting on floating ice.  A legal instrument to fill this gap 
and protect those seals was needed as the hunting of seals was a big industry. The 
choice lay between, on the one hand, following the precedent of the Agreed Measures 
and incorporating the agreement in the form of an Antarctic Treaty Recommendation 
and, on the other hand, adopting a free-standing instrument.  The Consultative State 
parties chose the later course by negotiating and opening for signature the Convention 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) in London in 1972. CCAS is of 
indefinite duration and may be amended at any time.103 It covers all seals in Antarctic 
waters, defines hunting zones and seasons combined with conservative catch limits 
and a permit system.  New Zealand signed CCAS in London in 1972 but has never 
ratified it, largely due to the fact that the harvesting of seals had all but ceased by this 
time.104  Although seals are occasionally taken for scientific purposes, there have been 
no attempts to commercially harvest Antarctic seals since 1964.  
 
(c) Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980 105   
 
The recognition of the importance of krill in the Antarctic marine food chain and the 
development of large, distant water, freezer trawlers lent a feeling of urgency to the 
consideration of marine living resources of the Southern Ocean which was included as 
                                                 
101 Neil Gilbert, ‘Antarctica and Environmental Management’ (Presentation delivered at the Graduate 
Certificate in Antarctic Studies Programme, Christchurch, November 2003) 5. 
102 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature on 1 June 1972, 29 UST 
441 (entered into force 11 March 1978) (‘CCAS’). 
103 CCAS, art 8 (1). 
104 Any taking of seals by a New Zealand vessel would be regulated by the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act (1978), specifically para 16, which covers the Ross Dependency Region. 
105 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for signature on 20 
May 1980, 19 ILM (1980) (entered into force 7 April 1982) (‘CCAMLR’). 
  31
   
an agenda item106 of ATCM IX in 1977.  Soon after, the negotiation of the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
began and was concluded in May 1980.   
 
The economic use of marine resources was not at that time covered by the existing 
Antarctic Treaty System framework and ‘CCAMLR negotiations were conducted in 
secret, preserving the dominant role of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties 
and preventing external interference.107 CCAMLR became the principal legal 
instrument adopted by Antarctic Treaty parties to deal with the conservation and 
management of marine living resources.  Although CCAMLR was developed in 
response to the potentiality for over-harvesting of krill, it was soon recognised as the 
only Antarctic Treaty arrangement that could manage fin fish fisheries in the Southern 
Ocean, an industry the was quick to develop. 
 
CCAMLR’s objective is the conservation of marine living resources in the Southern 
Ocean.108  By definition ‘conservation’ in CCAMLR includes ‘rational use’109 and so 
CCAMLR allows harvesting within set limits and in a prescribed manner.  CCAMLR 
applies to ‘Antarctic marine living resources’110 and defines those as meaning ‘the 
populations of fin fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living 
organisms, including birds…’111 CCAMLR has a resource focus providing guidance 
on utilisation, conservation and management112 for the purposes of extraction of this 
marine resource ‘as a source of protein.’113 
 
CCAMLR contained a number of innovations.114 First, CCAMLR adopted an 
‘ecosystem approach’ to the protection of marine resources, requiring that the effects 
of dependent and associated species must be taken into account when allowing for 
                                                 
106 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting Report VIII, Oslo, 9-20 June 1975, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: Oslo, 1976, 40; Recommendation VIII-10 ‘Antarctic Marine Living Resources’, to be included 
on the agenda at ATCM IX.  
107 Dillon Burke, Exploiting the Last Ocean (PhD Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2001) 72. 
108 CCAMLR, art II (1). 
109 CCAMLR, art II (2). 
110 CCAMLR, art I (1). 
111 CCAMLR, art I (2). 
112 See generally, Donald Rothwell and Ruth Davis, Antarctic Environmental Protection: a collection 
of Australian and international instruments (1997) 58-59. 
113 CCAMLR, preamble. 
114 Cohan, above n 51, 353. 
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catch/harvest quotas, thereby conserving the relationship between all living species in 
the CCAMLR region. That is, CCAMLR protects not only the species that is targeted 
for harvest, but also those which may be connected through the food chain.115 This 
ecosystem approach is reflected in the second innovation, that the area of application 
of CCAMLR is larger than the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty (Map 1, 
Appendix 3). The northern limit of the CCAMLR is the northern limit of the Antarctic 
marine ecosystem-up to the 60o South latitude line and including the Antarctic marine 
living resources in the area between that latitude line and the Antarctic 
Convergence.116 Thus the CCAMLR boundaries and the Antarctic Treaty boundaries 
are not co-incident. Blay called inclusion of the marine ecosystem both ‘a welcome 
innovation and an acknowledgement of the complex relationships of Antarctic marine 
living resources with each other and their physical environment.’117   
 
CCAMLR provides for the establishment of a Commission whose function is to give 
effect to the objectives of the Convention.118  The Commission fulfils this role 
practically by setting total allowable catch limits in each of the CCAMLR fishing 
zones (Map 2, Appendix 3) for each species that may be harvested, by overseeing the 
inspection and observer system, and by drawing to the attention of all contracting 
parties any activity which affects the objective of CCAMLR, or does not comply with 
obligations.119 CCAMLR also establishes a Scientific Committee as a consultative 
body to the Commission.120 
 
Until recently, because of the inaccessibility and expense of fishing in most parts of 
the Southern Ocean, pressures on fish stocks were negligible or controllable because 
there was little to no fishing. The harvesting of krill initially was of concern, but the 
                                                 
115 See Fernando Zegers, ‘The Canberra Convention: objectives and political aspects of its negotiation’ 
in Francisco Vicuna (ed), Antarctic resources policy: Scientific, legal and political issues (1983) 149, 
161. 
116 The Antarctic Convergence is a shifting, biological boundary, that is the boundary of the Antarctic 
Southern Ocean ecosystem; CCAMLR art I (1). 
117 S K N Blay, ‘New Trends in the Protection of the Antarctic Environment: The 1991 Madrid 
Protocol’ (1992) 86 2 The American Journal of International Law 377, 381. 
118 CCAMLR, art VII. 
119 CCAMLR, art X (2). 
120 CCAMLR, art XIV. 
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development of longline fishing methods (which significantly increases the capacity 
of the fishing industry) is now causing great concern.121   
 
The target of the Southern Ocean fishing industry is primarily the Patagonian 
toothfish.  Today, the toothfish fetches a price even greater than that for salmon or 
tuna. While it appears that the legal toothfish industry is a sustainable commercial 
enterprise, the toothfish industry includes an illegal element by some. The 
effectiveness of the CCAMLR Commission is being questioned, especially as regards 
the failure of the Commission to stop this illegal element. There have been many 
reported incidents of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated122 (IUU) fishing in the 
CCAMLR region.  IUU fishers target toothfish outside of CCAMLR regulations, their 
acts jeopardize the commercial viability of the industry (and therefore threaten to 
close the legal fisheries), threaten to make toothfish extinct and claim the lives of 
thousands of seabirds as by-catch each season. Thus while it might be possible to 
regulate any bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean marine environment under 
CCAMLR, the ineffectiveness of the Commission to date may render it unable to take 
on any new commercial enterprise.  
 
Academic debate has surrounded the question as to whether CCAMLR is a 
conservation convention or a resource regulation. The distinction may be important as 
it may play a role in any regulation of bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean. It 
currently plays a role in the decisions taken by CCAMLR state parties. The origin of 
CCAMLR, the political and legal context within which it was negotiated and the 
history of the evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System all point, according to 
Couratier, to CCAMLR, ‘as a text designed to protect and conserve the Antarctic 
                                                 
121 Kenneth Bertrand, ‘Operational Considerations: The Historical Background’ in Gerald Schatz (ed) 
Science, technology and sovereignty in the polar regions (1974) 15, 15. 
122 The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, FAO IPOA IUU (2001) defines 
Illegal fishing as fishing conducted in contravention of a state’s laws and regulations, or relevant 
managements organisations and measures; Unreported fishing is defined as not reported or misreported 
activities; Unregulated fishing is defined as that conducted by vessels without nationality or by those 
flying a flag of a state not party to the management regime; See, eg, David Doulman ‘Global Overview 
of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing and its impacts on national and regional efforts to 
sustainably manage fisheries: the rationale for the conclusion of the 2001 FAO International Plan of 
action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing’ (Paper presented at 
the expert consultation on fishing vessels operating under open registries and their impact on IUU 
fishing, Florida USA, 23-25 September 2003). 
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environment and not as a resource convention.’123 So that any approach to a decision 
should begin from a conservation perspective.   
 
CCAMLR applies to ‘the Antarctic marine living resources’124 south of the Antarctic 
Convergence.  While the definition of ‘marine living resources’ is stated to mean ‘the 
populations of fin fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living 
organisms…’ found south of the Antarctic Convergence, it is arguable whether the 
intention was to include micro-organisms. Micro-organisms found in the Southern 
Ocean include bacteria, algae and protozoa. These, along with benthic organisms, are 
the common targets of Antarctic bioprospectors.  CCAMLR, however, pre-empted 
both the knowledge of microbial abundance in the Southern Ocean, and the 
technology necessary to exploit these organisms and the CCAMLR Preamble is 
evidence to support the notion that it was not the intention of CCAMLR to apply to 
these organisms. It was the intention of CCAMLR to conserve those living resources 
of the CCAMLR region that could be utilised for human consumption.  The Preamble 
notes ‘the increased possibilities offered by the utilization of the resource as a source 
of protein.’125  Doubt is cast, therefore, on whether application of CCAMLR as it 
currently stands could ever be stretched to cover conservation, including rational use, 
by bioprospectors of marine microbes.  This point is further discussed in Part IV of 
this thesis. 
 
(d) Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
1988126 
 
The Antarctic Treaty does not specifically address the issue of mineral exploration 
and related activities. Even though mining-related activities had yet to take place in 
the Antarctic Treaty area, Treaty parties in the early 1970s saw that there would be a 
growing interest in Antarctic mineral exploration because of various factors, including 
the new international law of common resources and the 1970s oil crisis.   
 
                                                 
123 Josyane Couratier, ‘The regime for the conservation of Antarctica’s living resources’ in Francisco 
Vicuna (ed), Antarctic resources policy: Scientific, legal and political issues (1983) 139, 147-148. 
124 CCAMLR, art I. 
125 CCAMLR, preamble para 2. 
126 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for signature on 25 
November 1988, 27 ILM (1988) (not in force) (‘CRAMRA’). 
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Geologists agree that Antarctica was once part of the supercontinent Gondwana, 
which 200 million years ago began to break up into its constituent parts including 
Antarctica.  By reconstructing Gondwana geologists have postulated the presence of 
significant mineral deposits in Antarctica, since some of these Antarctic regions once 
lay adjacent to some of today’s largest and richest known mineral regions of the 
world. Antarctica is expected to hold similar mineral reserves.127   
 
While there was little doubt that Antarctica would attract interest because of its 
mineral reserves, there was doubt, however, over the legality of mineral exploration 
and exploitation in Antarctica.  Some believed the activity would violate the Antarctic 
Treaty, acting against the prejudice towards ‘pure science’ activities, leading 
inevitably to contamination of the environment, and consequently, frustrating the 
fundamental objectives of the Treaty.128  Feasibility uncertainties surrounding the 
exact location, quantity and quality of the resource coupled with difficulties with 
extraction and uncertain economics meant that mineral exploration and exploitation 
had yet to take place in Antarctica. 
 
In the context of the Antarctic Treaty System at the 1975 Consultative Meeting in 
Oslo, specifically considered mineral exploitation for the first time.  The subsequent 
meeting saw guidelines put forward as Recommendation X-1, and then again as 
Recommendation XI-1, which provided a general framework outlining the risks that 
could result from permitting mineral activity on the Antarctic ecosystem and 
principles on which further negotiations concerning mineral exploitation might be 
based.  These risks, coupled with the contentious territorial claims and unresolved 
sovereignty, did not stop the Antarctic Treaty parties from initiating discussions on a 
legal instrument which would allow mineral activities in Antarctica. 
 
Sovereignty became one of the primary sticking points during negotiations.  Resource 
exploitation (both living and non-living resources included) is normally a corollary of 
national sovereignty.129  With sovereignty unresolved in the Antarctic Treaty region, 
questions surrounding resource rights would prove difficult to answer.  Interests in 
                                                 
127 See generally, Philip Quigg, Antarctica: the continuing experiment (1985). 
128 Francesco Francioni ‘Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica’ (1986) 19, Cornell 
International Law Journal 163, 166. 
129 Ibid, 168. 
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Antarctica from third party states were also increasing at this time.  Developing states 
were interested in any benefits derived from mineral resource exploitation; this 
attracted the interest of the United Nations, which the claimant states perceived as a 
threat to their Antarctic sovereign claims. 
 
Ironically, the perceived threat from the United Nations to the authority of the 
consultative state parties (namely the claimant states) was the primary catalyst for the 
minerals discussions and the sense of urgency that the discussions adopted. Leaving a 
gap in regulations would be a temptation for other states or intergovernmental 
agencies to pursue the regulation of that issue.  Any such outside regulation would 
have weakened the responsibilities on the whole of Consultative Parties, and it is said 
that ‘deflecting this danger constituted the underlying philosophy of CRAMRA.’130 
 
The result was that CRAMRA was negotiated over six years and subsequently 
adopted in Wellington on 2 June 1988, by the 20 states that were then Consultative 
State parties.  CRAMRA set up mechanisms for the regulation of Antarctic mineral 
resource activities and included complex interactions which reflected the parties’ 
conflicts of interests.131 An Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission132 and an 
Antarctic Mineral Resources Regulatory Committee133 would have been established 
under the convention, whose permanent headquarters was to be established in New 
Zealand.134 
 
CRAMRA required ratification by at least 16 states, including all seven of the 
claimant states and the US and USSR.  Although all the claimant states had signalled 
that they would ratify the convention, just after signing France and Australia (two of 
the seven claimant states) announced that they would not ratify the convention.  Many 
other claimant states, including New Zealand135 then joined them by announcing that 
they too would not proceed with ratification. Lobbying against the convention by 
                                                 
130 Rudiger Wolfrum, The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(1991) 12. 
131 Watts, above n 59, 64. 
132 CRAMRA, art 18(1). 
133 CRAMRA, art 29. 
134 CRAMRA, art 20(5); New Zealand led the negotiations for CRAMRA. 
135 See eg, the press statement by the Right Honourable Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, of 26 
February 1990. 
  37
   
environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) is credited with the change 
of mind by governments.136  Even though a mining convention, CRAMRA did set 
new standards for the protection of the Antarctic environment.137 Article 2, paragraph 
3, set out the general principle and objective of CRAMRA being that: ‘In relation to 
Antarctic mineral resource activities…the Parties acknowledge the special 
responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the protection of the 
environment…’138 No mineral exploitation in the Antarctic region would have been 
allowed outside of the CRAMRA regime. 
 
Many believed that CRAMRA would have established the property rights regime 
essential for mining to proceed – and to that extent actually ‘increased the likelihood 
of mining.’139 The general issue of commercial information and access to data was 
also addressed in CRAMRA in Article 16: Availability and Confidentiality of Data 
and Information, reiterating the Antarctic Treaty Article III (1) (c) obligations for free 
availability and exchange of information, an issue that the Treaty parties must 
inevitably return to in the context of bioprospecting. CRAMRA made a distinction 
between ‘prospecting’ for minerals and the subsequent stage of ‘exploration’.  The 
distinction was based on the concept of right.140 Prospecting would not convey 
exclusive rights to an area while exploration might. This distinction could be applied 
in the context of bioprospecting whereby any ‘prospecting’ that is the process of 
search and discovery of novel biodiversity does not convey exclusive rights, each and 
every organism being made part of a freely available Antarctic database.  Further 
phases of development of any portion of any organism found in that database, would 
be subject to rights, and presumably obligations, and benefit-sharing criteria, as laid 
down under rules or guidelines that could be developed. 
  
CRAMRA was not, however, ratified and the Protocol now bans all mining activities, 
other than that associated with scientific research141 in Antarctica. Nonetheless, 
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CRAMRA remains an important part of the negotiating history of the Antarctic Treaty 
System and it is still considered a source of international law despite the fact that it 
never came into force. The principles and procedures it contains for assessing the 
likely impact of Antarctic-based resource-related activities have continuing relevance 
for other ongoing activities on the continent,142 including issues related to 
bioprospecting.  It has also been regarded by some as an important model for the 
future development of international law concerning the cooperation of states in the 
administration of areas beyond national jurisdiction.143 
 
(e) Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991144 
 
Most wilderness areas of the world are protected against adverse impacts of human 
activities by the state that has sovereign power over them. Antarctica, as subject of 
disputed sovereignty, however, cannot rely on such sovereign protection.145 The 
demise of the minerals regime, even with all its provisions for environmental 
protection, allowed for the consideration and development of a single environmental 
protection instrument for Antarctica by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative States. The 
adoption of the Protocol was the result and is a major step towards the comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic continent. The Protocol was the outcome of the review 
post-CRAMRA and consistent with the rationale of establishing a single 
comprehensive legal instrument for the protection of the Antarctic environment.146  
The Protocol was negotiated relatively quickly, emerging out of three Special 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meetings in Chile and Spain.147 On October 4, 






                                                 
142 Gerard Van Bohemen and Thomas Gault, Antarctica (1994) 40. 
143 Wolfrum, above n 130, 2. 
144 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature on 4 October 
1991, 30 ILM (1991) (entered into force 14 January 1998) (‘Protocol’). 
145 See Bastmeijer, above n 57, 1. 
146 Blay, above n 117.  
147 Vina del Mar, Chile, November-December 1990; Madrid, Spain, April & June 1991. 
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 Annex I – Environmental Impact Assessment 
 Annex II – Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna 
 Annex III – Waste Disposal and Waste Management 
 Annex IV – Prevention of Marine Pollution 
 Annex V – Area Protection and Management 
 
These annexes were adopted on 4 October 1991 in Madrid148 as a supplement149 to the 
Antarctic Treaty. It entered into force in January 1998 and now covers human impact 
from all activities in the region south of 60o south latitude. The Protocol is a 
comprehensive approach to environmental management for Antarctica. Significantly, 
the Protocol prohibits all activities relating to mineral resources,150 except those 
extracted for scientific research, and provides that this prohibition cannot be amended 
for at least 50 years, by less than a unanimous agreement.  The Protocol builds upon 
the Antarctic Treaty and its associated environmental recommendations to extend and 
improve the Treaty’s environmental protection effectiveness. Article 2 of the Protocol 
commits the parties to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and 
designates Antarctica as ‘a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.’  It sets out 
basic principles and obligatory regulations applicable to all human activity in 
Antarctica, including obligations to accord priority to scientific research.151  
 
Importantly, all human activities taking place in Antarctica are subject to Protocol 
requirements.  The Protocol seeks to ensure that human activities, including those 
outside of national Antarctic programmes, do not have adverse impacts on the 
Antarctic environment, or on its scientific and intrinsic values.   
 
The Protocol does not include rules relating to liability for environmental harm in 
Antarctica. Article 16 of the Protocol, however, provides for a further annex to the 
Protocol to be negotiated setting out rules and procedures relating to liability arising 
from activities taking place in the Antarctic Treaty area and which are covered by the 
Protocol. By providing a legal obligation for environmental damage, Antarctic Treaty 
parties believe that there will then be an incentive to be more cautious in the conduct 
                                                 
148 Annex V was adopted two weeks later on 17 October 1991 in Bonn Germany. 
149 Protocol, art 4 (1). 
150 Protocol, art 7. 
151 Protocol, art 3 (3). 
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of Antarctic activities. NGO groups believe that liability provisions are the only way 
to send a clear message that the protection of the environment is the major 
consideration for all human activities there152 and believe that without these rules, that 
the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment will not be ensured. To 
date however, the negotiations on an agreement for liability continue and the issue 
remains as an item on the agenda of the ATCM. The ATCM’s sub-group on liability, 
chaired by New Zealand, made further progress on the draft text at ATCM 2004.  
There is some hope that the liability discussions can be successfully concluded within 
the next two ATCMs.153 
 
The commitment to environmental protection of the Antarctic in the Protocol is in 
marked contrast to the extremely limited objectives of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. 
Volger notes, ‘the extent of the change is reflected in the way in which norms of 
environmental responsibility, strict conservation and the need for precautionary action 
have developed and find their fullest expression in the new instrument.’154  
 
(i) Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) 
 
The Protocol created a new institutional body to oversee compliance, entitled the 
Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP).155 Each party to the Protocol is 
entitled to be a member of the CEP and is entitled to appoint a representative.156  The 
CEP's primary function as described in Article 12(1) is to provide advice and 
formulate recommendations in connection with the implementation of the Protocol for 
consideration at ATCMs.  Although intended to oversee compliance with the Protocol 
the CEP lacks independent capabilities including the power to enforce compliance or 
the issuing of sanctions; ensuring compliance is left to the states themselves.  ‘All 
attempts to create an organ with genuine law-making or law enforcement powers were 
blocked by those states which regarded such an establishment as a threat to their 
sovereignty in Antarctica.’157 
                                                 
152 See Boyd, above n 139, 108-109.   
153 Neil Gilbert, ‘The 26th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM XXVI) Madrid, June 2003’ 
in Alex Conte et al, (eds) New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (2004) 191, 196.  
154 John Vogler, The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis (1995) 85. 
155 Protocol, art 11 (1). 
156 Protocol, art 11 (2). 
157 Wolfrum, above n 130, 93. 
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4 Interrelationship between the Antarctic Treaty System Instruments 
 
The legal instruments adopted were ‘rather disparate’158 so that it became necessary to 
consult numerous sources simply to ascertain what was the applicable or current 
regulation. The recent appointment of an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat should assist 
with this. There were also concerns regarding the relationship between successive 
legal instruments dealing with the same subject-matter in some cases.159  
 
In the case of the Protocol, Article IV says that the Protocol ‘…shall supplement the 
Antarctic Treaty and shall neither modify nor amend that Treaty.’  The major effect of 
the Protocol is to supersede many of the Agreed Measures160 and the environmental 
recommendations agreed to throughout the years.  
 
CCAMLR and the Protocol overlap to an extent, particularly with respect to the 
environmental principles created by Article III of the Protocol and CCAMLR 
principles dealing with marine resource management. The Protocol aims for 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment, while conservation is the 
primary aim for CCAMLR, the CCAMLR definition of conservation includes rational 
use.  Some of the institutional bodies created by the legal instruments have 
overlapping objectives.  For example, the CEP and the CCAMLR Commission’s 
areas of responsibility overlap as regards human activities in the CCAMLR marine 
zones. Arguably then, there is potentiality for institutional clashes between these 
competing objectives.  It is this conflict that activities such as bioprospecting may 
exploit.  
 
All the major legal instruments of the Antarctic Treaty System repeat the fundamental 
Article IV Antarctic Treaty obligations regarding sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
158 Rothwell, above n 93, 149. 
159 See generally, Watts, above n 59, 73. 
160 Gilbert, above n 101. 
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It should also be noted that no two of the treaties have precisely the same list of state 
parties (Appendix 2), so that the level of participation and obligation within the 
Antarctic Treaty System framework is different amongst the parties.161 
 
5 Other components 
 
The Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System notes:  
 
‘The Antarctic Treaty System also includes the results of Meetings of Experts, the 
decisions of Special Consultative Meetings and, at a non-government level, reflects the 
work of the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) on all aspects of the 
system.  These various measures and actions were adopted and taken when a need for 
them was perceived.  The practice has been essentially pragmatic, and it was not until 
the conclusion of the Protocol that there was a systematic attempt to provide a code for 
the regulation of all Antarctic activities.’162   
 
The importance of the availability of components such as Meetings of Experts has 
become increasingly apparent with the emergence of non-government expeditions to 
Antarctica; the most recent Meeting of Experts163 involving a discussion of tourism 
activities in Antarctica. This device, therefore, may prove useful in the context of an 
activity such as bioprospecting which in most cases involves a non-governmental, 
commercial partner. 
 
(a) Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) 
 
Under a treaty where one of the main purposes is the maintenance of freedom of 
scientific investigation, ‘it is fitting that there is a close relationship between science 
and the consultative machinery of the Antarctic Treaty.’164  Often an issue is 
identified for which scientific advice is needed before deciding what action may be 
required. SCAR was established under the International Council for Science (ICSU) 
and although it is not formally recognised by the Antarctic Treaty, it is a highly 
regarded independent body with observer status at Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
                                                 
161 See Watts, above 59, 74. 
162 Cohan, above n 51, 1. 
163 Norway, March 2004. 
164 Cohan, above n 51, 3. 
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Meetings.  SCAR's Constitution states that it is ‘charged with the initiation, promotion 
and the coordination of scientific activity in Antarctica’. It will also formulate and 
provide answers to requests for scientific advice, which are then transmitted back 
through National Antarctic committees and Treaty governments to an Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting for consideration. The SCAR Constitution Guidelines 
also notes, however, that ‘SCAR will abstain from involvement in political and 
juridical matters, including the formulation of management measures for exploitable 
resources…’,165 reflecting the reticence of a scientific organisation to be involved in 
formulating management regulations involving Antarctic natural resources, a 
potentially political topic. 
 
(b) Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP)166 
 
COMNAP was established in 1988 to facilitate liaison between the managers of the 
national Antarctic agencies which are responsible for the conduct of logistics and 
operations in support of Antarctic-based scientific operations.  COMNAP aims to 
enhance the conduct of scientific research, operational efficiency, safety and 
environmental stewardship in Antarctica.  Representatives meet annually to exchange 
information and ideas and will occasionally, on request from ATCMs or the CEP, 
formulate technical advice for use within the system. COMNAP has become an active 
player in the international Antarctic community with an established Secretariat based 
in Hobart, Tasmania.  Over the past ten years it has developed procedures and policy 
on safety, waste management and environmental protection. It may therefore have a 
role to play in bioprospecting discussions. 
 
(c) Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 
 
When the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated the parties did not incorporate a role for a 
Secretariat within the articles of that legal instrument. The absence of a permanent 
Secretariat, although ‘surprising within the context of a modern regime’167 was a 
deliberate omission.  There was reluctance on the part of the states claiming 
                                                 
165 SCAR Constitution (1958), para 3. 
166 See www.comnap.aq for additional information. 
167 Karen Scott, ‘Institutional Developments within the Antarctic Treaty System’ (2003) 52.2 
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sovereignty in Antarctica to create any form of permanent administrative machinery 
during the Antarctic Treaty negotiations.  
 
The discussions of a secretariat for the Antarctic Treaty began in earnest over 20 years 
ago, beginning with informal discussions in 1983 at ATCM XII.  The primary 
stimulus to the discussions was the rapidly increasing complexity of the ATS, post-
CCAMLR and with CRAMRA presumed to soon follow.168 The task of administering 
mineral resources required an arrangement of far greater complexity than those 
created by the Antarctic Treaty.   
 
While formal recognition of a need for a permanent secretariat was first expressed in 
1985 at ATCM XIII and consensus was reached that a secretariat should be 
established169 the question of location became the key point of disagreement, and that 
delayed the actual establishment of a secretariat for another decade. Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, was supported by most of the Consultative State parties as the preferred 
location. The United Kingdom, however, refused to support this location, in reality 
because of their post-Falklands/Malvinas political relationship,170 but with the United 
Kingdom formally stating that further discussion on location was needed. In 2001, 
however, at ATCM XXIV, the United Kingdom announced that it would finally 
accept Buenos Aires as the site for the secretariat,171 thereby giving the decision the 
unanimous support it required. 
 
The secretariat is a constituted organ of the Antarctic Treaty. What actual level of 
control or influence this position will wield may not be discernable for some time. 
The inaugural Executive Secretary, Mr Johannes Huber, was appointed at ATCM 





                                                 
168 Alan Hemmings, ‘Legal issues within the Antarctic Treaty System: Institutional reform-The 
Antarctic Treaty Secretariat’ (Presentation for the Antarctic Legal Issues Course, Christchurch, 
December 2002). 
169 XVII ATCM Final Report (1992), paras 41-51. 
170 Hemmings, above n 168. 
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6 Consensus Decision-Making 
 
Article IX (4) of the Antarctic Treaty provides that measures shall become effective 
when approved by all contracting parties and Article XII 1(a) requires that any 
modifications or amendments to the Antarctic Treaty at any time may be made only 
‘by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are 
entitled to participate in the meetings…’ This implies the right to veto and it is not, by 
strict definition, the same as a consensus system.  
 
The United Nations consensus process first involves an obligation on all the parties to 
arrive at or attempt to arrive at an agreement by all possible means; it requires parties 
to act in good faith, thus entailing a positive obligation.172 However, ‘the spirit which 
has reigned ever since the Treaty’s inception has caused this provision to be 
interpreted as a mechanism of consensus - and it is precisely this interpretation which 
has made possible all the achievements of the Antarctic System.’173  
 
The lack of institutional provisions in the Treaty, including the lack of a Secretariat, 
and the consensus requirement are both indicators of the claimant states concerns over 
protecting their sovereignty in Antarctica.   Originally this consensus system made 
good sense. There were 12 original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, all of them 
granted consultative state party status; which included seven claimants and two others 
that asserted a basis of a claim. Thus, nine state signatories out of the original 12 had 
some ‘weight of influence, notwithstanding it is a consensus system.’174 There are 
now, however, 27 consultative state parties and a total of 47 participating states 
involved in some part of the system.  So that today the original signatories and those 
claimant states are in the minority. Also changes as to what is required to obtain 
consultative state status means that in a consensus system it is possible for states with 
little or no scientific research presence in Antarctica to frustrate the interests of 
‘active’ states, this includes several original signatory states who now do little, if any, 
research in Antarctica but who retain their consultative status indefinitely.  
 
                                                 
172 See Zegers, above n 115, 155-156. 
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174 Anthony Press, ‘Antarctica and the Future’ in Jabour-Green and Marcus Haward (eds), The 
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The last large increase in Antarctic Treaty membership occurred in the 1980s during 
the time of the negotiation of minerals regime. Any discussions involving utilization 
of Antarctic resources, including discussions concerning bioprospecting, may see the 
same effect, so that there may be rekindled interest in becoming part of the Antarctic 
Treaty System. This raises the question of the future of consensus decision-making 
within the system.   Most argue that while it may limit progress, that it is fundamental 
to the Antarctic Treaty and must be retained as the only method acceptable to a 
diverse range of interests.  Increasing the number of signatories leads to difficulty in 




The Antarctic Treaty System continues to evolve. The development of institutional 
structures have an impact on the position of the states claiming territorial sovereignty, 
since such ‘internationalization dilutes their otherwise exclusive rights’176 to regulate 
activities in their claimed territory.  Even while Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty 
protects their legal positions, at least for the duration of that treaty, Watts argues that 
‘the cumulative practical implications of any such institutional internationalisation 
cannot be ignored’177 as it is likely to erode the territorial claimants positions. 
 
Understanding the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System is vital to any 
discussions regarding the possible exploitation of Antarctic resources.  It is against 
this background that discussions regarding the legal implications of bioprospecting in 
the Antarctic will be determined. 
 




Although bioprospecting has been occurring in the Antarctic for many years, there is 
no mention of ‘bioprospecting’ per se in any of the Antarctic Treaty System legal 
                                                 
175 Ibid 161; See also Graduate Certificate in Antarctic Studies presentation on ‘Does a consensus 
system make good sense today in the ATS?’ January 21 2005, Gateway Antarctica, Christchurch. 
176 Watts, above n 59, 87. 
177 Ibid, 88. 
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instruments.  Even the Protocol, adopted as recently as 1991 and covering all human 
activities in the region does not specifically mention bioprospecting.    
 
While the legal machinery of the Antarctic community appeared to be ignoring the 
activity, groups of Antarctic scientists recognised very early on the potential benefits 
from bioprospecting-related research and have been engaged, to one extent or another, 
in the activity ever since.  To date, no one has been able to ascertain the precise nature 
and extent of current Antarctic bioprospecting activities.178   
 
There have been groups from at least three Antarctic Treaty Consultative states, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, actively involved in Antarctic 
bioprospecting on the continent and in the marine environment since at least 1995.  To 
date, this work has been carried out by universities, research centres and companies, 
all of which tend to act as part of consortia groups which are a mixture of public and 
private bodies.179 The funding for such research also usually represents a mixture of 
public and private sources. One Antarctic scientist estimates that commercial private 
sector companies have provided $US1 million dollars in funding from 1997 to 2004 
for work on Antarctic microbiology and biotechnology.180 This adds to the difficulties 
in distinguishing between scientific investigation and commercial investigation. Even 
though the groups are actively involved in Antarctic bioprospecting, no mention of 
bioprospecting was formally made in the context of Antarctica until 1999 when the 
first apparent reference to ‘biological prospecting’ at an Antarctic Treaty Meeting was 
presented in an Information Paper181 tabled by SCAR at the twenty-third ATCM in 
Lima, Peru.182 
 
Bioprospecting is in some cases included as research priorities in national science 
strategy documents. In New Zealand for example, the first Science Strategy for 
                                                 
178 United Nations University/Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU/IAS), The International Regime for 
Bioprospecting: Existing Policies and Emerging Issues for Antarctica (2003) 6. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Roberta Farrell, pers comm. April 2003. 
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information purposes only and not necessarily a document which requires action amongst parties. 
182 SCAR ‘Scientific research in the Antarctic’, XXIII ATCM IP 123 (1999) 3. 
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Antarctica and the Southern Ocean183 included not only a mention in the strategic 
context of the value of bioprospecting research,184 but specifically referred to research 
into life in extreme environments ‘that supports biotech and pharmaceutical 
industries’185 and noted that this type of research would be supported by the New 
Zealand government Crown Entity, Antarctica New Zealand.186  This strategy has 
recently been replaced by the 2004-09 strategy,187 which considers biodiversity 
research to be of fundamental importance. It makes mention of research related to 
biotechnology, however, only briefly stating in Theme 3: Antarctic Ecosystems 
Research, ‘Understanding of Antarctic biological processes such as freezing, or 
desiccation resistance will also provide a vital stimulus to diverse biotechnology 
industries.’188 
 
SCAR’s Working Group on Biology recognised in its 1999 Information Paper under 
the heading of Life Science, that there appeared to be ‘no provisions in the Antarctic 
Treaty to deal with the exploitation of biological resources in the Antarctic…’ (with 
the exception of fisheries).  They also noted that there had already been collections of 
micro-organisms in Antarctica for pharmaceutical purposes and that a biological 
prospecting interest was ‘developing rapidly’ in Antarctica.  The implications of this 
growing interest was noted as a concern by the SCAR Working Group on Biology 
because of what they saw as the implications for science and conservation in the 
region, with the group agreeing to raise the issue with the SCAR and with 
CCAMLR.189   
 
But it never did, and as Hemmings notes, there had been no substantive discussion of 
the issue in open sessions of the ATCMs, CEP or CCAMLR, or so far as anyone can 
                                                 
183Antarctica New Zealand, ‘A New Zealand Science Strategy for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean’ 
(1988). 
184 Ibid, para 3.1; The Strategic Context ‘Enhancing New Zealand’s economic opportunities within the 
parameters of the Antarctic Treaty System’. 
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diversity and Environmental Change: ‘Research into biodiversity…is of potential value to fishing, 
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186 The New Zealand Antarctic Institute Act 1996, s 5 (a). 
187 Antarctica New Zealand, ‘New Zealand Science in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean (2004-2009)’ 
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tell, in any of the closed sessions of the Heads of Delegations.190 The limited 
discussions that have taken place to date within the Antarctic Treaty System are 
presented below. 
 
G Discussions within the Antarctic Treaty System  
 
It was not until the XXV Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Warsaw, Poland, 
in September 2002, that bioprospecting appeared as an issue for discussion and as the 
subject of specific formal papers.  At the CEP meeting, a week prior to the 
Consultative Meeting, the United Kingdom presented Working Paper 43.191 This 
Working Paper noted in its paragraph 3: ‘Significant value is particularly attached to 
bioprospecting in special habitats…increasingly, the Polar Regions. Accordingly, 
Antarctica is far from immune to the considerable expansion of  bioprospecting.’192  
 
The Working Paper was of the opinion that bioprospecting was a matter in which pre-
emptive discussion and decision-making was required, saying ‘ground-rules need to 
be put in place before this activity gains a momentum of its own.’193 Today it might 
argued that it now has such momentum. 
 
The Working Paper also highlighted three issues that the United Kingdom believed 
warranted particular attention: 
 
1. The conflict between confidentiality that surrounds commercial exploitation of 
biological materials and the free exchange of information provision mandated 
by Art III of the Antarctic Treaty. 
2. Regulation of bioprospecting and related activities. 
3. Regulation in respect of revenues derived from commercial exploitation of an 
Antarctic species. 
 
The CEP V Final Report notes that state delegates accepted that the issue required 
further discussion and some noted that the issues were ‘complex and included legal 
                                                 
190 See Alan Hemmings, ‘A Question of Politics: The Role of the Antarctic Treaty System’ in Alan 
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and political issues’ that were beyond the ‘environmental brief’ of the CEP.  Several 
of the NGO observers, including the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 
representatives stated their concern that bioprospecting ‘would represent a further 
penetration of commercial and economic interests into Antarctica…’ and argued that 
bioprospecting should not be accepted as a ‘fait accompli.’194  This is interpreted to 
mean that just because bioprospecting activities are currently underway in the 
Antarctic, it does not necessarily mean that we should accept that this is so; but we 
should consider all options for regulation and management, including a moratorium 
on bioprospecting activities in the region. 
  
The CEP concluded that additional discussions were needed, but it was suggested that 
consideration was required by the Consultative states at the ATCM itself.  The final 
report of the ATCM in paragraph 68 notes that the ATCM agreed with the CEP that 
biological prospecting was a very important matter which raised legal and political 
issues, as well as environmental issues.  Members were encouraged to investigate the 
issues and options and prepare papers for the 2003 ATCM and CEP VI (2003). 
 
At the same time SCAR prepared a Working Paper195 that it had intended to present at 
the 2002 Warsaw ATCM. This paper was withdrawn before the meeting and so was 
never formally discussed. The reasons for its retractions remain unclear, suppositions 
include unsatisfactory SCAR sign-offs on the document, arguments that the paper 
went beyond SCAR’s scientific brief into policy areas, and suggestions that a key 
state player in Antarctica may have been unhappy with any proposal that involved the 
operations of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Antarctica.196  In the 
paper, SCAR specifically recognises the value of the CBD to the conservation and 
sustainable management of Antarctic flora and fauna. In paragraph 10, SCAR goes as 
far as to recommend that the Antarctic Consultative State parties consider accepting 
the application of the appropriate articles of the CBD for the Antarctic through a 
measure.197 Which articles thought appropriate by SCAR were not listed. A discussion 
of the CBD is presented later in this thesis. 
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In November that same year, CCAMLR XXI was held in Hobart, Tasmania.  Item 
13.14 of the Final Report from that Meeting198 noted that the Chair of the CCAMLR 
Scientific Committee participated in CEP V and he noted that an important issue of 
relevance to CCAMLR included, inter alia, the complexity of biological prospecting 
in Antarctica. 
 
Several Consultative States, including New Zealand, began discussions on the issue to 
prepare Information Papers for ATCM XXIV held in Madrid in July 2003. However, 
only two papers concerning bioprospecting were actually tabled at the CEP VI (2003) 
meeting. The first Information Paper, IP 47, tabled by New Zealand was the outcome 
from the Gateway Antarctica Academic Workshop on Bioprospecting in Antarctica 
held in April 2003.199  The paper, tabled by the New Zealand delegation with the 
disclaimer that it did not necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand 
government, addressed issues of supply, environment, equity and ethics as well as the 
legal and political difficulties surrounding Antarctic bioprospecting.  The Legal 
Working Group from the Workshop, chaired by Mansfield and including international 
law experts such as Rothwell, was of the view that bioprospecting ‘per se appears not 
to pose legal issues in relation to Article III of the Antarctic Treaty’.200  This was the 
conclusion from the group after a full discussion of intellectual property rights, 
particularly patenting, in the context of Antarctic-derived materials.  The legal group 
reported that ‘benefit-sharing’ was the most significant issue, but that there was no 
benefit-sharing mechanism within the Antarctic Treaty System. Both of these points 
will be considered later in this thesis.   
 
The second Information Paper simply entitled ‘Bioprospecting’,201 tabled by the UK 
(jointly with Norway), written by academics at the United Nations University in 
Tokyo and accompanied by a disclaimer similar to that of the New Zealand paper, 
included a review of bioprospecting activities in Antarctica and worldwide.  The 
paper also went on to discuss the relevance of the CBD to Antarctic bioprospecting, 
saying it ‘contained the pre-eminent standards for bioprospecting and may apply to 
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some extent to bioprospecting activities in Antarctica…especially in the context of the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits which may arise from the use of biological 
resources’.202  
 
Information Paper 75 cites various and numerous conclusions, raised questions and 
raised or supported points that were previously raised, that required in-depth 
consideration.  Most relevant amongst these are:   
 
1. That the absence of regulations in Antarctica may increase bioprospecting; 
2. Controlling the use of genetic resources in Antarctica needs to take account 
of the complex jurisdictional issues raised by Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty and the different legal regimes relevant to the Southern Ocean;  
3. Features of CRAMRA’s provisions regulating mineral resource activities 
and its treatment of data and information that have potential commercial 
value may be of particular relevance; 
4. Is bioprospecting contrary to Article III of the Antarctic Treaty? 
 
Both of the Information Papers were received by the CEP and ATCM, however, the 
discussions were once again delayed until ‘a future ATCM’. No reason for a delay 
was given, however a delegate to the CEP notes that the legal and political issues 
surrounding this activity may simply be too hard for the Consultative State parties to 
contemplate at this time.203 
 
A third paper was presented by Chile.204 The paper drew on principles in an earlier 
Chilean Working Paper205 tabled in 1989 which had addressed ‘comprehensive 
measures for the protection of the Antarctic environment’ and suggested that the 
effects of any activity had to be considered in the context of potential effects on the 
ecosystem as a whole, including any bioprospecting-related activity. Hemmings 
seems to think this was a call for application of the ‘precautionary principle’ to 
                                                 
202  Ibid para 92. 
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204 Chile, ‘Notes on bioprospecting and Antarctic research’  XXVI ATCM (2003); Hemmings defines it 
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bioprospecting.206 It also looked at the possible roles of other existing legal 
instruments, both internal and external (including, inter alia, the CBD, the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights207 and the Bonn 
Guidelines208) to assist in the regulation of bioprospecting in Antarctica.  
 
There was no further discussion of bioprospecting at the Madrid ATCM in 2003. The 
ATCM Final Report mentions bioprospecting once, in the context of the CEP: ‘The 
CEP discussed the issue of biological prospecting in Antarctica and noted that there 
are many complex legal and political issues that should be considered by a future 
ATCM.’209 The vagueness of ‘a future ATCM’ could not be taken to necessarily mean 
the next meeting, which was to be in 2004. However, item 17 ‘Biological Prospecting 
in Antarctica’ did appear in brackets on the preliminary agenda for XXVII ATCM in 
South Africa as a possible item for inclusion. 
 
No substantive discussion of bioprospecting took place at the CCAMLR XXII in 
October - November 2003. Only the CCAMLR executive secretary’s ATCM report210 
considered bioprospecting and included in the ‘main points of direct relevance to 
CCAMLR…the issue of biological prospecting in Antarctica’.211 The only other 
comment recorded in the Report of the Commission was the observation by Norway 
that bioprospecting ‘would involve complex political and diplomatic issues’.212 
 
1 The most recent Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
 
At ATCM XXVII held in South Africa in May 2004, bioprospecting was briefly 
discussed at the CEP Meeting.  No substantive discussions took place.  One 
Information Paper213 was presented by the United Nations Environment Programme214 
(UNEP). This paper is essentially a ‘survey of relevant activities in Antarctica, 
                                                 
206 Hemmings, above n 190. 
207 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature on 15 
April 1994, 1869  UNTS 229 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘TRIPS Agreement’). 
208 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization, COP VI Decision VI/24 (‘Bonn Guidelines’). 
209 Final Report of CEP VI, paras 171-179. 
210 CCAMLR Executive Secretary ‘Report of the CCAMLR Observer to ATCM-XXVI’ CCAMLR-XXII/BG/5 
(2003) para 22. 
211 CCAMLR ‘Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Commission’ (2003) para 13.2 (viii). 
212 Ibid para 13.7. 
213 UNEP ‘Industry Involvement in Antarctic Bioprospecting’ XXVII ATCM IP 106 (2004). 
214 UNEP has expert status at ATCM and CEP meetings. 
  54
   
research programmes most directly involved, and records of the appropriate patent 
offices.’215 It was written by the authors of the United Nations University Information 
Paper. It concludes that while patents have been taken based on Antarctic-related 
organisms, products and processes have not yet been commercialised. It is also noted 
in the paper’s conclusion that ‘companies have not made it a priority to focus their 
attention on Antarctic samples, as the cost, risk and time involved do not concur with 
the necessity to generate marketable products.’216 The paper, while a useful start to 
investigating the level of activity that surrounds Antarctic bioprospecting does not 
directly support a debate on the legal implications of allowing the activity to continue 
in Antarctica.  After presentation of the paper, there was still no substantive debate on 
the legal aspects of Antarctic bioprospecting at the meeting. 
 
The report from CEP VII (2004) and the Final Report from ATCM XXVII (2004) 
each refer to bioprospecting only once.  CEP Report, item 7 ‘Biological Prospecting’ 
says:  
 
‘UNEP introduced ATCM XXVII/IP106 Industry Involvement in Bioprospecting, 
noting the level of commercial use is limited, that no commercial product has been 
developed so far, but nevertheless that a significant amount of research is of 
commercial interest.  Germany noted that the issue was important and that the CEP 
needed to address the issue in a more detailed manner than it has so far.’ 
 
The Final Report from ATCM XXVII refers in its Paragraph 17 Biological 
Prospecting in Antarctica, stating:  
 
‘The representative from UNEP gave a short introduction to its Information Paper 106 
on industrial involvement on Antarctic bio-prospecting. A number of parties 
emphasised the increasing importance of this topic for the ATCM and urged interested 
delegations to introduce Working Papers at XXVIII ATCM, so that consideration of 
this important subject can progress. The need for the ATCM to be informed of 
developments on this topic in other international fora was stressed.’ 
 
 
                                                 
215 UNEP, above n 213, 3. 
216 Ibid 19. 
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2 Summary 
 
Discussion regarding bioprospecting in the Antarctic have begun within the Antarctic 
Treaty System, but these discussions have been progressing slowly.  Perhaps this is a 
reflection of other important discussions that have taken place, and therefore taken 
time, regarding the establishment of an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat and recently the 
discussions involving tourism in Antarctica. It may also be a reflection of deeper 
concerns involving, inter alia, resource management in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, the ramifications of the CBD and tensions between any commercial use 
of Antarctica and the primacy awarded to science. The most recent ATCM contained 
little in the way of discussion on the topic and only one Information Paper was 
presented, authored not by a Consultative State but by UNEP, an organization with 
expert status.  This may reflect the reluctance of Antarctic Treaty states to begin 
substantive discussion on an issue that may become as contentious as the minerals 
debate of the 1980s. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty legal system, an administrative unit which prides itself on being 
proactive and pre-emptive to regulate and therefore protect the Antarctic environment 
when faced with emerging challenges, arguably has, on this occasion, failed to 
recognise and regulate (or prevent) an activity that has already resulted in the 
patenting worldwide of more than 40 patents that rely on Antarctic flora and fauna217 
and an estimated 92 patent applications that refer to Antarctica in the US Patent 
Office. 218 
  
The recognition of the usual proactive approach of the Treaty System was stated in a 
recent SCAR Working Paper: ‘To date it has been a hallmark or aspiration of the 
Treaty parties to regulate…for such issues ahead of them becoming a commercial 
reality (witness the proactive approach taken by the parties in respect of for example, 
CCAS and CCAMLR).’219  SCAR suggests that the reason for doing so is so that ‘the 
issues…can be debated without the pressures of commercial vested interest 
intervening.’220  In this case the parties appear to be failing, they simply do not 
                                                 
217 Gary Stix, ‘Patents on ice’, Scientific American (USA), May 2004, 26. 
218  United Nations University/Institute of Advanced Studies, above n 178, 7. 
219 SCAR, above n 195, para 10. 
220 Ibid. 
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consider bioprospecting to be a pressing issue at this time or the issue is too difficult 
to tackle right now or the expertise necessary to fully consider the issues is not 
available.  This failure may also be a reflection of the closeness of the issue to the 
scientific community, to scientific research and to the National Antarctic programmes 
themselves.  That is, bioprospecting in the Antarctic has principally been an internally 
generated activity, an outgrowth of science undertaken within National Antarctic 
programmes.  In that way, it is different from other commercial activities, as they take 
place outside of these state programmes and are non-governmental activities.  This 
could mean that since at least some of the members of National Antarctic programmes 
have a vested interest in at least some phases of bioprospecting, there may be fewer 
champions for response measures than seen in the past with other ‘outside’ 
activities.221    
 
H Definitions proposed within the Antarctic Treaty System 
 
An Antarctica New Zealand internal paper on bioprospecting written by their science 
strategy manager, defined bioprospecting as: ‘the search for commercially valuable 
biochemical and genetic resources in plants, animals and organisms.’222 
 
This paper also goes on to note that: 
 
‘these resources may be used in food production, pest control, the development of 
new pharmaceuticals and other biotechnology applications. The key distinguishing 
feature from other biotechnology research is the concept of ‘prospecting’ – the 
search of biological material for as-yet undiscovered substances and applications.  
It is normally a targeted search for a certain end use.’223  
 
The paper identified several key questions for consideration associated with 
bioprospecting in Antarctica, including: 
 
 
                                                 
221 Hemmings (pers comms), February 2005. 
222 Dean Peterson, Bioprospecting in Antarctica, Antarctica New Zealand Internal Paper (October 
2001), 1.  
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1. Should the New Zealand government have a policy on bioprospecting in 
Antarctica? 
2. Should New Zealand benefit from bioprospecting? If not who should? 
3. Is the protection of intellectual property gained from scientific investigations 
consistent with the Antarctic Treaty?  Should the issue of bioprospecting and 
intellectual property from Antarctic research be discussed at an Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting? 
4. What are the costs, benefits and risks associated with bioprospecting? Should 
the benefits be negotiated between New Zealand research institutions and 
international collaborators privately?224 
 
The paper was never discussed in the context of the Antarctic Treaty System; it was 
purely an internal paper for the use of Antarctica New Zealand staff and its board 
members. It was released in response to a request under the Official Information Act. 
 
In the context of the Antarctic Treaty fora, Working Paper 43 tabled by the UK at 
ATCM XXV in Madrid (July 2003) was the first formal Antarctic Treaty paper to 
attempt a definition of the term bioprospecting. It states, ‘biological prospecting (or 
bioprospecting) is: The exploration of naturally occurring micro-organisms, plants 
and animals for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources.’225 The 
definition then continues to highlight the fact that the practice has been around for 
many years, with applications being found to support increased food production, 
regulate disease and pests, and in a variety of medical applications. 
 
A New Zealand-based researcher, who has been involved in looking at the chemistry 
of Antarctic flora and fauna for many years, defines bioprospecting as ‘a description 
of the process of discovery of a new lead structure with biological potential from a 
natural resource.’226 
 
The reference to any sort of ‘prospecting’ especially in the context of Antarctica 
inherently includes the perception of exploitation227 and with it, pollution or 
                                                 
224 Ibid 2. 
225 United Kingdom, above n 191. 
226 Munro, above n 27. 
227 Farrell and Duncan, above n 25, 2. 
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degradation of the environment. Prospecting was specifically referred to and defined 
within CRAMRA228 and so any reference to the word may carry an echo of the 
complexity and issues surrounding a minerals regime for Antarctica. However, the 
environmental management and protection of the Antarctic environment is, at least for 
the moment, now adequately regulated by the Protocol and in some cases 
bioprospecting collection requires a sample so small it can be collected by merely 
wiping a sterile swab onto the collection target.229 
 
I Fundamental considerations towards an adequate definition 
 
The discussions regarding Antarctic bioprospecting also involve distinguishing the 
activity primarily as scientific research or as one of commercial activity. An activity 
that is considered scientific research is a legitimate activity in the Antarctic according 
to the Antarctic Treaty. While there are at least two legal activities (tourism and 
fisheries230) currently taking place in the Antarctic that can be labelled commercial, 
commercial activities in the Antarctic are generally perceived as being outside or 
contrary to the objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. The discussions surrounding 
commercial activity in the Antarctic will be considered in some detail later in this 
thesis; there are divergent views depending on one’s perspective as to whether 
bioprospecting should be treated just as any other scientific research activity in the 
Antarctic or be seen as an emerging commercial activity.  The opinion of at least one 
academic sums up the difficulty when saying that the present form of bioprospecting: 
 
 ‘the taking of samples of genetic material for further research cannot be 
compared with the exploitation and depletion of marine living resources as 
occurs in  fishing activities. Since the collection of the samples for the sake of 
their genetic resources is not concerned with the mass of the material but rather 
with the further research on its content, the activity, [genetic sample collection], 
although highly commercial, resembles scientific research.’231 
 
                                                 
228 CRAMRA, arts 1(8), 37, 38. 
229 Farrell and Duncan, above n 25, 2. 
230 This does not include those activities which are attributable to IUU fishing. 
231Nele Matz ‘The interaction between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea’ in Peter Ehlers, Elisabeth Mann-Borgese and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds), Marine 
Issues: from a Scientific, Legal and Political Perspective (2002) 203, 210. 
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This distinction becomes important for any discussion regarding the legitimacy of 
allowing the activity in the Antarctic Treaty region. While different publications may 
agree on the ‘essence of what bioprospecting is’,232 and while it is not difficult to see 
for oneself what the necessary steps are in the process, sources differ on the exact 
definition and on how far ‘bioprospecting extends down the path toward 
commercialisation’.233  In many cases there is no prospect of utilising the 
bioprospected material in any commercialisation. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, a modified version of the definition stated in the 
Australian bioprospecting document shall be utilised. That is, bioprospecting is 
herewith defined as: the search for valuable chemical compounds and genetic 
materials from plants, animals and micro-organisms; the extraction and testing of 
those compounds and materials for biological activity; and the research and 
commercial development of those that show activity. This definition is inclusive of all 
phases of the process from search and discovery through to any commercial 
development.  
 
This broad definition has been adopted so that the legal implications of all phases of 
the activity may be considered. The definition reflects the fundamental importance of 
‘the search’ which is the phase of the activity which is undertaken within the 
Antarctic region. The definition also captures the many stages in any bioprospecting 
process and critically it includes any work on an isolated compound or material 
extracted from Antarctica that may be commercially developed.  The inclusion of the 
commercial development stage of the process is an important legal consideration even 
though this stage does not take place in the Antarctic region itself and is currently 
subject only to regulation under relevant domestic policy and guidelines. 
 
J Environmental Impact 
 
As mentioned the inherent implication in the concept of prospecting, is that the 
activity is a threat or potential threat to the Antarctic environment.  Like many 
                                                 
232 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), ‘Bioprospecting Marine Resources’ 
(Information Paper presented at the Seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (COP7), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9-20 February 2004) 4. 
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extractive activities, bioprospecting has the potential to cause harm to the 
environment.  The harm may come from over-collecting that is, taking too much of 
one species, or taking a species which is slow to grow and therefore slow to recover; 
the introduction of exotic species into the relatively pristine Antarctic environment; 
mis-collecting, that is, the use of inappropriate collection methods that result in 
damage to habitats or species other than those that are actually being targeted for 
collection; or simply accidental interference with, or destruction of, one or more 
species. 
 
Proponents of the activity maintain however, that bioprospecting usually only 
involves the collection of a small amount of a species. There are arguments whether 
this is true in fact, as some believe that reports by researchers are inaccurate and that 
the reality may be that collection processes are poorly documented and confidentially 
agreements that are common for such surveys complicate access to information.234 
Regardless of the amount, the sample is then put through a range of clinical tests to 
determine its usefulness. If the test indicator is positive for a bioactive compound, the 
compound can usually be synthesised and this synthetic clone of the original then 
used for the remainder of the testing. If successful, it is the clone that will be mass 
produced to commercial specifications.   
 
Existing Antarctic Treaty System legal instruments address environmental impacts 
that may result from first generation bioprospecting, that is, probable impacts from 
ordinary sample collection.  Second generation, ex-situ bioprospecting has no 
additional impact on the environment as the compound that is isolated to undergo 
clinical trials was extracted from Antarctica for another purpose, has been researched 
and investigated for that specific purpose and has been discarded by its original 
extractor.  If proven during initial trials to be bioactive, then it too will be synthesised 
for further testing and possible production. The second generation bioprospecting, 
while an environmentally sound practice, raises its own unique issues around 
intellectual property rights and benefit-sharing, discussed later in this thesis.  
 
 
                                                 
234 United Nations University/Institute of Advanced Studies, above n 178. 
  61
   
 
K Impact on Intrinsic Value of the Antarctic Region 
 
In the 1980s a dilemma existed between claimant and non-claimant states, between 
member states in favour of commercial activities and those in favour of conservation, 
and between Antarctic Treaty Party states and external states.  All the Antarctic 
Treaty Party states eventually awarded top priority to conservation.  The question then 
became how best to achieve their conservation goal. In the end, conservation was 
achieved by rejecting CCAMRA and adopting the Environmental Protocol.235 
 
The Protocol includes protection of a new value for Antarctica. Reflected in its 
environmental principles section it states:  
 
‘The protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems 
and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and aesthetic 
values…shall be fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.’236  
 
The inclusion of protection of the ‘intrinsic value’ of Antarctica is a reflection of a 
shift in contemporary international law. Birnie and Boyle explain that:  
 
‘in the early development of environmental law, the focus was that of anthropogenic 
motivation, most notably in attempts to develop a new human right to a decent 
environment…more recently, the inclusion of protection of ethical considerations such 
as intrinsic values, of a place or of biodiversity inter alia, reflects a growing ecocentric 
perspective, that can lead on to a rather different vision of respect for the world.’237 
 
While it can be seen that the intrinsic value of the area must be considered, what this 
actually means in practice in the context of the Antarctic region is still unclear. Since 
protection of this value is a recent inclusion in the Antarctic Treaty System, it has not 
yet been tested or challenged.  Usually, intrinsic value recognises the right of 
something to exist for its own sake, not as a means to complete a goal. 
                                                 
235 See van der Lugt, above n 8. 
236 Protocol, art 3(1). 
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So that while the Protocol states that all human activities in the Antarctic Treaty 
region are subject to its strict environmental criteria and while the Protocol preserves 
the priority afforded to science in the Antarctic Treaty area above all other activities 
on the continent, this new reference to protection of intrinsic values of the region, if 
upheld in practice, may prove to be a barrier to some forms of activities including, 
arguably, some forms of science which appear to impact upon this value, or 
commercial activities.  This may be an issue which requires consideration in the 
context of bioprospecting. 
 
Outside the context of Antarctica, the concept is also reflected generally as regards the 
use of biological materials. For example, Dyer notes:  
 
‘Rather than seeing only the economic potential of biotechnological manipulation of 
nature for the purpose of human development, a “green theory” of value, for 
example, would suggest that nature is valued for its naturalness, and so any kind of 
intervention is devaluing and a threat to the environment.’238   
 
Bioprospecting activities in the Antarctic region may therefore present the first 
challenge under the Protocol in regard to protection of its intrinsic value. So that it 
may attract attention or even criticism from the global community that is currently 
arguing for protection of the ‘naturalness’ of the global biological environment. 
 
L Current Levels of Bioprospecting Activity in the Antarctic  
 
Research into Antarctic biodiversity remains relatively low and the knowledge base 
that biotechnology companies require in order to begin their expensive 
bioprospecting-related investigation has not been sufficiently developed.  The 
biodiversity research efforts in the Antarctic to date have focused particularly on the 
marine environment of the Southern Ocean.  
 
                                                 
238 Hugh Dyer, ‘Biotechnology and international relations: the normative dimensions’ in Alan Russell 
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As mentioned previously, the most recent Information Paper focussing on 
bioprospecting was a ‘survey of the relevant activities in Antarctica, the sectors using 
genetic material from Antarctica [and] research programmes most directly 
involved.’239  Table 1 (below) contains a summary of the companies mentioned in that 
Information Paper. The table refers to consortia here defined as public-private 
arrangements. The Information Paper implies that such collaborative arrangements 
conceivably will become more attractive in the future. No explanation of the consortia 
nomenclature is given in the Information Paper, but it appears there are at least five 




Cerylid Biosciences Australia CRC
Genencor International International Micromat







Bath University UK UK
Bordeaux University France Micromat
DSMZ Germany Micromat
Imperial College London UK IC
Nevada University United States
University of Auckland New Zealand
University of Canterbury New Zealand UC
University of Ghent Belgium Micromat
University of Liege Belgium Micromat
University of Nottingham UK Micromat
University of Tasmania Australia CRC





United States Antarctic Program  
Table 1: Organisations identified in ATCM XXVII IP-106 (2004) as either currently 
or recently engaged in activities related to Antarctic bioprospected materials.  
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The general conclusion from the Information Paper survey was that  
 
‘scope for development exists…however, current constrains on the industry mean that 
there is not currently a priority to focus on Antarctic samples.  While patent 
applications reflect a high level of interest at the opening of this “new frontier”, 
industry has reduced their level of involvement due to an underdeveloped knowledge 
base and uncertainty regarding sample ownership and intellectual property rights.’240  
 
We may never be able to ascertain the level of bioprospecting activity and the results 
of that activity to date.  We should however begin to collect data from researchers 




While activities related to bioprospecting are underway in the Antarctic region, a 
definition of the activity has not been agreed upon internationally and has not yet been 
developed for the Antarctic region. Breaking down the activity into phases may help 
in understanding the activity itself, but it does little to contribute to any discussions 
regarding commercialisation in the Antarctic region and it does not help arguments 
regarding rights to Antarctic resources. While a comprehensive definition is clearly 
needed, it may be difficult for the Consultative State parties to reach consensus on a 
definition, as national definitions of the activity vary or in some cases bioprospecting 
has yet to be considered domestically.  However, the first step in the regulation of this 
activity in the Antarctic will be for the parties to agree on a definition.  Once the 
activity is defined, extent of the activity to date and results produced to date should be 
surveyed, perhaps through SCAR.  
 
While bioprospecting appears to involve little environmental impact, there are always 
possible impacts associated with any human activity in Antarctica. Therefore, the 
search and collection phase may well involve impacts that are more than minor or 
transitory. The notion of protection of the intrinsic value of the Antarctic has yet to be 
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tested.  It is unclear what this obligation entails nor even if it implies any obligation in 
practice.  If the intrinsic value of Antarctica means simply that Antarctica should be 
protected from adverse environmental impacts, then most activities in Antarctica may 
continue.  If however it means that Antarctica has value simply by its very existence 
and that no direct interference with the place should be allowed, no human activity, 
including bioprospecting, would be permitted in the Antarctic region. It is doubtful 
that this idea will ever formerly be debated within the Antarctic Treaty arena at least 
in the near future. 
  66
   
 II LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BIOPROSPECTING IN THE ANTARCTIC: USE 





The principles of the Antarctic Treaty System are often debated.  Most would agree 
that the Antarctic Treaty, the founding document of that system, lays down at least 
two fundamental legal obligations, which are: 
 
1. Peaceful use of the Antarctic Treaty region; and 
2. Freedom of scientific investigation and co-operation toward that end, in the 
Antarctic Treaty region. 
 
Part II of the thesis concentrates on these two fundamental legal obligations of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Other scholars include a third obligation, that is, the obligation to 
compromise on sovereignty in the Antarctic.241  
 
In addition to the obligations established by the Antarctic Treaty, the recently enacted 
Protocol lays down a further fundamental obligation for all signatory parties, the 
obligation to actively protect the Antarctic environment.  This obligation is 
particularly evident in the access and reporting requirements found in Annex I of the 
Protocol.242 
 
The broad question to be considered in this part of the thesis is, does allowing or 
conducting Antarctic bioprospecting infringe the Treaty obligations of peaceful 
purposes and freedom of scientific investigations? Answering this question requires 
consideration of Articles I, II and III of the Antarctic Treaty. The discussions 
surrounding the sovereignty compromise obligation and the environmental obligation 





                                                 
241 See R Tucker Scully ‘The Antarctic Treaty System as a System’ in Richard Herr, Robert Hall and 
Marcus Haward (eds) Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or change? (1990) 95; See also Loraine Elliott, 
International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic (1994) 35-38. 
242 Protocol, Annex I Environmental Impact Assessment. 
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B Article I Antarctic Treaty: Peaceful Purposes Obligation 
 
From the start of the negotiations of the Antarctic Treaty, the ‘peaceful use’ of 
Antarctica constituted the fundamental objective.243  The inclusion of such an 
objective was motivated by a desire to retain Antarctica’s non-militarised status in the 
context of the fear of the spread of the Cold War. 
 
The Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty states that the governments of the signatory 
parties recognise ‘that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue 
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes…’244  This preamble statement 
reflects Article I, paragraph 1, of the Antarctic Treaty which states that, ‘Antarctica 
shall be used for peaceful purposes only.’ The Antarctic Treaty has thus ensured the 
use of the continent for peaceful purposes only, at least as regards the current 45 
signatory states. 
 
What peaceful purposes specifically means, and more importantly what it practically 
does, is not defined within the Antarctic Treaty System. Even in 1959, the phrase was 
‘clouded in ambiguity’245 and the parties devoted little time in their discussions to its 
precise meaning.  In a strict sense a ‘peaceful purpose’ carries with it a negative 
connotation.  That is, ‘let’s not do anything with a military purpose in the region.’  
This interpretation made sense in 1959 when the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated and 
signed, as the United States in particular did not wish to see the Cold War spread into 
the Antarctic region.  Some go so far as to cite Antarctica under the Antarctic Treaty 
as the first successful attempt at regional disarmament.  This is, in fact, misleading for 
two reasons.  First, Antarctica never hosted established military bases, although the 
majority of the original Antarctic stations were indeed set up by military personnel 
from the original signatory countries. So that there was, in fact, nothing to disarm. 
Secondly, others have argued that while the peaceful purposes objective gives the 
perception that it demilitarised Antarctica it does not in fact do so,246 as there is still a 
military presence as such in Antarctica as many national Antarctic research 
programmes utilize military personnel to support their operations.  The objectives of 
                                                 
243 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica (1986) 70. 
244 Antarctic Treaty, preamble para 1. 
245 Beck, above n 243, 70. 
246 See Alan Hemmings, ‘Is Antarctica Demilitarised?’ in Richard Herr, Robert Hall and Marcus 
Haward (eds), Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or change? (1990) 225. 
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these operations, however, are non-military - they are there to provide science 
logistics support. 
 
While the objective of maintaining a non-militarised zone in the region was of critical 
importance in the late 1950s when the Treaty was negotiated and signed, the science 
of the International Geophysical Year (IGY 1957-58) became the primary means of 
implementing the peaceful purposes objective.  So the obligation has come to be 
interpreted to mean that scientific investigation and associated activities represent 
examples of peaceful purpose.  
 
Outside the National Antarctic Science Programmes and their associated activities, it 
is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of other actions which meet the obligation as 
to peaceful purpose. In 1959, the limited range of feasible human activities that could 
take place in the Antarctic was ‘an important ingredient’247 for the governments 
agreeing on the Antarctic Treaty. Clearly the goal was to maintain a non-militarised 
zone.  However the dividing line between peaceful and military purposes was not an 
easy one to draw, as certain peaceful, even scientific, activities possessed possible 
military purpose.248 
 
Bush249 described any activity that was a peaceful activity as legitimate and therefore 
allowed in the Antarctic.  He made two further qualifications: first, that the activity 
met the environmental criteria laid down now within the Protocol and second, that the 
activity have some value to science and/or support scientific cooperation in the region, 
this being the other fundamental obligation of the Antarctic Treaty. Arguably, 
following Bush’s criteria, commercial activities, that is those that are carried out 
primarily to make a profit, may be carried out in the Antarctic as long as they are 
‘peaceful’, do not harm the environment and have some value to science. Currently, 
within the Antarctic Treaty region there are two commercial industries that are carried 
out within the Antarctic Treaty System, but external to any National Antarctic 
Programme.  These are tourism and marine fisheries. Both are briefly discussed below 
                                                 
247 William Bush, ‘The Next 40 Years: The Challenge of Economic Globalisation and 21st Century 
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Until 1966, virtually all expeditions to Antarctica were organised by governments or 
had some measure of governmental backing. In that year, there appeared, for the first 
time, a commercially organized, ship-based tourism expedition.  Since then 
commercial tourism has steadily increased and regular airborne tourism began in 
1977. Airborne tourism diminished considerably after the tragic crash on Mount 
Erebus of the Air New Zealand plane on 28 November 1979 when 257 lives were lost.  
But the last summer season (2003/04) saw the largest number250 of tourism visitors to 
the Antarctic region. Antarctic tourism principally involves short, ship-based visits 
especially in the Antarctic Peninsula region.  Passengers travelling ashore are well 
supervised and little time is actually spent on continental Antarctica. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties formally recognised this increase in 
non-governmental activities in 1994, when they approved Recommendation XVIII: 
Tourism and Non-Governmental Activities.  The recommendation while not directly 
supporting activities outside those of National Antarctic Programmes does: 
 
1. Acknowledge the increase in the development of tourist activities in the Antarctic; 
2. Note that such visitors are subject to legally binding obligations including, upon 
its entry into force, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty; and 
3. Desire to ensure that those who visit the Antarctic do so in accordance with 
existing obligations and in accordance with the Protocol pending its entry into 
force.  
 
An attachment on ‘Guidance for Visitors to the Antarctic’ was produced as was 
‘Guidance for those Organising and Conducting Tourism and Non-Governmental 
Activities in the Antarctic’.  This implies an acceptance that non-governmental, 
                                                 
250 For the 2003/04 season IAATO reported 19,500 visited the region on IAATO member vessels-a 
45% increase over 2002-03. See IAATO statistics for visitor numbers trends from 1992-2004 at 
www.iaato.org. 
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commercial activities, while not directly supporting the objectives of the Antarctic 
Treaty do not contravene those objectives and therefore should not necessarily be 
prohibited. 
 
Tourism meets the Bush criteria, in that, it is a peaceful activity, which some argue 
directly supports and contributes to science, and if carried out properly does not cause 
environmental harm.  The contribution to science stems from the logistical support 
tourism vessels provide to national science programmes and individual researchers 
from those programmes and also, the industry reports from the information they 
collect on biodiversity, such as reporting whale sightings.  The tourism industry 
reports that Antarctic tourists become important ambassadors for the conservation and 
protection of the Antarctic region, a factor which indirectly supports science in that it 
prevents the region from being used for things other than scientific research. The 
International Association of Antarctica Tourism Operators (IAATO) guidelines 
supply its Antarctic industry members with strict guidelines to safeguard the well 
being of passengers and IAATO and the Protocol provide for guidelines to protect the 
Antarctic environment.  While most of the tourist vessels are operated by IAATO 
members, some are not; this may mean some operators act outside of the guidelines 
that IAATO has set.  
 
2 Marine Fisheries 
 
A second example is that of marine fisheries in the Southern Ocean. This commercial 
activity differs from tourism in at least one respect, in that it is a highly extractive 
activity. It is a very lucrative and large industry.251 Southern Ocean fisheries are 
managed by the CCAMLR Commission, the body established by CCAMLR itself.   
 
While problems with Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing in the 
CCAMLR region have seen an increase in national navies involved in surveillance 
and policing in the region and while the continued allowance of the activity may have 
the potential to escalate into a ‘scene or object of international discord’,252 fishing 
remains a non-governmental, commercial and legitimate activity within the Antarctic 
                                                 
251 See www.ccamlr.org for Southern Ocean fisheries catch statistics. 
252 Antarctic Treaty, preamble. 
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Treaty region, as long as it is carried out within the regulations of CCAMLR and the 
relevant national fisheries authorities. 
 
Considering the Bush criteria in regard to these marine fisheries, the activity arguably 
has some value to science in that catch statistics may contribute to our understanding 
of marine species. It is however a highly extractive industry which, thus, has a high 
impact on the marine environment.253 The impact and conflict of IUU fishing has 
created disharmony in the region leading to the recent increased involvement of 
Southern Ocean surveillance by naval personnel.254 While this surveillance increases 
the number of armed forces personnel in the region, their focus is not the strategic use 
of the Antarctic region, their presence is focused on enforcement of CCAMLR 
regulations in the CCAMLR fishing zones or surveillance of recognised Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) around the Sub-Antarctic Islands.  So that while the initial 
purpose of the activity may be peaceful and while the carrying out of fishing activities 
in the CCAMLR region by abiding CCAMLR members is also peaceful, the presence 
of IUU fisheries in the region, some of which fly flags from CCAMLR member 
states255 has the potential to lead to international discord in the region. This may lead 
to increased armed forces presence and then threaten the peaceful use of the region, 
ultimately breaching the strict interpretation of ‘peaceful purposes’.  For the 
foreseeable future, however, this appears to be an unlikely result of marine fisheries in 
the region. 
 
3 Mineral Exploitation 
 
The focus on a non-renewal fossil fuel supply in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
turned the attention of the world to Antarctic mineral resources which led Antarctic 
Treaty parties to consider mineral exploitation in the Antarctic region. No exploitation 
of Antarctic minerals was taking place at that time and a voluntary moratorium on any 
such activity was put in place to which all Antarctic Treaty parties adhered.  This set 
the scene for the negotiation of an Antarctic mineral resource convention. 
                                                 
253 Including high seabird mortality rates. 
254 See for example the case of the Australian navy and their pursuit of IUU fishers all the way to the 
South African EEZ. 
255 See for example CCAMLR meeting 2003 on Russian involvement in IUU fishing in the Southern 
Ocean. 
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After many years, the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 
from Antarctica256 (CRAMRA) was negotiated. Some Antarctic Treaty State 
governments believed that CRAMRA, although providing a high level of 
environmental protection, would be seen as ‘an incentive to mine’,257 which led to 
concerns regarding the peaceful nature of the outcomes of allowing the activity. So 
once again, while the purpose of the activity was peaceful, its nature had the potential 
to lead to international discord in the region. For example, the Australian Government 
said, ‘it was concerned that the Minerals Convention could become an incentive to 
mining and prospecting, which could in turn generate expectations and pressures 
which would threaten the basic co-operation amongst Treaty parties.’258   
 
Consideration of mineral exploitation before, during and after the negotiation of 
CRAMRA has caused significant debate.  First, some argue that CRAMRA laid down 
strict environmental safeguards so that the activity, while highly extractive, would not 
have caused significant environmental damage. Arguably, the activity would have 
certainly resulted in more than a minor or transitory impact on the environment. Risk 
to the environment is the often cited reason why France and Australia259 refused to 
sign CRAMRA which would have allowed mining in Antarctica. Their refusal to sign 
meant that CRAMRA could never come into being as the convention required 
acceptance by all Antarctic territorial claimant states.  
 
Recalling the Bush criteria that the activity must contribute significantly to scientific 
investigation, is also not met in this instance.  While mineral extraction may well be 
the result of good science, it is not science itself. While some argue that mineral 
extraction provides the science community with information that they would 
otherwise not have uncovered, it is suggested that only the exploration and discovery 
phase of the process can be said to contribute significantly to our understanding of a 
region, and not the extensive exploitation of the mineral resource itself which 
                                                 
256 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for signature on 25 
November 1988, 27 ILM (1988) (not in force) (‘CRAMRA’). 
257 See Richard Woolcott, ‘Changes and Challenges’ in Robert Herr, Richard Hall and Marcus Haward 
(eds) Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or change? (1990) 21, 26. 
258 Ibid. 
259 See the France-Australia Working Paper on Possible Components for a Comprehensive Convention 
for the Preservation and Protection of Antarctica, XV ATCM (2002). 
  73
   
CRAMRA would have allowed for. Finally, the Bush criteria required that the activity 
must be peaceful in order for it to be legitimately carried out there. Like marine 
fisheries, while the initial intention of the activity is a peaceful purpose, it is probable 
that such an activity, recalling the words of Australia, could threaten the basic co-
operation of the Treaty parties. This has the potential to lead to discord in the region, 
and certainly to discord in the governing of the region, thus ultimately breaching the 
peaceful purposes objective.  Any significant Antarctic mineral find, at a time such as 
the present when the world’s fossil fuels are being depleted, has the potential to lead 
governments to war to control those resources. Thus while mining is now prohibited 
within the Antarctic Treaty area by the Protocol it is proposed that the activity would 





Bioprospecting also appears, prima facie, to be an activity with a peaceful purpose, 
which not only has high scientific value-adding to our understanding of the 
biodiversity of the region, but also potentially which generates other benefits that 
could be applied for the good of all mankind and be of commercial value.  If carried 
out under the strict environmental regulations of the Protocol, it has been proposed 
that bioprospecting will do little if any significant harm to the Antarctic environment. 
Assuming technology allows for the synthesis of any bioactive compound, molecule 
or material that is initially extracted from the Antarctic, there is little risk of species 
depletion or extinction, probably less so than there is with fisheries260 and its related 
activities.  
 
One potential problem with bioprospecting in Antarctica then, appears to be 
analogous to the IUU marine fisheries and to mineral exploitation. That is, that any 
commercial activity related to resource extraction, especially in an area where 
sovereignty is undetermined, while initially carried out for a peaceful purpose and 
otherwise legitimate as regards the Bush criteria, has the potentiality to create internal 
and external conflict in the region.261 This conflict opens up the possibility that the 
                                                 
260 Burke, above n 107, refers to the commercial stock depletion of Patagonian toothfish already. 
261 See Wolfrum, above n 130.  
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Antarctic region could see an increased armed forces presence with the objective of 
protecting the strategic and economic value of the region.  This would breach the 
peaceful purposes objective as laid down in the Antarctic Treaty.   
 
Unlike the IUU problem however, and arguably unlike any mineral extraction that 
might have taken place in the Antarctic under CRAMRA, any biomaterials that are 
extracted from the Antarctic will always carry the ‘Antarctic stamp’.  That is, it will 
be difficult to argue that your isolated bioproduct was derived from outside of the 
Antarctic region262 and therefore not subject to regulation from the Antarctic Treaty 
System, if the very compound, gene or molecule derived exists and is valuable 
because of its extreme adaptation to an Antarctic environment. Mineral resources and 
even many fish species extracted from the Antarctic region do not carry this unique 
signature.  This may then limit the extent of any ‘IUU bioprospecting’ or biopiracy263 
that could ever take place in the Antarctic, and thereby reduces any potentiality for 
conflict. As with IUU fishing, however, the lack of legal sanctions within CCAMLR 
in particular and generally throughout the Antarctic Treaty System, usually means that 
illegal activities may be worth their inherent risk.  Any bioprospecting regulation 
should therefore include sanction provisions which, while difficult to enforce, might 
provide the necessary deterrent to any illegal action. 
  
Generally there appears to be at least the perception with respect to any commercial 
activity in the Antarctic that, if the stakes get too high, the activity could generate 
expectations and pressures leading to actions which threaten the peaceful purposes 
objective of the Antarctic Treaty. When mining was perceived to have this capacity to 
disrupt, the solution was the same that applied to the strict military and nuclear 
activities in the region, that is, these activities are banned.  While appearing to be 
legally legitimate within the letter of the Antarctic Treaty, that is, for being peaceful 
in its purpose, bioprospecting in the Antarctic could arguably be banned simply 
because, as a potentially lucrative commercial activity, it may lead to international 
                                                 
262 This is often the argument cited by IUU fishing operators, that is, that the fish was caught outside of 
the CCAMLR region. 
263 See Graham Dutfield, Intellectual property, biogenetic resources and traditional knowledge (2004), 
52-59; Biopiracy is defined as the exploitation and appropriation by unauthorized parties, of biological 
and genetic resources and/or associated traditional medicinal knowledge, without the approval or 
consent of their holders, and without adequate compensation. 
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discord and might thus lead to a breach of the peaceful purposes objective of the 
Treaty.  
 
While the obligation to peaceful purpose, only falls on Antarctic Treaty Party states, 
any third party state adjudged likely to threaten the peace of the area will be subject to 
the combined pressures of the parties ‘either to constrain its activities or become a 
party to the Antarctic Treaty.’264 
 
C Articles II & III Antarctic Treaty: Freedom of Scientific Investigation 
Obligation 
 
1 The Role of Science 
 
Immediately prior to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, scientific activities were 
demonstrated during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) to defuse sovereignty 
issues.  Auburn said, ‘The reason that Antarctica is uniquely dedicated to science does 
not arise from its particular suitability for research but rather from political 
necessity.’265 The success of the IGY was a platform that became a new opportunity 
for states with involvement in the Antarctic region. Today, for an Antarctic Treaty 
State party, obtaining Consultative State status depends on the degree to which that 
state is involved in Antarctic science.  Only states conducting ‘substantial scientific 
research’266 in the Antarctic are entitled to apply for Consultative Party status. Thus 
science gives these states an opportunity to vote, and in a consensus voting system 
therefore a ‘veto’ right, on key issues affecting Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. 
 
 
Today, science is still often stated as the ‘currency’267 of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
In the Antarctic context, science is said to have different goals from those of science 
conducted domestically,268 it is the legitimising activity in the Antarctic region.  For 
states maintaining and leading science programs in the Antarctic, operating a National 
                                                 
264 Beck, above n 243, 88. 
265 Auburn above n 74, 99. 
266 Antarctic Treaty, art IX (2).  
267 Patrick Quilty, ‘Antarctica as a Continent for Science’ in Robert Herr, Richard Hall and Marcus 
Haward (eds) Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or change? (1990) 29, 29-30.; See also Bush, above n 
247, 131. 
268 Quilty, above n 267. 
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Antarctic science programme is the key to international credibility.  Science programs 
allow small nations an opportunity to operate as equals alongside more powerful 
states in the international arena.  Therefore, Antarctic science allows nations to 
influence decisions in a large and important area of the world. This credibility also 
extends from the nation within the Antarctic Treaty System, to credibility of the 
Antarctic Treaty System itself within the broader international community as a whole.   
 
2 The Commercialisation of Science: Credibility diminished? 
 
Although science is the recognised currency in the Antarctic, its role269 and substance 
has changed dramatically since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, and it will 
continue to change.270  This change is evidenced by two trends.  The first trend is the 
increased recognition of the policy relevance of science and use of science towards 
international policy development.  In the past, the driver for undertaking scientific 
research was national interests that provided strategic operations in the southern 
hemisphere and gave the nation credibility within the Antarctic Treaty System as well 
as internationally.  Also, to some extent, the operation of long-term scientific stations 
in Antarctica, have been used in support of territorial claims.271 
 
Importantly for the purposes of bioprospecting discussions, is the second trend, the 
trend away from basic or ‘blue-skies’ science towards more applied or directed 
science. So that rather than basing scientific research on curiosity, science is 
increasingly directed at very specific questions which may address issues of global 
importance, or issues relating to the future protection, management, and utilization of 
the Antarctic and its natural resources. This should not come as a surprise, as it was 
predicted early on that scientific research would be directed at answering specific 
questions. But along side of this, it was also predicted that this directed science would 
be ‘commissioned’, where commissioned represents increased investment by 
commercial organisations, seeking to derive a commercial or industrial advantage 
from that research.272 
 
                                                 
269 Ibid 31. 
270 See Press, above n 174,162. 
271 This is true-even recognising the provisions of Antarctic Treaty, art IV (2). 
272 See Press, above n 174, 162-163. 
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Quilty argued as early as 1990, that if too high a proportion of Antarctic science was 
directed, there might be criticism in the long term that the Antarctic Treaty System is 
a convenient and ‘cosy club for those with other than pure goals for the region.’273  
Directed science has increased even since his statement in 1990, with many National 
Antarctic Programmes shifting focus from basic science towards directed research. 
There has also been the accompanying increase in commissioned research that Press 
predicted.  The general questions this raises are: does this change in science towards a 
more directed, commissioned approach breach the scientific investigation and 
cooperation objective of the Antarctic Treaty? Should directed scientific research 
projects, especially those that are commissioned, be banned from the Antarctic 
region? Does that go as far as meaning that all commercial activities should be banned 
from the region as breaches of Articles II and III of the Antarctic Treaty?  If 
conducting commercial or commissioned science is not a direct breach of the 
Antarctic Treaty it still may reduce the credibility of the Antarctic Treaty System and 
that of the states operating within that system.   
 
The answer to these questions has specific relevance to the question of allowing 
bioprospecting in the region.  Bioprospecting is an example of the continuing shift 
towards commercially-driven, applied, directed science in the Antarctic.  It is argued 
that this shift will also create criticism that the Antarctic Treaty System is once again, 
as with mineral exploitation, turning its attention away from the pure goals for the 
region, as evidenced by the IGY, for the benefit of the ‘cosy club’.  This assumes of 
course that the goals for the region are, or at least were at one point as pure as the 
snow.   
 
With this in mind the questions regarding the legal implication of bioprospecting in 
the Antarctic are: Is bioprospecting simply an activity that should be considered 
scientific investigation and which, therefore, supports the obligation to promote 
freedom of scientific investigation and co-operation toward that end or is it more than 
that? If it is a commercial activity that does not contribute to the obligation for 
scientific investigation in the region then is it an activity that should be banned from 
the Antarctic region? Bioprospecting has been referred to as simply another ‘flavour 
                                                 
273 Quilty, above n 267, 37. 
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of science.’274 While this appears to be unhelpful in the quest to uncover an adequate 
definition of the activity, it does imply the bioprospecting should be allowed to 
proceed in the Antarctic just as other science is allowed to proceed.  That is, under the 
strict environmental regulations of the Protocol and within the context of the 
additional obligations of the Antarctic Treaty. For the purposes of these discussions, 
the obligations prescribed in Articles II and III are discussed below. 
 
3 International Cooperation in Scientific Investigation 
 
The notion of international cooperation in scientific investigation supported generally 
by the Antarctic Treaty and specifically in its preamble and in Articles II and III, is 
considered here.  Bush, among others, has argued that there is the potential if the trend 
towards ‘economics research’ continues to transform the traditional non-controversial 
scientific cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty to one of competition, it could lead 
to controversy and have serious consequences for cooperation between states under 
the Antarctic Treaty regime.275   
 
While it may be true that an increase in commercially-funded scientific research in the 
Antarctic could lead to less collaboration between research teams, scientific research 
in Antarctica is extremely difficult; it almost always requires cooperative effort 
between states at both a practical and political level. Even the US requires cooperation 
from New Zealand for its operations at McMurdo Station and Amundsen-Scott South 
Pole Station, and to a lesser extent to Chile and Australia for its operations in the 
Antarctic Peninsula and Southern Ocean regions. Without the cooperative 
arrangements that have been in place among those nations since the 1950s, it would 
be difficult and expensive for the US to carry out the broad science programme that it 
currently maintains in the Antarctic. 
 
Some academics have questioned whether bioprospecting generates ‘scientific 
observations and results’.276 Since only scientific obligations and results are required 
to be made freely available and exchanged under the Antarctic Treaty Article III 
                                                 
274 See Supply Workgroup Report from the Bioprospecting in Antarctica Workshop, Christchurch, 
(2003). 
275 See Bush, above n 247, 137-139. 
276 See, eg, Jabour-Green and Nicol, above n 23,100. 
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obligation, clarification on the issue is important. Some argue that bioprospecting 
does not. The argument presented is that any bioprospecting is simply data collection 
for the purposes of resource related activities and which arguably would not impose 
exchange and free availability obligations because it is not scientific observations and 
results.  It is difficult to see what would not be considered to fall within this broad 
category. It has also been suggested, however, that the sample collection (done in 
Antarctica) and the isolation, characterisation and culture phases (done in a national 
laboratory) are scientific investigation, while downstream processes including 
screening for bioactivities and any subsequent product development fall outside of 
scientific investigation and fall within a category referred to as ‘exploitation-driven 
science’.277 For some it is simply ‘resource exploration’.278 While there has been little 
debate on this point it would appear that downstream product development may in 
fact fall outside of the scientific investigation definition, however it seems 
conceivable that it could well be interpreted as ‘result’.   Informed discussion is 
needed before any conclusions can be drawn.  
 
While neither ‘scientific investigation’ nor is the phrase ‘scientific observations and 
results’ are defined in the Antarctic Treaty, the matter was raised during the Antarctic 
Treaty negotiations. It was not seriously debated even despite UK concerns that 
national programme activities might be carried out under the ‘cover of research’.279   
The concern during the negotiations was that activities labelled ‘scientific 
investigation’ would actually be military or non-peaceful activities hiding behind the 
veil of science, or were in reality, sovereignty-related. Consideration of the definition 
of ‘scientific investigation’ today must be done in the context of the current political 
arena. That is, Antarctic research programmes are assuming a more applied character 
and it is being questioned whether this applied character should be considered 
scientific investigation or merely the first stage in resource exploitation. The 
distinguishing line is difficult to draw. For example in the 1980s, the British Antarctic 
Survey (BAS) science programme focused on ‘resource-oriented research’280 in the 
physical science context. The borderline between scientific investigation and resource 
                                                 
277 Ibid 102. 
278 Alfred Soons, ‘Regulation of Marine Scientific Research by the European Community and Its 
Member States’ (1992) 23 Ocean Development and International Law 259, 260. 
279 Beck, above n 240, 107. 
280See British Antarctic Survey (BAS), Memorandum of the British Antarctic Survey, 6 Dec 1982. 
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exploration proves vague and confused281 and it is difficult if not impossible to 
separate pure research from applied research, and often the former leads to the later.  
Also in many cases it is impossible to predict the commercial implications of any 
scientific research. 
 
The current move in the Antarctic region towards research into understanding the 
biological environment and the regions’ biodiversity282 may cloud the distinction 
between these pure science programmes and any bioprospecting that is directly related 
to this research or is a result of this research.  Therefore while it has been proposed 
that bioprospecting activities are simply another ‘flavour of science’ which does 
represent scientific investigation and therefore generates scientific observations and 
results, the difficulty with allowing bioprospecting in the Antarctic may stem from the 
fact that in general it is ultimately a commercially-driven activity. The distinction 
from this activity and other scientific investigation may therefore be found in its 
commercial direction as revealed by the source of the funding which supports it. This 
factor may require consideration in any application for logistics support to Antarctica. 
 
 
4 Articles II and III Antarctic Treaty: The Extent of the Obligation 
 
 
The few discussions to date surrounding the legal implications of bioprospecting in 
the Antarctic have focused on the Article II and III obligations of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Exactly what the extent of these obligations mean for Antarctic Treaty State parties 
and, whether bioprospecting is an activity that can legally be carried out in the 
Antarctic, while allowing state parties to continue to meet these obligations, is 
problematic. 
 
The second fundamental obligation of the Treaty, that of freedom of scientific 
investigation, is first mentioned in the preamble. The Treaty then states the obligation 
in a general way in its Article II, saying that ‘Freedom of scientific investigation in 
Antarctica and co-operation toward that end, as applied in the International 
Geophysical Year, shall continue…’ In support of this, Article III goes on to give 
                                                 
281 Beck, above n 243, 108. 
282 For example, New Zealand’s BIOROSS marine biodiversity programme and the Latitudinal 
Gradients Project (LGP). 
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specific indications of what was foreseen by the Treaty Parties in Article II.    Article 
III states: 
 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, 
as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to 
the greatest extent feasible and practicable: 
 
a. information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged 
to permit maximum economy of and efficiency of operations;   
 
b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and 
stations; 
 
c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made 
freely available. 
 
Bush argues that Articles II and III only served to ‘crystallize[d] pre-existing state 
practice’.  He also noted that the phrase ‘freedom of scientific investigation’ implied a 
‘freedom of movement in and around Antarctica by surface and air, at least for the 
purposes of scientific investigation.’283 While this seems trivial, it is the first glimpse 
at the compromise on sovereignty that the Treaty parties would have to agree to. 
Generally, it gave Antarctic Treaty state parties the right to freely move about the 
Antarctic continent, regardless of any states’ position as to territorial claims, when 
movement usually within a territory is under the control of the sovereign. 
 
The provisions were codified by a Recommendation284 which states the standard 
format for exchange of information.  This standard format includes providing details 
to other Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties such as advance notification of 
research plans and logistics and supply arrangements. Today, the exchange and free 
availability obligation has come to be more widely interpreted.  Many states cite the 
phrase to imply that all activities related to scientific investigation on the continent 
should be shared and be made available for free or without reservation to anyone who 
requests the information. The Legal Workgroup from the Bioprospecting in Antarctica 
Workshop believed the obligation was for the information to be placed into the 
‘public domain’ and they agreed that this was not necessarily synonymous with ease 
of access to data.285 
                                                 
283 Bush, above n 243, 53. 
284 ATCM Recommendation VIII-6, ATCM VIII (1975). 
285 Supply Workgroup, above n 274. 
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Whatever the current extent of the obligation, it appears that the ‘freedom of scientific 
investigation’ obligation has historically been met by all Antarctic Treaty State 
parties.  Through the cooperative arrangement of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting system and related organisations such as the Council of Managers of 
National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP), all National Antarctic Science Program 
information is prepared and presented to all Treaty parties at the annual meetings.  
Many of the programmes operate cooperative arrangements when providing air, 
marine and surface support, so that generally there is no restriction on freedom of 
scientific investigation in a practical sense. It is the more specific obligation laid down 
in Article III that may prove to be the most difficult to interpret and apply in the 
context of bioprospecting activities in the Antarctic. Further consideration of this 
point is presented below. 
 
5 Article III Antarctic Treaty: Further Consideration 
 
Bush notes that the Antarctic Treaty parties realised as early as 1973 that it was 
Article III, with its obligation to make freely available scientific results and 
observations from Antarctica, which would have implications for the exploration of 
economic resources of the region.286 This is because activities related to the 
exploration of economic resources287 has the potential to place limits on free 
availability of observations and results.  The question is, if this potentiality is realised, 
are these limits appropriate within the Article III obligations of the Antarctic Treaty? 
 
While there have been few problems to date with either sections a or b of Article III, 
paragraph 1, in discussions involving bioprospecting in the Antarctic, problems do 
appear to arise as regards the extent of the obligation in section c. Article III (1) (c) is 
repeated here in its entirety, and reads: 
 
                                                 
286 See Bush, above n 243, 55; See Antarctic Treaty Document AT30051973 ‘Report of a Meeting of 
Experts organised by the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation on existing law relevant to the authorisation or 
prohibition of mineral exploration for commercial purposes in the Antarctic Treaty area’, section 23. 
287 Jabour-Green and Nicol prefer to utilise the phrase ‘commercialisation of science’ instead of 
‘exploration of economic resources’ when asking this question. 
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1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting 
Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable: 
 
c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and 
made freely available. 
 
An Antarctic Treaty document of 1972 describes Article III (1) (c) as making 
‘possible the exchange of scientific information freely and directly between scientific 
organisations.’288  The precise nature, however, of the disclosure and exchange 
requirements imposed by Art III (1) (c) is uncertain.289  To date, little debate on the 
issue has been required as scientific investigation has primarily been a result of state 
government funded and supported expeditions which carries with it obligations to 
disclose and publish results. Scientists also clearly recognise the value of publishing 
their data, observations and results in peer reviewed journals. Publication has at least a 
three-fold benefit for these scientists: one, it often meets their obligations prescribed 
by National Antarctic Programmes for logistical support for their field research 
component; two, it often attracts new or continuing funding for their research; and 
three, it also advances their international reputation as scientists.  
 
With the emergence of privately-funded commercial research activities, there is not 
always an obligation to publish prescribed by the funding organisation.  This may lead 
to unpublished Antarctic observations and results and may also involve protection of 
associated Intellectual Property. It may also include ‘trade secrets’ limiting the free 
availability of any results, all of which may be in breach of the Article III (1) (c) 
obligation.  In the case of bioprospecting there may already be exclusive collaborative 
arrangements between Antarctic researchers and commercial companies which have 
funded the research and which call for confidentiality and exclusive rights to any 
discoveries. 
 
This is, however, not the first instance of the Antarctic Treaty System dealing with 
availability of observations and results from Antarctica in regard to resources. The 
issue has been discussed in the context of an Antarctic mineral regime. When 
CRAMRA was finalised it included Article 16 dealing with the availability and 
                                                 
288 See Bush, above n 9; See Antarctic Treaty Document AT30101972.01 ‘Report and 
recommendations of the VIIth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, para 11. 
289 Jabour-Green and Nicol, above n 23, 104. 
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confidentiality of data and information.  The article is a reiteration in part of the 
Article III (1) (c) obligation with a two-part proviso and one potentially significant 
difference.  It reads: 
 
Data and information obtained from Antarctic mineral resource activities shall, to the 
greatest extent practicable and feasible, be made freely available, provided that: 
 
(a) as regards data and information of commercial value deriving from prospecting, they 
may be retained by the Operator in accordance with Article 37290; 
 
(b) as regards data and information deriving from exploration or development, the 
Commission shall adopt measures relating, as appropriate, to their release and to 
ensure the confidentiality of data and information of commercial value. 
 
 
The inclusion of this article within CRAMRA implies that the parties were flexible as 
to the extent of the obligation to make data and information freely available, even 
going so far as to ‘ensure the confidentiality of data and information of commercial 
value.’  The article does not make ‘results’ part of the exchange agreement. Whether 
this was a deliberate omission or simply an oversight is unclear. It was one of the 
CRAMRA Commission’s functions to facilitate and promote the exchange of 
information and specifically ‘to adopt measures relating to the availability and 
confidentiality of data and information, including measures pursuant to Article 16’.291 
 
Inclusion of these provisions in CRAMRA was a signal that the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative parties would not limit nor prohibit an activity from taking place in the 
Antarctic region if it generated data of a confidential or commercial character.  This 
implies that any activity that generates confidential or data of commercial value will 
not prima facie mean that the confidential nature of the data will be in breach of the 
Article III (1) (c) ‘freely available’ obligation and therefore the activity may proceed. 
 
 
6 Intellectual Property Rights, Patents and the Article III Obligation 
 
Intellectual Property (IP) is a generic term that refers to a range of private property 
rights292 accorded to ‘creations of the mind’.293  Since the US Supreme Court case of 
                                                 
290 CRAMRA, art 37 deals with obligations surrounding ‘prospecting’. 
291 CRAMRA, art 21 (1) (h). 
292  TRIPS Agreement, preamble, para 4. 
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Diamond v Chakrabarty294 these creations of the mind may include IP rights 
associated with micro-organisms, and micro-organisms are emerging as a large and 
important source of Antarctic biodiversity.  
 
IP rights vary globally and there are many different types of such rights in use today. 
Generally, however, there are three major categories of IP: patents, trademarks and 
copyright. Of these three, patents are of most import to any study concerning 
bioprospecting and genetic resources.295  Patents are the primary means of granting 
exclusive use of a novel product or process to the inventor for a limited period of 
time.  Patents are granted on a national basis and therefore domestic laws dictate the 
treatment, protection and enforcement of patenting rights. They are however also 
subject in some cases to international agreements and constraints. In New Zealand for 
example, patenting rights are provided for under the Patents Act 1953.296 A patent is 
an intellectual property right granted by a state authority which excludes others from 
the use or benefit of a patented invention for a limited time.  In New Zealand, a 
patent’s life is 20 years. 
 
At present there appears to be nothing specific in the domestic law of states which 
prevents an individual or organisation from protecting the IP associated with an 
Antarctic-derived novel product or bioproduct, as long as that product fulfils the 
essential patent criteria under the domestic legislation. The criteria do not allow for 
patenting the discovery itself, that is, the inventor must add a useful step which results 
in a novel product or process. There is no evidence that patenting offices give 
consideration to the fact that the product or process may have been derived from the 
Antarctic region. In fact, many patents already exist (Table 2, next page) in relation to 
Antarctic-derived products and processes.297 All of the Antarctic-related patents 
applied for to date have been from members of an Antarctic Treaty Party state. 
                                                                                                                                            
293  Kim Connelly-Stone, ‘Patents, Property Rights and Benefit-sharing Issues’ in Alan Hemmings and 
Michelle Rogan-Finnemore (eds) Antarctic Bioprospecting (2005) (In press). 
294 Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 447 U.S. 303. 
295 Nicholas Mason, Forging a New Global Commons: Introducing common property into the global 
genetic resource debate (MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2004) 18. 
296 The Patents Act 1953 (NZ). 
297  Sample, above n 6; At least 92 patents referring to Antarctic organisms or molecules extracted from 
them have been filed in the United States and a further 62 patents have been filed in Europe. 
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JP9176036 1988 Cosmetics  
Table 2: List of patents granted in respect of Antarctic biodiversity since 1988.  The 
determination of some sectors was inconclusive from the patent description and the 
list is not exhaustive. (Data compiled by the author from information contained in 




   
Allowing for patenting of products and processes associated with Antarctic 
bioprospecting raises two issues.  The first is of a general nature, that is, that allowing 
patenting would lead to greater involvement of commercial interests in the Antarctic-
this has generally been seen as against the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. This same 
argument was delivered during the negotiation of CRAMRA, that is, that setting up a 
regulatory framework which provided certainty of access and property rights 
regarding mineral resources would only encourage commercial involvement, and 
would act as incentive to mining. With the demise of CRAMRA and the moratorium 
on mining, it is impossible at this stage to know whether this would have proved true.  
Therefore any attempt to negotiate a bioprospecting convention could be seen as 
providing an incentive to bioprospect in the region. 
 
Secondly and more specifically, in the context of the Antarctic Treaty and its Article 
III (1) (c) obligation, the lawfulness of patenting must be considered.  The mandate 
for the free exchange of information has led to fears that commercially focussed 
research, and in particular, patenting would be in breach of Article III and therefore 
would be contrary to the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
While Bush argues that commercial activities may not breach the Article I peaceful 
purposes obligation, he takes an extreme position on the Article III obligation, stating 
that all research of a commercial nature (whether it leads to IP protection or not) is in 
danger of breaching the Article III requirements.  Bush noted that ‘A growth in the 
demand for research of economic relevance is likely to run counter to the Antarctic 
Treaty requirement that “scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be 
exchanged and made freely available.’298 Counter arguments are based on the notion 
that the patent system is in fact a device allowing scientific information and new 
discoveries to enter the public domain, while protecting the inventor’s rights for a 
limited time.   
 
Generally, a patent applicant must meet four requirements in order to be successful. 
Three of these four refer specifically to the invention itself (novelty, non-obviousness, 
& usefulness).  The fourth requirement is that the product or process be described 
                                                 
298 Bush, above n 247, 138. 
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with adequate specification and disclosure.  In the United States for example, the US 
Constitution clearly states that the patent system was established in order to ‘promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’299 So 
that, the United States patent law finds its rationale for allowing patenting in its 
instrumental power to promote scientific progress, not in a basic right to one’s own 
intellectual property.  The patent encourages disclosure of information that otherwise 
might not be open to scrutiny by others while protecting the exclusive right of use of 
the inventor.    
 
In New Zealand that sentiment was supported in the Pharmaceutical Management 
Agency Ltd300case, when Gault J. recently put it thus: ‘The patent system rests on the 
policy that a limited term monopoly will be granted as an incentive to innovation but 
subject to the invention and the best method of carrying it out being disclosed and 
made available…’301 
The patent holder may only control the exploitation of the information, the 
information itself cannot be locked up.302  Whether this really satisfies the Article III 
(1) (c) obligation is at the heart of any debate. While patents promote knowledge 
sharing by requiring the details of the patented invention to be placed in the public 
domain,303 and while this disclosure and sharing of information clearly supports the 
spirit of Article III, it is not clear whether patenting breaches the legal letter of the 
Article III (1)(c) obligation. While the legal letter of the law is usually of fundamental 
importance the spirit of cooperation that has existed amongst Antarctic Treaty parties 
has arguably supported the robustness and effectiveness of the Antarctic Treaty 
System to date and may be of at least some importance. 
Consideration of Antarctic Treaty states that are developing nations must be taken 
with care. There is a widespread belief amongst developing nations that the IP right 
systems are mainly designed by the developed nations for the specific purpose of 
                                                 
299 United States Constitution, art 1 s 8. 
300 Pharmaecutical Management Agency Ltd. V Commissioner of Patents (2000) 2 NZLR 529. 
301 Ibid 533. 
302 Andrew Allen, ‘Biotechnology, Research and IP Law’ in Canterbury University School of Law (ed), 
The Canterbury Law Review  8 (2002) 237-424, 368. 
303 Australian Law Reform Commission, Genes and ingenuity: gene patenting and human health report 
(2004) Sydney, 58. 
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exploiting the natural resources of developing nations304 and are not necessarily a 
device established to promote the progress of science.  Third World Governments see 
no evidence that patents encourage research, saying this is a benefit often wrongly 
cited by industrialised countries.305 This belief must be examined carefully in a system 
that has often been referred to as a ‘rich man’s club’306 but which now consists of 
developed and developing nations.  
For this reason, any regulation within the Antarctic Treaty System on the use of 
Antarctic living resources, which includes patenting rights, may see opposition from 
the developing nations that are Consultative State parties to the Antarctic Treaty.307 
Consensus may thus be difficult to achieve on the formulation of bioprospecting 
regulation which allows for protection of IP rights. 
 
The clause ‘to the greatest extent feasible and practicable’ allows Antarctic Treaty 
parties some discretion;308 and some even argue that this qualification may reduce the 
level of obligation or in fact eliminate the obligation during times when it is not 
feasible of practical to meet it.309  The onus is left to the goodwill and efficiency of 
the state.310 Attention has also been drawn to the use of the word ‘shall’ in the phrase 
and not the more obligatory word ‘will’.  However, in practice the parties have had 
the expectation that the obligation will be met. It also should be noted that the 
acquisition of intellectual property rights is only one phase of a typical bioprospecting 
project.  The first stage, the discovery or collection of biological resources or material, 
does not itself constitute or create intellectual property - a discovery does not equate 
to an invention.311 Therefore any consideration of the legality of bioprospecting in the 
context of the Article III obligation should discuss the legality of the individual phases 
of that activity. 
 
                                                 
304 Krishna Dronamraju, Biological and social issues in biotechnology sharing (1998) 1. 
305 Cary Fowler, ‘Biotechnology, patents and the Third World’ in Vandana Shiva and Ingunn Moser 
(eds) Biopolitics: A feminist and ecological reader on biotechnology (1995) 214, 219. 
306 Beck, above n 243,184. 
307 Keith Suter, Antarctica: private property or public heritage? (1991) 23; Calls inclusion of India in 
ATS a ‘shrewd move’.  
308 Jabour-Green and Nicol, above n 23, 100. 
309 Legal Workgroup, above n 200. 
310 Beck, above n 243,104. 
311 Connelly-Stone, above n 293.  
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7 The Article III Obligation and other International Requirements 
 
(a) The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
1994 (TRIPS Agreement)312 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 
(TRIPS Agreement) is a multilateral treaty with the objectives of reducing 
impediments and distortions to international trade, promoting effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights, and ensuring that measures and procedures 
to enforce those rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.313 
Specifically its article 7 reads: 
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of production and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to the 
balance of rights and obligations.314 
 
It also sets out the requirements regarding patentable subject matter in its article 27 
saying that: 
 
Patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application…patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products 
are imported or locally produces.315   
 
The TRIPS Agreement requires that signatory states must make patents available for 
any invention or creation that satisfies the patenting criteria and in exchange the 
conditions on the patent applicant require that the applicant ‘shall disclose the 
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete’.316   
                                                 
312 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,  opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1869 UNTS 229, entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘TRIPS Agreement’). 
313 TRIPS Agreement, preamble. 
314 TRIPS Agreement, art 7. 
315 TRIPS Agreement, art 27. 
316 TRIPS Agreement, art 29. 
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Importantly all of the Antarctic Treaty state parties are signatories of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  So that any decision within the Antarctic Treaty System that patents 
regarding an Antarctic derived product or process could be withheld simply because 
they are derived from the Antarctic region may contravene the requirements of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement does, however, include allowable exclusions from patenting 
and allowable restrictions on the use of patents.  Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, 
allows states to exclude patents when it is ‘necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality…or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment…’ but they may not 
exclude micro-organisms.317 While the opposition to patenting of biological-related 
inventions on ethical grounds is growing318 there are some countries that do not 
include this provision for exclusion in their domestic patent legislation.319  It may be 
that with the recent calls for creating a global commons over genetic resources and 
also the calls for Antarctic to be regarded as a global commons, the exclusion on 
ethical grounds could be successfully used by the Antarctic Treaty System, or by 
those outside it, who oppose patenting of Antarctic-related bioproducts and processes 
for whatever reason, so that patents in respect of Antarctic bioprospecting could 
legally be denied.  Ethical issues surrounding the patenting of discoveries involving 
micro-organisms and the utilization of genetic resources, remain the subject of policy 
considerations at both a national and international level. Further discussion is required 
regarding these ethical issues to determine the implication of the TRIPS Agreement 






                                                 
317 TRIPS Agreement, art 27 paras 2-3. 
318 Jabour-Green and Nicol, above n 23, 89. 
319 For example the United States and Australia. 
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(b) Convention on Biological Diversity320 & Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of their Utilization321 
 
The discussion of exploitation of natural resources is fundamentally important in the 
context of access to and benefit-sharing from Antarctic biodiversity. While the 
Antarctic Treaty refers to issues related to access to the Antarctic region for the 
purposes of scientific investigation and inspection, it does not contain provisions 
specifically regarding either of these subjects in the context of living resources.  
CCAMLR, of course, considers access to marine living resources for the purposes of 
‘rational use’. 
Outside of the Antarctic Treaty System, there is an international convention which 
takes into consideration regulations for access to and benefiting-sharing from 
biodiversity. This multilateral convention is the 1992 UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). All of the original 12 signatory states to the Antarctic Treaty have 
signed the CBD.  All seven of the territorial claimant states have ratified the CBD, 
however while the US has signed, it has not ratified the Convention. The CBD is ‘a 
framework agreement that outlines goals and policies for the conservation of 
biological diversity…but which leaves countries to operationalize the principles’322 to 
reach those goals and implement policy. The CBD commits parties to take steps to 
achieve three objectives: conserving biological diversity, using natural resources 
sustainably and fairly and equitably sharing benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources.323 It is the last objective that is the focus of this section of the thesis, as the 
management of any benefits derived from Antarctic bioprospecting is of particular 
importance in the context of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
 
                                                 
320 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature on 5 June 1992, 31 ILM (1992) (entered 
into force 29 December 1993) (‘CBD’). 
321 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization, COP VI Decision VI/24 (‘Bonn Guidelines’). 
322 Karin Timmermans, ‘Intellectual property rights and traditional medicine: policy dilemmas at the 
interface’ (2003) 57 Social Science and Medicine 745, 747. 
323 Kevin Grey, ‘Accomplishments and New Directions?’ (2003) 52.1 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly ICLQ 256, 261-263. 
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The CBD reaffirmed324 in Article 3 that states have a sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies.  
Article 15 provides that the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests 
with national governments and is subject to national legislation and where access is 
granted it should be on ‘mutually agreed terms’.  Contracting parties are also required 
to adopt measures that aim to achieve the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the commercial (and other) utilisation of genetic resources, and the results of 
research and development, with the state that provided the resource.325   
With its focus on access and benefit sharing, the CBD's Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) discusses Intellectual Property rights frequently in the context of benefit 
sharing.  At the 6th COP, work included the development of the Bonn Guidelines on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
Out of their Utilisation326 (Bonn Guidelines).  While non-binding, they provide 
guidance on matters such as the negotiation, monitoring and evaluation, 
implementation and enforcement of access and benefit-sharing agreements, 
procedures for obtaining prior informed consent and mechanisms for benefit-
sharing.327 
Ownership of relevant IP rights is listed as only one of a number of possible benefits 
in Appendix II of the Bonn Guidelines. Other benefits include non-monetary benefits 
such as: Sharing of research and development results; Collaboration, cooperation and 
contribution in scientific research and development programmes, particularly 
biotechnological research activities, where possible in the provider country; 
Participation in product development; Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in 
education and training; and admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to 
databases. 
While the Antarctic Treaty System on the whole cannot be a party to the CBD, the 
withdrawn SCAR Working Paper recognised the value that the CBD provided. The 
withdrawn Working Paper stated that: 
                                                 
324 CBD, art 3 is identical to Stockholm Declaration (1972), Principle 21, which was the first 
international agreement to formally state this principle. 
325 CBD, art 15(7); See also CBD art 16, 19 regarding access to and transfer of technology, and 
handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits. 
326 Bonn Guidelines, CBD COP Decision VI/24. 
327 See Connelly-Stone, above n 293. 
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 ‘it would now appear that the Antarctic is now the only part of the world, excluding the 
High Seas, to which the Convention (on Biological Diversity) does not apply. Yet it 
might reasonably be expected that…such a globally accepted progressive 
approach…would be entirely appropriate.’328 
 
It remains to be seen how appropriate the CBD and Bonn Guidelines will be in the 
context of the Antarctic Treaty System and the Antarctic region, especially given that 
the US has not ratified the CBD and the significant, though non-claimant, role the US 
plays in the Antarctic region.  The CBD, based as it is on sovereign ownership does 
however mention in its article 5 that: 
 
‘Each Contracting Party shall…cooperate with other Contracting Parties…through 
competent international organizations, in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
and on other matters of mutual interest, for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity.’329 
 
This article could be relied upon by the contracting state parties to work together 




It appears that prima facie, bioprospecting in Antarctica does not breach the Article I 
obligation for use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only. Like any commercial 
activity however, it may have the potentiality to lead to international discord in the 
region which would breach the peaceful purposes obligation. 
 
The Article II obligation for freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation 
towards that end is not easy to define.  It may mean that all commercial activities in 
the Antarctic are in danger of breaching the obligation. 
 
In particular, it is the obligation for free availability and exchange of scientific 
observations and results as required under Article III that may prove to be the most 
                                                 
328 SCAR, above n 195, para 5. 
329 CBD, art 5. 
  95
   
problematic. Patents for Antarctic-derived bioprospected materials already exist. It 
appears that protection of Intellectual Property rights do not necessarily breach the 
Article III (1) (c) obligation. In fact, requirements under the TRIPS agreement may 
mean that patents for Antarctic-derived, bioprospected materials cannot be denied.  
Consideration of ethical issues surrounding patenting and whether patenting does in 
fact meet the obligation for free availability and exchange must be explored, need to 
be openly and formally discussed before any conclusions are drawn. 
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Sovereignty in Antarctica is contentious. Seven states make territorial claims to 
various portions of Antarctica.  To date, the legitimacy or otherwise of these claims 
remains unresolved. The unresolved nature of the territorial claims means that there is 
no universally recognised sovereign (or sovereigns) over any portion of Antarctica.  
 
International law provides that it is a sovereign state’s right to exploit its natural 
resources. The Antarctic Treaty makes no provision for the utilization of Antarctic 
resources, but importantly, it does involve an obligation on the parties to compromise 
on sovereignty. This means that any legal discussion involving the utilization of the 
Antarctic’s natural resources is problematic.  
 
Watts put it succinctly when he said ‘It is impossible to discuss any legal issue in the 
Antarctic context without sooner or later, and usually it is sooner, having to refer to 
the differences over sovereignty.’330  An essential requirement for the functioning of 
the Antarctic Treaty System has always been balancing sovereignty considerations.331  
This is reflected initially in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and subsequently in the 
conventions and numerous recommendations that restate and reaffirm the Article IV 
agreement. 
 
The unresolved nature of Antarctic sovereignty is a source of contention amongst the 
Antarctic Treaty parties themselves, which while abated because of Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty may reignite in the future. Commercial opportunities involving 
Antarctic resource use and management may well be the source of such conflict. The 
unresolved nature of Antarctic sovereignty is also a source of contention between the 
Antarctic Treaty parties and third party states many of whom believe the resources of 
the Antarctic region should be utilized for the benefit of all mankind. 
 
                                                 
330 Watts, above n 59, 111. 
331 See Davor Vidas, Implementing the Environmental Protection Regime for the Antarctic (2000), 266. 
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Similar issues were faced during the negotiation of CRAMRA and accommodations 
were created to address these internal and external conflicts.  While lessons can be 
learned from CRAMRA consideration must also be directed to emerging norms for 
utilizing resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction and those global resources 
which many believe should either be utilized for the benefit of all mankind or, on the 
contrary, not considered a resource to be utilized at all. 
 
In order to consider the legal implications of bioprospecting in the context of 
unresolved sovereignty, Part III of this thesis will discuss the concept of sovereignty 
itself, the Antarctic territorial claims, and the legal operations of Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Consideration is then given to the internal and external challenges 
that any discussions involving Antarctic resource use must address and the various 
models that can be applied in the context of Antarctic living resources. 
 
B Sovereignty Defined 
 
Sovereignty is defined as ‘the plenary competence of a state, or as the totality of the 
rights and duties of a state which are recognised by international law…which 
connotes the exclusive right of a state to perform state functions within its own 
territories.’332  Central therefore to the notion of sovereignty is the territory within 
which the state exercises its exclusive sovereign rights. Huber J, in the Island of 
Palmas333 case said ‘much depends upon which state possesses territorial sovereignty 
over a given area…if there is no sovereignty over an area, that area inevitably comes 
under an international regime of some sort.’334  Davidson describes sovereignty 
simply as ‘rights of ownership’.335  The right is earned by a sovereign through the 
completion of a number of steps defined in international law.  First, since territory is 
central to the notion of sovereignty, a sovereign must have acquired territory.  This 
may be achieved in a number of ways including discovery of territory that is terra 
nullius (land belonging to no one), the primary mode of acquisition of Antarctic 
territory to date. 
                                                 
332 Triggs, above n 76, 1, 150. 
333 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA, 829. 
334 Ibid. 
335 J Scott Davidson, ‘Antarctic Legal Issues: An Introduction’ (Paper prepared for the University of 
Canterbury Antarctic studies course, Christchurch, 1999). 
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Simply discovering a territory however is not enough, and today, the most 
problematic of issues surrounding territorial claims to Antarctica regard whether 
claims based on discovery have actually been perfected.  Discovery of territory only 
provides an inchoate title336 to the territory at best; effective occupation of the 
territory is then required337 to perfect that title.   There has been much debate 
surrounding the concept of effective occupation338 and what that phrase actually 
means, especially in the context of the vast, remote and harsh environment of 
Antarctica. 
 
The United States, a non-claimant state but an active player in the Antarctic Treaty 
area, developed a stance of non-recognition of the Antarctic claims on the basis that 
effective occupation was a necessary requirement to perfect any sovereign title and 
this had not been achieved. This has constantly been their position339 even though 
they themselves reserve the right to make an Antarctic territorial claim in the future, 
based on acts similar to those made by the current claimants and supported by 
occupation at the numerous US Antarctic research stations. 
 
It is not the intention of this thesis to debate the legitimacy of the current territorial 
claims to Antarctica, this has been covered by many authors.340 The next section is 
confined to a discussion of the territorial claims that we are currently presented with, 
that is, the territorial claims situation frozen as at 1961 by Article IV the Antarctic 
Treaty, and within which we must resolve any legal issues related to bioprospecting in 





                                                 
336 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA, 829. 
337 Clipperton Island (1931) 2 RIAA, 1105. 
338 See, eg, The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933) PCIJ, Ser A/B, No. 53. 
339 The position of the US was first expressed by US Secretary of State Hughes: ‘It is the considered 
opinion of this department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with 
the formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty, unless the discovery is 
followed by an actual settlement of the discovered territory.’ 
340 See generally, Triggs, above n 76 for a full discussion of the legitimacy of the Antarctic territorial 
claims. 
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C Antarctic Territorial Claims 
 
Antarctica was the last continent to be discovered.  While no one argues that 
Antarctica was terra nullius before its discovery, there is some debate on who actually 
was the first to discover continental Antarctica.  The United States, Russia and the 
United Kingdom all claim the honour based on discovery expeditions of Nathaniel 
Brown Palmer (1820), Fabian von Bellinghausen (1819) and James Cook (1773), 
respectively. Today, Antarctica remains the only continent without a permanent341 
human population and the only land area with unresolved sovereignty.   
 
By 1955, seven states had laid territorial claims to sectors of Antarctica, principally 
based on discovery. The legitimacy of those claims and the basis for the claims has 
been debated ever since. Seven states lay claim to seven Antarctic territorial sectors, 
three of these territorial claim sectors overlap and are mutually contested.342 All of the 
seven claims, except one, converge at the south geographic pole and have a northern 
boundary at the 60o South Latitude line.343 All but one employ the sector principle344 
to define their territory. A large portion of Antarctica remains unclaimed (Map 1, 
Appendix 3). In addition to the seven claimant states, two additional states reject all 
seven of the territorial claims, whilst these also maintain that they each have a legal 
basis to claim Antarctic territory should they ever wish to do so.345 To date, none of 
the claims or basis of claims is recognised internationally, except in some cases by 
other ‘neighbouring’ Antarctic claimant states.346  For most of the rest of the 190-odd 
states, ‘Antarctica is seen as the common heritage of all mankind’.347   
 
                                                 
341 While many countries maintain what they refer to as ‘permanent bases’ in Antarctica, the population 
of those stations is rotated usually on an annual basis and the majority of these stations are without 
personnel over the Antarctic winter. 
342 The overlapping claims are those of the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Chile. 
343 Norway does not employ the sector principle to define its claim in Antarctica, preferring to leave the 
northern and southern extent of their claim undefined.  This may effectively create a zone of unclaimed 
territory at the south geographic pole. Chile does not designate a northern boundary for its Antarctic 
land-claiming contiguity with the Chilean landmass.  
344 See Triggs, above n 76 for a full discussion of the sector principle; While not a basis of claim to 
Antarctic territory, states appear to employ the principle as a convenient way to define their boundaries 
in the south polar region. 
345 The United States and Russia (as recognised successor from the USSR) each maintain a basis for 
claim. 
346 Australia, New Zealand, France, Norway and the United Kingdom reciprocally recognise the 
validity of their claims. 
347 Hemmings, above n 190. 
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While Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty provided the parties with a solution for the 
duration of the Treaty, it did not solve the problem and so the territorial claims issue 
remains unresolved. The question as to whether the claims to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica are valid has never been decided upon by international arbitration or 
adjudication.348  This is the situation we are presented with and which forms the 
background for any discussion involving the control and use of Antarctic natural 
resources. 
 
D Article IV Antarctic Treaty: The Obligation to Compromise on Sovereignty 
 
As described in Part I of this thesis, Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty dealt with the 
complicated legal situation regarding territorial claims and sovereignty. Whilst Article 
IV has been described by many as successful,349 it did not resolve, nor was it intended 
to resolve,350 the complicated territorial claims situation in the Antarctic. It simply 
froze the legal status quo as at 1961 and deferred the issue351 for the duration of the 
Antarctic Treaty. The parties recognized in the late 1950s that it would be the only 
outcome that all parties might agree to and would therefore allow them to progress 
with other issues. The bi-focal approach of the article satisfied all the states involved 
in the Antarctic Treaty negotiations and their varying stances on Antarctic 
sovereignty. With Article IV, all parties to the Treaty were guaranteed involvement in 
decision-making on future issues affecting the region.352 Paragraph 1 is the critical 
section of the article for the purposes of this discussion and is repeated here. It states: 
 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:  
 
a. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;  
 
b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;  
                                                 
348 The United Kingdom in 1947 and 1955 made applications to the International Court regarding the 
sovereignty dispute arising from the overlapping claims of the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile.  
Both Argentina and Chile refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court on this point 
therefore the situation was not considered. 
349 See, eg, Joyner, above n 65, 58. 
350 Ibid; Joyner argues that criticism of Antarctic Treaty article IV presupposes that the sovereignty 
issue can be resolved. 
351 Beck, above n 243, 118. 
352 Lorraine Elliot, International Environmental Law and Politics: Protecting the Antarctic (1994) 35. 
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c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-
recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica.  
 
This results in no recognised sovereign for Antarctica in its entirety or for any portion 
of Antarctica.  The seven claimant states still maintain the legitimacy of their 
individual territorial claims and one portion of Antarctica (nearly 20% of the land) has 
never been claimed and remains unclaimed.353 The legal operation of any sovereign 
rights are suspended for the life of the Treaty and no acts or activities by the parties 
can be used to support or deny a territorial claim. The duration of the Treaty is 
indefinite.  
 
For the purposes of discussing the legal implications of bioprospecting in the 
Antarctic, the freezing of the status quo does little to assist in any resolution to the 
question as to who owns or controls Antarctic living resources that are the focus of 
bioprospectors. Beeby identified the problem of authority over Antarctic natural 
resource exploitation as an issue during the mineral convention negotiations and said 
that, ‘Its silence could lead the parties to the Treaty straight back to the central 
problem of sovereignty and conflicting territorial claims. Who is to authorise the 
exploitation of the resources in Antarctica and for what area?’354 
 
The lack of agreement on the legal status of the territorial claims in Antarctica is ‘the 
centre of the most difficult problems related to Antarctic resources.’355  Had the 
controversial territorial claims issue been resolved during the negotiation of the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty, the probable result would have been the carving up of the Antarctic 
continent into at least seven different national territories, all of which today would 
presumably be under national jurisdiction and control. Cold War conflicts coupled 
without an Article IV provision could have led to a superpower showdown involving 
the Antarctic region. Had that been the result, Antarctic resources then would be 
treated as are all other resources found within a sovereign territory. That is, as a 
resource to be used for the benefit of the state subject only to outside jurisdiction 
                                                 
353 Antarctic Treaty, art IV (2) asserts that no new claims to territory can be made by the parties while 
the treaty is in force. 
354 Beeby, above n 73, 18. 
355 Keith Brennan, ‘Criteria for access to resources of Antarctica: alternatives, procedure and 
experience applicable’ in Francisco Vicuna (ed) Antarctic Resources Policy (1983) 217, 217. 
  102
   
based on agreements or international treaties to which that state was a party. The 
discussions surrounding bioprospecting would simply take place at a national level 
and there would be no further discussion on utilizing the natural resources of the 
Antarctic for the benefit of all mankind.  Therefore, while delaying the question of 
sovereignty may not be considered an ideal situation to be confronted with, it does 
allow for an opportunity to treat the Antarctic region and its resources in a special 
way.  Further discussion of this point is presented in subsequent sections of this thesis. 
 
E Legal status of Antarctic Marine Areas  
 
The Southern Ocean is a highly biodiverse zone and therefore a target of Antarctic 
bioprospectors. In international law, the status of marine offshore zones depends on 
the legal status of the land adjacent to it. For the Antarctic, the situation regarding 
territorial claims and the effect of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty create a 
complicated jurisdictional situation for the Southern Ocean.  In the absence of 
recognised sovereignty ashore in continental Antarctica, a recognised coastal state or 
states is absent.  As a consequence, it is argued that the high seas extend to the 
coastline of Antarctica, although most claimant states356 assert some form of 
jurisdiction over coastal waters, thus adding a further dimension to any discussions 
related to marine areas and marine living resources.   
 
As all of the Antarctic territorial claims involve sectors which include a coastal area 
of the Southern Ocean, each of these territorial claims, if perfected, generates as a 
right marine off-shore zones.357 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea358 (UNCLOS) established that a coastal state has sovereignty over an adjacent 
                                                 
356 Email from Trevor Hughes to Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, December 28 2003, notes that as regards 
New Zealand’s position on the legal status of the Ross Sea in the Ross Dependency Region:  ‘This is a 
complex issue.  Essentially we regard the seas around Antarctica as the high seas, ie international 
waters.  With the other States Parties to CCAMLR we have agreed to conserve and manage the living 
resources south of the Antarctic Convergence (minus whales which come under IWC) through the 
Convention.  We regard ourselves as having the right, however, under the 1923 Order in Council 
“providing for the government of the Ross Dependency” and the 1977 Territorial Sea and EEZ Act, to 
declare an EEZ in the Ross Dependency.’ 
357 Note that there is further complication with determining baselines in Antarctica due to the ice that 
occupies coastal regions there and annual sea ice formation that effectively doubles the size of the 
Antarctic continent in winter. 
358 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM (1982), 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) 
(‘UNCLOS’). 
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territorial sea to a limit of twelve nautical miles.359 There is also a contiguous zone 
that extends for a further twelve nautical miles, over which states may exercise 
limited control.360  Part V of UNCLOS establishes that the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) extends for up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea.361  
Within the EEZ the sovereign coastal state has the rights: 
 
‘for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superadjacent to the sea-bed and of 
the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of that zone…’362 
 
The sovereignty of the Sub-Antarctic Islands is generally not contested, so that for 
these islands there are undisputed maritime zones under the control of their respective 
sovereigns.  The unclaimed sector363 of Antarctica does not generate maritime zones 
and therefore the marine off-shore area of the unclaimed sector is legally considered 
high seas.   
 
Although Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty clearly states that the geographic scope of 
that treaty is the area south of the 60 degrees south latitude, the jurisdiction of the 
Antarctic Treaty parties within that area is limited by the express saving of the 
freedom of the high seas and arguably the jurisdiction of the International Seabed 
Authority.364  Notwithstanding this high seas express saving, the whole of the 
Southern Ocean is subject to regulation by CCAMLR, for those state parties to that 
convention, for the purposes of conservation (including rational use) of marine living 
resources. 
 
At the time of the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in the late 1950s, international 
law recognised the existence of territorial seas of between three and 12 nautical miles.  
By the 1980s, when CCAMLR was negotiated, there was recognition of the existence 
                                                 
359 UNCLOS, art 2-4. 
360 UNCLOS, art 23. 
361 UNCLOS, art 57. 
362 UNCLOS, art 56 (1) (a). 
363 This ignores the reservation of a basis of claim by both the (former) USSR and United States whose 
claims might each pertain to the whole of the Antarctic continent. 
364 Triggs, above n 76, 161. 
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of at least 200 nautical miles of fishing zones and Exclusive Economic Zones. The 
rights of a coastal state over the continental shelf were first advanced in the US 
Truman Proclamation of 1945 and were affirmed in 1958 as not depending on 
occupation, effective or notional, or any express declaration of a coastal state.365 The 
International Court of Justice endorsed this view in 1969 stating ‘the rights of the 
coastal state in respect of the continental shelf…exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue 
of its sovereignty over the land.’366 There is no need for any formal declaration over 
the continental shelf. 
 
Thus, states claiming sovereignty in Antarctica argued that a fishing zone or an EEZ 
was a non-severable attribute of such sovereignty.367 All Antarctic territorial claimants 
were therefore able to regard their slice of the Antarctic as including control over 
resources on the seabed and subsoil in at least that area covering up to 200 nautical 
miles. Australia in particular took the view that to assert a fishing zone368 would not 
be an extension of an existing Antarctic claim nor for that matter a new claim by 
them, but merely the exercise of a function necessarily appurtenant to an existing 
claim,369 as any new claim or territorial extension would be in breach of Article IV (2) 
of the Antarctic Treaty.  Non-claimants states have a different view concluding that 
the general non-acceptance of Antarctic territorial claims means that all offshore 
marine areas are designated as high seas.370 
 
Any Southern Ocean bioprospecting would therefore also involve discussion of 
Antarctic territorial claims and the sovereignty situation.  It is argued that regulation 
of bioprospecting activities in the Southern Ocean, regardless of the lack of agreement 
on sovereignty, is already possible within the context of CCAMLR which purports to 
                                                 
365 Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature on 29 April 1958, 450UNTS 311 (entered 
into force 10 June 1964) art 2 (3). 
366 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Netherlands, Denmark v Germany) (1969)ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 
para 69. 
367 Keith Brennan, ‘Recent International Developments regarding Antarctica’ in Richard Herr, Robert 
Hall and Bruce Davis (eds)  Issues in Australia’s Marine and Antarctic Policies (1982) 93; See also, 
Triggs, above n 76, 225-226. 
368 Australia alone amongst the claimant states does exert an Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) around its 
external territories including Antarctica.  
369 Also see Note No 35/2004 of the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations to the 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 12 May 2004, regarding Australia’s intention to 
make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for the coast of Australia 
and its external territories.  
370 MJ Peterson, Managing the Frozen South: The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty 
System (1988) 69. 
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regulate ‘all marine living organisms’.371 There has also been a suggestion that the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) may have a role to play in regulating Antarctic 
marine bioprospecting.372  While Antarctica is a unique area in international law, 
Burke argues that the Southern Ocean shares many of the problems of high seas 
around the globe.373 Therefore lessons learned from the negotiations of the UNCLOS 
may well be of value in the context of Southern Ocean marine bioprospecting whether 
the parties agree to allow ISA involvement or not. Antarctic Treaty Consultative State 
parties have not taken the opportunity to discuss these points and it seems unlikely 
that in a consensus system involving seven claimant states that any agreement could 
be reached to formally declare all the coastal waters of Antarctica as high seas.  The 
result is that while the Antarctic Treaty is in force, the waters up to the coast of 
Antarctica are considered high seas. 
 
F Unbalancing the Sovereignty Equation 
 
Heap believed that ‘balancing sovereignty was the true reason that the Antarctic 
Treaty was negotiated and that the often cited reasons of promotion of peace and 
scientific co-operation in Antarctica were actually simply results of the agreement and 
not its intended objectives’.374   ‘Fear of chaos’375 in the Antarctic region was the 
motive for balancing sovereignty in Antarctica given the political situation376 at the 
time of the Antarctic Treaty’s negotiation. This ‘common fear’377 led to an underlying 
agreement by the governments concerned, resisting any temptation to implement their 
particular view of Antarctic sovereignty at that time. Any conclusion of these varying 
views would have led to rivalry378 instead of cooperation, which may have led 
ultimately to international discord in the Antarctic region.  The bi-focal approach of 
the Antarctic Treaty in its wording of Article IV thus allowed for varying 
interpretations that accord with competing views of state sovereignty in the Antarctic.  
                                                 
371 CCAMLR, art 1(1).  
372 Jabour-Green, above n 22. 
373 Burke, above n 108, 82. 
374 Heap, above n 68,105-106. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Buck, above n 70, 57; According to Buck, the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 was an ‘epiphany’ 
for the international community. The Soviet success in launching Sputnik made the Southern 
Hemisphere (in particular) and its allies nervous that the Soviet Antarctic bases would be used to install 
missiles, putting the Southern Hemisphere countries in range. 
377 Buck, above n 70, refers to ‘the common fear’ of an Antarctic military presence as dwarfing any 
other internecine disputes related to Antarctica at that time. 
378 Heap, above n 68, 104-105. 
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This in turn prevented chaos and international discord, by leading to the signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty. The fear of chaos has arguably subsided and with it there has been a 
shift in the ‘value’ of Antarctica, from a strategically valuable area towards first a 
valuable resource ‘treasure island’379 and more recently as a valuable area for 
conservation and protection.380 This shift is not meant to imply a diminishment of the 
importance of sovereignty considerations for the region, but merely implies that 
sovereignty considerations can now be addressed in a different arena.  
 
In 1959 most experts estimated that resource extraction from Antarctica was 30 years 
away.381 This view meant that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty’s focus could be sovereignty 
and while the Treaty was able adequately to address the signatory parties’ sovereignty 
concerns at that time, the inclusion of a provision for review after 30 years was a 
signal that parties to the Treaty should be prepared to focus on resource issues in the 
late 1980s or early 1990s. The 1980s focus on resource regime negotiations382 did 
highlight the fact that matters regarding economic use of resources had not been 
covered.  The CRAMRA negotiations in particular highlighted internal and external 
conflicts that needed to be addressed.  These conflicts are still relevant today in the 
context of bioprospecting.  Failure to at least recognise these conflicts may disrupt the 
system. 
 
1 Internal conflicts  
 
During the CRAMRA negotiations it was noted that any legal solution regarding the 
use of Antarctic resources would have to include an internal accommodation 
addressing internal conflicts that existed. That is, it would have to address the varying, 
diverse views of the individual Antarctic Treaty states. These internal conflicts 




                                                 
379 Beck, above n 243, 210. 
380 As evidenced by the ratification of the Protocol which designates Antarctica as a ‘natural reserve’. 
381 See Peterson, above n 370, 70. 
382 Including negotiations for both CCAMLR and CRAMRA. 
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1. Claiming sovereignty and those non-claimants who neither made nor recognised 
claims; 
2. Most of whom were developed nations and those that were least developed or 
developing states; and 
3. Who were likely to directly engage in the activity and those who would not, or who 
would indirectly participate through the activities of other parties.383 
 
During the negotiations of a minerals resource regime Wolfrum notes that it was the 
first conflict that ‘left its mark on almost every phase of the negotiations.’384 The two 
extreme positions which states could have promoted with regard to mineral resources 
were represented by the claimant states on the one hand, asserting that they alone had 
the legal competence to regulate mineral resource activities, and the non-claimant 
states on the other hand asserting that all Consultative State parties had the right to 
regulate resource activities. These two views represented the extreme positions, so 
that for the minerals convention to work, the result had to represent an arrangement 
where the parties could collectively regulate resource activities without jeopardising 
the claimant states rights. The successful negotiation of CRAMRA was an indication 
that the convention was able to address these extreme positions.  However, its 
subsequent failure meant that its effectiveness cannot now be measured. 
 
Such internal conflicts still exist.  The increase in the number of Antarctic Treaty 
parties even since the minerals negotiation continues to shift the balance underlying 
these issues. Any discussions regarding bioprospecting in Antarctica will once again 
have to take into consideration the varying views of the Antarctic Treaty parties and 
address these external conflicts. 
 
2 External conflicts 
 
On some subjects, the interests of the Consultative State parties are aligned with or 
identical to those of the international community.  Some examples of such interests 
would include non-nuclear use and non-militarization of the region, freedom of 
scientific investigation and environmental protection of Antarctica and the Southern 
                                                 
383 See Wolfrum, above n 130, 13; See also, Gillian Triggs, ‘Negotiations of a Minerals Regime’ in 
Triggs (ed) The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources (1987) 182, 187. 
384 Wolfrum, above n 129, 13. 
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Ocean. Other interests are at times at odds with the international community. 
Wolfrum noted one such example during the CRAMRA negotiations saying that the 
interest in the utilization of resources was at odds with the international community 
and this external conflict rendered the situation much more complex.385  The 
international community wishing to see Antarctic resources utilised for the benefit of 
the global community and not simply for Antarctic Treaty Consultative states only. 
 
Since the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty, the international community has 
questioned the legitimacy of conducting resource-related negotiations only among the 
Consultative State parties.  In the 1980s in the context of the CRAMRA negotiations, 
two additional external conflicts were added to the situation. Firstly, there was access 
for the wider community to any Antarctic resource regime; and secondly, there was 
the distribution of any benefits to the wider community.386 With sovereignty issues 
unresolved in the Antarctic region a basic legal question which impacts on Antarctic 
bioprospecting discussions concerns who is entitled to be endowed with the legal 
capacity to dispose freely of natural resources from Antarctica?387  Note that ‘dispose 
of’ includes the right of exclusion, utilisation and derivation of any benefit from the 
natural resource. Any discussions involving regulation of living resources from the 
Antarctic will need to address and accommodate similar external conflicts.  This is 
especially true in regard to the two new external conflicts because, with CRAMRA 
abandoned, there has yet to be exploitation of Antarctic resources outside marine 
fisheries. 
 
Failure to address these conflicts may damage the reputation of the system in the eyes 
of the international community, the reputation of which was recently strengthened by 
the ratification of the Protocol. It also creates political tension internally amongst the 
Antarctic Treaty parties.  Arguably the claimant states do not wish to see their status 
in Antarctica eroded and any major disruption to the system could well see the 
Antarctic Treaty System Consultative State parties withdrawing, so that they have an 
opportunity to formalise and legitimise territorial claims or in the case of non-
claimant states to openly guard against such claims. The feasibility of bioprospecting 
                                                 
385 Ibid 15; Wolfrum was referring to non-living resources but the general sentiment applies to living 
resources. 
386 Ibid.  
387 Nicholas Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1997) 7. 
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in the Antarctic region makes the situation different from that of minerals 
exploitation, because mineral exploitation was not actually occurring nor feasible at 
the time of the CRAMRA negotiations. At that time, claimant states had nothing real 
in economic terms to lose in negotiating a regime. Bioprospecting is a feasible 
commercial activity. Therefore, it has greater capacity to disrupt the system. 
 
G A Sovereign’s Rights over Natural Resources 
 
The genesis of the concept of sovereignty over natural resources as a principle of 
international law developed in the post World War II388 period.  The United Nations 
General Assembly promoted the concept, which was advocated by developing 
countries which sought to secure benefits from their natural resources.  While 
environmental awareness has introduced a balance of duties along with sovereign 
rights, the general principle of a state’s sovereignty over natural resources remains, 
that is, international law currently provides that it is the sovereign state that has the 
right to exploit its natural resources, subject to certain obligations relating to 
environmental protection.389  The CBD reaffirms this sovereign right over 
resources.390 
 
While claimant states continue to maintain that they have a legitimate basis of claim 
to territory in Antarctica, provisions of the Antarctic Treaty represent substantial 
abatements of the normal attributes of sovereignty.391  These abatements include 
granting freedom of scientific investigation to anyone, anywhere in Antarctica, 
allowing the building of a scientific base or bases anywhere in Antarctica and the 
prohibition of military activity south of 60o south latitude.  Yet, while the issue as to 
sovereignty remains unresolved, the territorial claimants continue to maintain their 
claims and only New Zealand, alone amongst the claimants, has ever offered to 
abandon its territory and therefore cede all sovereignty rights.392 So while we cannot 
say for certain who the sovereign, or sovereigns, are over Antarctic Treaty territory, 
                                                 
388 Ibid 3. 
389 See UNGA Resolution 1803 XVII Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(1962). 
390 CBD, art 3. 
391 Keith Brennan, ‘Recent International developments regarding Antarctica’ in Richard Herr, Robert 
Hall and Bruce Davis (eds) Issues in Australia’s Marine and Antarctic Policies (1982) 92, 92-95. 
392 See Beck, above n 243, 131. 
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we also cannot say that the region is beyond national jurisdiction as seven Antarctic 
Treaty nations continue to maintain their territorial claims. So the Antarctic Treaty 
parties, and especially the Antarctic territorial claimant states, maintain that they have 
the right to regulate Antarctic resource use under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
Because of the Antarctic Treaty and the operation of the Antarctic Treaty System, 
permanent sovereignty over Antarctic resources does not rest with the claimant states 
as individual sovereigns over the region. While the consultative states act collectively 
as a group making decisions concerning the region, they do so within the confines of 
the Antarctic Treaty System.  Therefore the model of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources cannot strictly apply to the natural resources of the Antarctic region 
and while the CBD supports international law and reaffirms a sovereign state’s right 
to control its natural resources, there are emerging views regarding property rights 
associated with resources that oppose this model and which may better suit the 
Antarctic situation. These models are discussed below. 
 
H Alternative Property Right Models over Natural Resources 
 
Roman law generally recognised four property regimes: res nullius, where the 
resource in question belongs to no one; res privatae, where the resource in question 
belongs to one or more individuals; res publica, where the government holds the 
resource for the benefit and use of the public; and res communes, where the resource 
is accessible to any user, but cannot be exclusively acquired.393  
 
The res communes regime or the common property doctrine, as it is now more 
commonly referred to, extends to most of the living resources of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, which are open to legitimate and reasonable use by all states and 
may not be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of any one state.394 Additionally 
there are some resources that are considered the common heritage of mankind (CHM) 
and calls for the CHM principle to be applied to other resources. The CHM principle 
is not the same as the common property doctrine, namely, the CHM is a more recent 
                                                 
393 See generally, Buck above n 70, 2-4; Joyner, above n 65, 25-35. 
394 See Birnie and Boyle, above n 237, 141-143. 
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concept which only applies to certain non-living resources.395 However, recently the 
CHM approach has been broadly, though not correctly, applied to all resources 
beyond national jurisdiction.  For this reason both concepts are considered below 
separately. 
 
1 Common Property Resources and the Global Commons   
 
Common property, or common pool resources, are said to be located in resource 
domains known simply as commons.  Global commons are large resource domains 
which are not exclusionary - an example would be the high seas region. Joyner notes 
that certain factors should be considered in deciding whether a domain qualifies as a 
global commons. He states these factors include: circumstances regarding delimitation 
of the area; the degree of national legitimacy, sovereign claims and jurisdictional 
reach within the area; the extent of control and regulation over the area; the degree of 
access granted; distribution of costs and benefits; and decisions concerning 
conservation or exploitation of the area.396  
 
Antarctica has been described as an international commons,397 a disputed 
commons,398 and Joyner states (with the criteria above in mind) that ‘the natural and 
legal situation of the Antarctic plainly intimate that the region qualifies as a global 
commons area.’399  The unresolved nature of the territorial claims is the sticking point 
in any declaration that the region is a true global commons, even though 
overwhelming the international community does not recognise the territorial claims.  
According to Buck, Antarctica is, at best, ‘an international commons rather than a 
global commons, because membership in the governing system for the Antarctic 
region is limited and it is therefore exclusionary.’400   She notes, however, that it 
shares many attributes of a global commons. Joyner goes further and states that: 
 
 
                                                 
395 Ibid 143-144; See also discussion below. 
396 See Joyner, above n 65, 25. 
397 See, eg, Buck, above n 70. 
398 See Ruben P Mendez ‘Ocean governance and development: The question of funding’ in Peter 
Payoyo (ed) Ocean Governance: Sustainable development of the seas (1994). 
399 Joyner, above n 65, 44. 
400 Buck, above n 70, 14. 
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‘so long as the parties comply with the [Antarctic Treaty] provisions, the Antarctic can 
be viewed legally as lying beyond limits of recognised national jurisdiction…as long as 
the Antarctic Treaty remains a functioning legal instrument, the Antarctic can be 
viewed legally as beyond the limits of recognised national jurisdiction…and therefore 
the Antarctic region is part of the global commons.’401  
 
This is clearly a contentious statement because of the seven territorial claims. Were it 
not for the territorial claims to Antarctica it is probable that the living natural 
resources of the Antarctic region might be regulated under the common property 
model today, and Antarctica would be recognised as a true global commons.  The 
continued maintenance of the territorial claims precludes the strict application of this 
model, even though the legal operation of these claims is held in abeyance by the 
Antarctic Treaty while it is in force. 
 
Advocating for a global commons models has certain disadvantages as well, often 
overlooked by the international community.  There is of course the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ as postulated by Hardin.402 In his tragedy of the commons scenario, a 
communal pasture is open to all for grazing of their cattle. For each individual 
herdsman who wises to exploit the pasture, there is every reason to add cattle to his 
herd. The pasture is limited, so that if each herdsman adds cattle, then, at some stage, 
the carrying capacity of the pasture is exceeded.  The pasture is overgrazed and 
destroyed.  The commons idea carries with it an implication that the resources of the 
area are there to be used and does not promote the idea of protection of the intrinsic 
and wilderness values of a place, like declaring an area as world park or natural 
reserve would.  These disadvantages must be borne in mind when considering a 




                                                 
401 Joyner, above n 65, 53. 
402 Garret Hardin and John Baden (eds), The Tragedy of the Commons (1977).  
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2 Res communes humanitatus, Antarctica? 
 
Often because of the unresolved nature of the territorial claims, Antarctic resources 
are referred to as the common heritage of mankind.403  Birnie and Boyle note that 
although the term common heritage is used loosely to refer either to all resources of 
nature, living and non-living, or to the global environment as an ecological entity, for 
legal purposes the term is only narrowly defined by the meaning given to it in two 
conventions,404 viz the 1979 Moon Treaty405 and the 1982 UNCLOS.406 As expressed 
in both these conventions, the concept of common heritage of mankind implies that 
the non-living resources of these areas, areas that are beyond national jurisdiction, 
‘cannot be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of states but must be conserved 
and exploited for the benefit of all, without discrimination.’407 
 
Arvid Prado in 1967 advocated what he termed the ‘Common Heritage Principle’ 
being ‘resources are the property of the global human population, whose benefits 
should be shared by all states, and should be distributed to all people, regardless of the 
states participation in the resources extraction.’408 Importantly, the concept differs 
from common property, in that it allows for all states to share in the benefits even if 
they are unable to participate in the process of extraction and exploitation. 
 
In regard to Antarctic living resources as common heritage of mankind, three 
important points must be made.  Firstly, the 1982 UNCLOS did not apply the 
common heritage regime to the waters above the deep seabed nor to the living 
resources found anywhere in the oceans.  This clearly has implications for the marine 
living organisms of the Southern Ocean in the context of bioprospecting, because 
currently the living resources of the Southern Ocean are not considered common 
heritage resources.  Secondly, the Protocol as the most recently adopted and most 
                                                 
403 See, eg, Buck, above n 70, 64-66; See Joyner, above 65, 32-33.  
404 Birnie and Boyle, above n 237, 143.  
405 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for 
signature on 1979, (entered into force on 11 July 1984) (‘Moon Treaty’). 
406 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM (1982), 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994), 
arts 136, 137 (‘UNCLOS’). 
407 Birnie and Boyle, above n 237, 143. 
408 Note verble, 17 August 1967, Permanent Mission of Malta to the UN Secretary General, UN 
Document A/6095. 
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comprehensive environmental protection regime for the Antarctic and its dependent 
and associated ecosystems, notes that a comprehensive protection regime is ‘in the 
interest of mankind as a whole’. It did, however, avoid direct analogy with the Moon 
Treaty and UNCLOS even though it had the opportunity to consider both of these 
agreements which deal with resources beyond national jurisdiction. This may imply a 
deliberate intention to exclude the resources of the Antarctic region as common 
heritage of mankind. Finally and perhaps critically, the territorial claims and the 
nature of disputed, but persistent, sovereignty claims means that the Antarctic Treaty 
region is not strictly a region beyond national jurisdiction and that common heritage 
of mankind considerations have been reserved to non-living resources that are beyond 
national jurisdiction. 
 
While a case may be made that the resources of the Antarctic region should be made 
the common heritage of mankind, such a view remains controversial and does not 
take into full account the complex legal and political arrangements for the region.409 
Any definitive statement regarding Antarctic living resources as common heritage 
would require that benefits derived from operations such as bioprospecting should be 
for the benefit of all mankind, not simply for the Antarctic Treaty states, Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative states, Antarctic territorial claimants or for those states which 
actively participate in the exploitation of the resource. 
 
Generally, developing countries view all genetic resources as part of the common 
heritage of mankind.410 There have also been recent initiatives to declare all 
biodiversity on Earth as the common heritage of mankind. An example can be found 
with the Treaty Initiative to Share the Genetic Global Commons (TISGC)411 a 
proposal promoted primarily by NGOs who were against the private ownership of 
genetic resources.  This initiative was released publicly in February 2002 at the World 
Social Forum and was proclaimed as an alternative to the CBD. Its intention was to 
declare the Earth’s gene pool as a new global commons. While the initiative has since 
disappeared from view and is unlikely to be formally presented or adopted in the near 
                                                 
409 Birnie and Boyle, above n 237, 144. 
410 Vandana Shiva ‘Biotechnological development and the conservation of biodiversity’ in Vandana 
Shiva and Ingunn Moser (eds) Biopolitics: A feminist and ecological reader on biotechnology (1995) 
193, 209. 
411 See, eg, ‘The Launch of the Porto Alegre Treaty to Share the Genetic Commons’ Feb 2002, World 
Social Forum. 
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future, such an initiative would have included the biodiversity found in Antarctica and 
the Southern Ocean.   
 
What the emergence of such new initiatives and changes in thinking mean for areas 
beyond national jurisdiction or simply for the Antarctic region which maintains its 
unresolved sovereignty status, is unclear and requires investigation.   It is probable 
that any new attempt to declare Antarctic resources as common heritage would see 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties claim to be the exclusive custodians of the 
resources with ultimate responsibility for governance in the Antarctic.  This approach 
was reflected in, for example Recommendation VIII-8 on ‘Activities of States that are 
not Consultative Parties’.  While the recommendation reaffirms the Antarctic Treaty 
Preamble sentiments that it is ‘in the interests of all mankind’ to govern the Antarctic, 
it also recognises and places a special responsibility on Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
parties, a view reaffirmed in both CRAMRA and the Protocol. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty Consultative State parties have blocked external initiatives in 
the past. As, for example in 1974, when the proposal by the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) for a ten year Antarctic marine living resources programme to 
utilize resources in the Southern Ocean for the benefit of the world as a whole and 
developing nations in particular412 was blocked.  
 
Before the negotiations of CRAMRA began, it was said that the Consultative Parties 
were signalling greater flexibility, reflected, for example, in their decision to allow 
expert groups like the United Nations Environment Programme to become observers 
in the ATS. Referring to this increase in flexibility, Wolfrum in answer to the 
question ‘Who is going to profit from the utilization of Antarctic mineral resources’, 
said that ‘it would be the claimant states, the non-claimant states and the world 
community.’413  Whether this would have been true or not is impossible to decide 
now that CRAMRA has been abandoned. However, the same question will 
undoubtedly be asked in the context of Antarctic bioprospecting. 
 
                                                 
412 Rudiger Wolfrum, ‘The Use of Antarctic Non-Living Resources: The Search for a Trustee?’ in 
Rudiger Wolfrum (ed) Antarctic Challenge (1983) 143, 160; See Auburn, above n 74, 127-128 for 
discussion of the FAO Southern Ocean Fisheries Survey Programme (SOFSP). 
413 Wolfrum, above n 412, 163. 
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I Declaring Antarctic Biodiversity as a Global Commons: An Opportunity for 
the Antarctic Treaty System? 
 
Perhaps at least for the duration of the Antarctic Treaty and while the seven territorial 
claims exist, there can never be full and formal agreement that the Antarctic is in fact 
a global commons. If we can accept for the moment, however, that the regulation of 
the use of any living resource from the Antarctic region should become a special case, 
that could be managed as if it were a global commons resource, we can begin to 
contemplate what is necessary to make it so in practice, by developing a management 
and regulation regime which truly reflects this special status for the benefit of all 
mankind.  
 
Even those wearing rose-coloured spectacles could imagine that realising this would 
be difficult to achieve. It does, however, provide the Antarctic Treaty System with a 
unique opportunity to: 1) promote its credibility and 2) allow consideration of points 
that any global commons regime would require, for example, open access and benefit-
sharing, which are considered below. 
 
1 Open access  
 
The CRAMRA negotiations highlighted access to resources as an important 
consideration for both the exploiter of the resource and as an internal conflict that 
would require accommodation.  Access also requires consideration in the context of 
living resources. For bioprospecting, access involves the initial opportunity to the 
living resource on the continent and in the Southern Ocean, and may also include 
repeated access to any compound or gene that can not be synthesised in a laboratory. 
In the case of sovereign states, access to an area’s resources are state controlled. In the 
global commons model, access to resources would be open, that is, access for all 
states, even those states outside of the Antarctic Treaty System. Bush argues that the 
Antarctic is ‘closer to an open access model…than to one of territorial control’414, so 
one of the tools for a true global commons model may already be in place. Care must 
be taken, however, as generally with open access models the prognosis for sustainable 
resource use and protection of the environment is poor.  This is evidenced in the 
                                                 
414 Bush, above n 247, 135.  
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Antarctic region by the results of whaling, sealing and fishing, which have all resulted 
in unsustainable harvesting of many species and the increased mortality of by-catch. 
Arguably with the comprehensive protection of the Protocol now in place the risk of 
severe impacts on the environment is less likely. 
 
For bioprospecting, access does not necessarily have to mean physical access to the 
Antarctic region, and in general, does not require access to the majority of the region.  
Biodiversity can be catalogued and listed in a physical repository or within a database.  
The Bonn Guidelines recognise the usefulness of databases as the repository of 
biodiversity information, proposing the development of databases for the purpose of 
information sharing.  In any Antarctic biodiversity global commons there would be a 
requirement for all samples of Antarctic biodiversity to be catalogued and collected in 
an Antarctic biodiversity database.  The information and samples contained therefore 
would be accessible and available to everyone.  Their use would reduce the impacts to 
the environment, create a mechanism for information sharing and act as a resource in 
itself. While the usefulness of such a database is acknowledged, it is also recognised 
that the creation and maintenance of an Antarctic biodiversity database would be a 
mammoth undertaking, especially given the need for it to include micro-organisms 
and marine species. 
 
2 Benefit-sharing  
 
Although this thesis focuses on the legal implications of bioprospecting in the 
Antarctic, the issue is also surrounded by important and difficult ethical implications 
and considerations. The ethical considerations have been outlined by Alistair 
Graham.415 Creating innovative legal solutions for bioprospecting in the Antarctic has 
the potential to address these important ethical concerns and presents a radical 
opportunity for the Antarctic Treaty System.  In the strict definition of CHM, benefits 
from non-living resources are derived for the benefit of all without regard to who 
actually participates in the exploitation or development of the resource. While it is 
realised that the CHM principle applies only strictly to non-living resources, 
consideration is given to the objects and purposes of this principle in the context of 
                                                 
415 Alistair Graham, ‘Environmental, ethical and equity issues posed by Antarctic bioprospecting’, 
(Presentation at the Bioprospecting in Antarctica Workshop, April 2003, Christchurch). 
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Antarctic living resources that may be utilized for bioprospecting. In any approach to 
resources, the benefit-sharing416 is an area that requires consideration in the context of 
the Antarctic Treaty System.  There are differing interests of stakeholders and broad 
implications in the word ‘benefit-sharing’. 
 
3 Who are the stakeholders? 
 
Within a sovereign state generally, benefits from bioprospecting within its territory 
accrue to that state primarily for the benefit of its people. Also benefits should be 
equitably shared between the parties involved in the bioprospecting.  In countries 
where there is an indigenous population and where a discovery is based upon 
traditional knowledge of the resource, the parties involved include the indigenous 
people of the region. As Antarctica has no indigenous population, no question 
surrounding traditional knowledge and indigenous culture, and intellectual property 
arise and the list of stakeholders cannot include an ‘Antarctic citizen’.  The list of 
stakeholders clearly includes the seven territorial claimant states, the other 
Consultative State parties and the Non-consultative State parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty.  If there are, however, to be provisions for a global commons arrangement, the 
list of stakeholders would include the remaining UN member states, which are 
currently outside of the Antarctic Treaty System.  
 
For any regime to be truly for the benefit of all mankind and not merely for the 
members of the ‘cosy club’, any regulation of bioprospecting should be developed to 
include not only any economic benefit, but also social benefit. These range from 
technology sharing, capacity-building, education, free or improved access to 
medications, agricultural and pharmaceutical products, to name only a few. Beyond 
improved or free access to products, the ATS has considerable experience with 
initiatives involving capacity-building and technology transfer between Antarctic 
Treaty states.   Developing guidelines to improve and maintain this initiative and 
extend that work to non-treaty states would be a great improvement on the system and 
would dispel many external conflicts that might arise.  
 
                                                 
416 New Zealand, above n 199, 8. 
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What this envisions is that all Antarctic biodiversity samples would be processed and 
catalogued without leaving Antarctica.  The information would be placed on the 
database by individuals learning the process.  The training would target those from 
developing states so that the knowledge gained would be taken back to those 
countries. Funds derived from benefit-sharing provisions in bioprospecting contracts 
would be invested by the ATS and this investment would be the basis of a capacity 
and technology building fund for developing states. Any contracts related to the use of 
Antarctic biodiversity must include provision amongst the parties involved, must 
deliver a benefit back to the Antarctic via the Antarctic Treaty System and must 
include a benefit that is invested or delivered to the global community.  The samples 
and the database itself would be the resource and would be managed as common 
heritage of mankind.  Such an approach synthesises the arguments for a biodiversity 





Hanessian hoped that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty would ‘ultimately permit the 
claims issue to die a natural death.’417  While Article IV has effectively ‘frozen’ the 
disputes over territorial claims, the claims issue has not died away.  Rather, it lies 
dormant, awakening when a new political and legal issue emerges - including those 
instances regarding the utilization of Antarctic resources. So that the issue of 
sovereignty continues to be of critical consideration, as it was in the minerals 
debate418 and certainly as it will be regarding bioprospecting. While Article IV does 
not solve the sovereignty dispute, it does in fact provide all parties with a solution, for 
the duration of the Antarctic Treaty, as regards the complicated territorial claims 
situation.  It provides, at the very least, interim stability in the region and the basis for 
a management framework.  It may, however, lack legitimacy in the long term and the 
seven territorial claims may never formally be recognised as legitimate in 
international law. 
 
                                                 
417 John Hanessian, ‘The Antarctic Treaty 1959’ (1960) 9 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 436, 470. 
418 See Triggs, above n 76, 150. 
  120
   
As with the minerals regime, negotiation of any bioprospecting regime will require 
ATCPs to pursue particular common and conflicting interests.  Living resource 
exploitation in Antarctica may revive the dispute over sovereignty, something held in 
abeyance by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Antarctic Treaty Consultative parties 
had previously recognised this potential, so that the Article IV protection is already 
included in other system instruments related to living resources.  CCAS, for example, 
affirmed Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, while CCAMLR reiterates the provision 
and adapts it for the marine environment.  CRAMRA would have also included 
Article IV protection in relation to mineral resources. For CRAMRA, theoretically 
two extremes existed for resource activities administration in Antarctica: (1) 
Territorial claimant states could have argued that they have the legal competence to 
regulate and control resource related activities (to the satisfaction of CRAMRA); (2)  
Non-claimants argued that all Antarctic Treaty parties have the right to undertake that 
task.   
 
Faced with the prospect of having to negotiate a regime to deal with mineral resource 
exploitation in Antarctica, these problems were not unlike those which were faced in 
the negotiation of CCAMLR, but they were more difficult.419  That difficulty was 
centred on unresolved sovereignty. With mineral exploitation there was a need to 
provide a means by which an exploiter could be given security of title, both to the 
extraction site and to the product. The same is true for title to Antarctic-derived 
products or processes.   
 
Since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty legal and political contexts have affected the 
evolution of management regimes420 for areas such as the Antarctic region, an area 
that some believe should be managed as a global commons. Ideas regarding 
international governance have also changed significantly, so that any reconsideration 
of sovereignty in the Antarctic must include consideration of the emergence of these 
new concepts.  
 
                                                 
419 Keith Suter ‘A Public Policy Problem for Australia in the 1980s’  in Richard Herr, Robert Hall and 
Bruce Davis (eds)  Issues in Australia’s Marine and Antarctic Policies, 101, 113-128. 
420 Buck, above n 70, 2. 
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Exploitation, ownership and distribution of any benefits derived from the natural 
resources from Antarctica challenge the isolation of ‘frozen’ sovereignty, with 
implications for peace and international scientific co-operation in the region under the 
Antarctic Treaty System.  This in effect may be a resurrection of the ‘fear of chaos’ or 
even chaos itself as proposed by Heap.  Sovereignty in the Antarctic therefore, is of 
fundamental importance to any legal solution affecting bioprospecting in the 
Antarctic. 
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Part IV of this thesis considers the future of bioprospecting in the Antarctic. It begins 
by summarizing the legal implications of allowing the activity to continue in the 
region; it then discusses whether a moratorium is appropriate, or even possible, at this 
stage; and finally it investigates options for regulation.  
 
Regulation may be achieved in a number of ways.  First, by utilizing and applying the 
tools that are already available within the constructs of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Presently all bioprospecting in the Antarctic is being carried out under the umbrella of 
the legal instruments and guidelines that were drafted to address entirely different 
purposes, with the exception of the rules laid down under the Protocol which was 
designed to address all human activity in the Antarctic. While the instruments on the 
whole may not be applicable to bioprospecting, many of these instruments contain 
articles, approaches or objectives that are also important for bioprospecting regulation 
- these are identified and presented in this chapter. 
 
If bioprospecting is to continue in the Antarctic, however, and if it is to be for the 
benefit of all mankind, consideration must be given to a new regulation for the 
activity, which would address the legal implications particular to bioprospecting, as 
presented throughout this thesis. So that, it will be necessary to create either a legal 
instrument dealing generically with Antarctic resource utilisation, including specific 
bioprospecting provisions, or a bioprospecting instrument that may act as a precedent 
for other Antarctic resource related regulation. The final section of this chapter 
presents key provisions for a bioprospecting convention taking the latter approach. 
The successful negotiation and completion of such an instrument, regardless of which 
approach is adopted, may, however, be difficult or impossible to achieve, and may be 
discouraged by environmentalists and the international community for the same 
reasons that CRAMRA was opposed. That is, because any convention which regulates 
Antarctic bioprospecting may, in fact, provide the certainty required to encourage and 
promote, and thereby expand, the activity. 
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B Legal implications: a summary 
 
Parts I, II and III of this thesis have investigated the legal implications of 
bioprospecting in the Antarctic region.  The key points presented, and summarised 
here, indicate that there are at least five fundamental legal issues that must be 
considered.   
 
The two most important legal implications of bioprospecting surround:  
 
1. The obligation for the free availability of observations and results; and  
2. The questions surrounding the unresolved nature of Antarctic sovereignty and 
benefits from, access to and utilization of resources. 
 
First, the exact nature and extent of the obligation under Article III (1) (c) of the 
Antarctic Treaty, to make freely available scientific information and results from 
Antarctica, is unclear and requires resolution.  In the case of bioprospecting, Antarctic 
Treaty parties must clarify whether IPR devices, such as patents, are acceptable in 
regard to an Antarctic product or process. It is also important to determine whether the 
maintaining of trade secrets is legally appropriate and whether external international 
obligations pose additional obligations to those found within the Antarctic Treaty 
System itself in relation to Article III. 
 
Second, the obligation to freeze the legal operation of sovereign rights associated with 
the territorial claims to Antarctica found in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and 
repeated in many of the major Antarctic Treaty System instruments requires careful 
consideration. Specifically, the nature of the situation in the Antarctic invites legal 
challenges from the international community involving ideas concerning a sovereign’s 
legal right to exploit the natural resources within its territory.  Uncertainty over the 
precise nature of the obligation may invite internationalism, once again, into the 
Antarctic arena. The lack of a recognised sovereign, or sovereigns, means that any 
regulation regarding natural resources from Antarctica or the Southern Ocean must be 
developed carefully, must address the internal conflicts that exist among state parties 
and must address external conflicts from an international community that does not 
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support the territorial claims to any part of Antarctica. This will certainly involve 
clarification of both global commons and common heritage of mankind issues. 
 
Closely, or perhaps intricately, related to the sovereignty issue, is benefit-sharing. 
Benefit-sharing is such an important legal issue in the context of the exploitation of 
Antarctic resources, however, that it should be considered as an issue in its own right.  
Any legal considerations given to benefit-sharing in the context of bioprospecting will 
also have implications and applications to future Antarctic resource issues. Within a 
sovereign state, resources are utilized for the benefit of the people of that state.  
Where there are commercial opportunities, any commercial benefits from the 
development of a product or process are generally given to the parties involved in the 
development.  For Antarctic bioprospecting, there is an expectation from the 
international community that any benefits derived from the Antarctic region should be 
for the benefit of all humankind.  This must be balanced against the strict application 
of the sovereign principle and the views of the territorial claimant states in particular. 
 
In addition to these critically important legal implications are secondary legal 
considerations, including the lack of a formal legal definition-which will require 
negotiation, development and acceptance (by consensus) by Antarctic Treaty 
consultative states of a definition of bioprospecting; the lack of legal clarity 
surrounding the extent of the meaning of peaceful purposes objective of Article I of 
the Antarctic Treaty-which will require consideration of whether commercially driven 
activities breach this objective, given their potential to lead to international discord in 
the region. 
 
In addition to the legal implications, there are environmental and ethical 
considerations which are also important. While these issues where not considered in 
any detail in this thesis, each also carries with it a legal implication, or implications, 
of its own. As far as the environmental issues are concerned, it appears that the 
current level of Antarctic bioprospecting is causing no more than a minor or transitory 
impact on the environment. Increased levels of activity, however, may result in 
increased impact. Worse yet, bioprospecting could result in sudden irreversible impact 
from an environmental accident. The Protocol appears to be able to manage 
bioprospecting as it currently stands.  Without a liability regime in place under the 
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Protocol, it would, at this stage, be impossible to prosecute or punish those 
responsible for any environmental damage caused by bioprospecting in the region.  It 
therefore seems imperative that the liability annex to the Protocol be fully and finally 
negotiated, accepted and adopted by all Antarctic Treaty states as soon as possible.  
There is some anticipation within the Antarctic community that this may occur in the 
very near future. 
 
The ethical considerations are embedded in the arguments surrounding benefit-
sharing.  A legal solution is required not only to distribute any economic benefits 
which may arise from Antarctic bioprospecting, but may also be required to define the 
range of other benefits, including social benefits, which may also be a result a 
successful commercial application. There are also ethical considerations involved 
simply in the use of biodiversity, these are already being considered by the 
international community. 
 
C Review of Antarctic Bioprospecting Activities  
 
In the Information Paper presented at the 2004 Antarctic Treaty Meeting in South 
Africa, it was suggested that the first step the Antarctic Treaty Consultative State 
parties should take, is to carry out an extensive review of bioprospecting in the 
Antarctic.421 The review should include quantifying the commercial value of the 
research on Antarctic biodiversity and should include consultation with the 
commercial organisations that are involved. The paper went on to note that important 
review aspects include whether the holders of the approved patents collected their 
samples from Antarctica or relied on ex-situ collections, how companies access 
collections and assert their right to use them, and how any benefits have been 
distributed.  This type of information needs to be known before the Antarctic Treaty 
parties can consider the regulation of bioprospecting.  The Information Paper 
advocated for the commercial organisations involved in Antarctic bioprospecting to 
be included in the policy-making process to avoid suspicion, doubt and resistance.  
 
While a review sounds like a logical start, it is not only the commercial organisations 
involved which should be surveyed, as bioprospecting is being carried out within 
                                                 
421 UNEP, above n 213. 
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National Antarctic Programmes.  Antarctic Treaty states are obligated to exchange 
information on their research programmes, so that, any review should begin by 
gathering information on bioprospecting research from these exchanges or from 
National Antarctic Programmes themselves. Some National Antarctic Programmes 
have openly reported on science events which focussed on bioprospecting, other 
national programmes have not reported such activities. This is either because none are 
being carried out within their programmes, or perhaps because the programmes are 
themselves unaware that the research being carried out is part of bioprospecting itself. 
It may also be because Antarctic bioprospecting groups may be relying on samples 
that are ex-situ and were extracted for another purpose. It may be difficult to ever 
fully understand the extent of this type of bioprospecting activity. It may even be that 
some National Antarctic Programmes may not wish to disclose bioprospecting-related 
events and activities for whatever reason.  An attempt should however be made to 
review the current level of bioprospecting-related work being undertaken within 
National Antarctic Programmes, even if the review cannot identify specific events and 
research organisations involved, but could provide an overview of the current level of 
activity, how that activity was undertaken, what funding sources were used and if any 
benefits have been derived. This would provide the transparency that is required to 




As with early mining discussions there has been little discussion in principle on 
whether bioprospecting activities should be allowed in the Antarctic region.  Unlike 
the mineral discussions, however, bioprospecting in the Antarctic is already occurring, 
so that any agreed moratorium would require a halt in any bioprospecting currently 
being undertaken. When the Protocol was negotiated, the idea of a permanent 
moratorium on mineral exploitation was an easy one to embrace.  This is because at 
the time of those discussions, even though exploration was taking place, mineral 
resource exploitation and extraction were not technically nor economically feasible, 
and, as a result, were not taking place in the Antarctic region.   
 
When the CRAMRA initiative failed, the crisis that the failure presented meant that a 
continuing moratorium of mineral resource utilization would be the only solution. It 
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resulted in the protection of the environment that was lobbied for and it rendered the 
sensitive sovereignty issue redundant insofar as a ‘delimitation in relation to mineral 
rights was no longer required’.422  A moratorium on bioprospecting would, for the 
time being, place the sovereignty issue once again on the back burner.  Perhaps, 
however, it is time to give full consider to whether territorial claims in Antarctica can 
(or should) ever be perfected. 
 
For bioprospecting it is unlikely, given that it is already occurring in Antarctica and 
the Southern Ocean, and given its resemblance to other scientific research that are part 
of National Antarctic Programmes, that any moratorium could now be effectively 
imposed.  There would undoubtedly be subsequent problems associated with 
adequately policing and enforcing of such a ban. Any samples that have already been 
legally extracted from Antarctica and the Southern Ocean could still be used for 
commercial development without breaching even a moratorium on extraction from 
Antarctica, as the samples are already part of national and private collections scattered 
throughout the world. Without any contract or formal agreement specifically 
addressing property rights of collected materials, these ex-situ collections become the 
legal property of the centre, consortia or the country in which the collection or 
database is stored,423 and the ‘owners’ are free to develop the materials in whatever 
way they wish, subject to applicable domestic legislation and policy. Antarctic 
samples removed from the region and now stored in national collections are under 
national jurisdiction and free availability can not be guaranteed nor enforced.  
 
While a moratorium may not be practical at this stage, however, a ban placed over the 
patenting of any product or process derived from the Antarctic would stop derivation 
of any economic benefit from bioprospecting. This would limit, at least for the time 
being, any upstream product development and any need to source Antarctic materials.  
It would, however, be difficult, or even impossible, to enforce as it would require 
reliance on national patenting offices to stop any Antarctic-related application. It may 
also conflict with state’s obligations under the TRIPS agreement, which all Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative states have ratified. 
 
                                                 
422 Davor Vidas, Implementing the Environmental Protocol Regime for the Antarctic, (2000) 4. 
423 See Sarah Whatmore, Hybrid Geographies: natures, cultures, spaces, (2002) 107. 
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Any moratorium appears unlikely, and perhaps even unnecessary, at this stage, given 
the perceived low level of activity in the Antarctic and the general feeling that 
currently the activity is causing little environmental impact. As an alternative to 
asking whether there should be a moratorium on bioprospecting, the question that may 
require consideration is ‘What losses [commercial, medical, industrial or otherwise] 
would we incur if we did not conduct bioprospecting in the Antarctic?’424 
 
Currently, all bioprospecting in the Antarctic is carried out within, and therefore with 
the approval of, national Antarctic research programmes.  Consultative states may 
decide that as long as the activity poses little to no environmental problems then the 
activity may proceed as is, that is, within the context of their research programs and 
without formal, specific, regulation.  The nexus, however, between scientific research 
within national Antarctic research programmes and the potential for the research to 
lead to a commercial benefit for the state (or states) involved, may prove to be a 
conflict of interest that prevents Antarctic Treaty Consultative states from acting truly 
in good faith in their discussions of Antarctic bioprospecting.  The likelihood of now 
enacting or enforcing a moratorium appears very low due to this close connection. 
 
E Interim Measure 
 
A less drastic approach may be to negotiate and approve an interim measure. A 
measure is the highest level of legal agreement by the Antarctic Treaty System which 
is allowed for under provisions of the Antarctic Treaty.425 A measure is an example of 
a ‘soft law’ tool and such tools have inherent advantages. First, such approaches, 
according to Joyner, ‘indicate where the law might be heading’.426  Second, they are 
legally binding once approved by all consultative states.  Finally, development of the 
interim measure allows for formal discussion and debate of the issue. 
 
Any major agreement for bioprospecting will require a degree of scientific certainty to 
be effective.  This certainty is currently lacking, as evidenced, for example, by the 
lack of consensus on a definition of bioprospecting, and by the need for the proposed 
                                                 
424 See Supply Workgroup Report, Bioprospecting in Antarctica Workshop, Christchurch, April 2003. 
425 See Decision 1(1995) Measures, Decisions and Resolution for a definition of Measure; See also Part 
I of this thesis. 
426 Joyner, above n 92.  
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review of its current level. An interim measure, therefore, might be appropriate at this 
stage.  The measure might be as simple restating the Antarctic Treaty Article III 
obligation or it might go further and elaborate on the precise meaning of the article in 
the context of commercial activity in the Antarctic. It should also include a 
reaffirmation of the Article II and IV provisions of the treaty. 
 
Birnie and Boyle note that ‘accommodations expressed through the adoption of soft 
law also serve as a focus for the emergence of a more widespread and consistent body 
of practice.’427 Any major legal instrument takes time to negotiate and to reach 
consensus, the Protocol’s annex on liability is only one such example within the 
Antarctic Treaty System. So that, an interim measure makes good sense at this point 
in time with this in mind.  
 
CCAMLR and CRAMRA were negotiated under urgency in a rush to ‘flesh out’ the 
Antarctic Treaty System and prove its viability by 1991428 - the deadline for the 
Antarctic Treaty 30 year review. This urgency, most likely, assisted in the successful 
negotiation of these two legal instruments.  The demise of CRAMRA, without a 
replacement, would have inevitably meant ‘formal review’ of Antarctic Treaty System 
on the whole, which could well have resulted in its downfall and substitution by 
another system. As no such deadline currently looms for a bioprospecting decision, 
any negotiations towards a comprehensive legal instrument might take years, or even 
decades, to put into place, especially given that there may be reluctance to target an 
activity that is taking place within the National Antarctic programmes themselves.  
The usefulness an interim measure at this stage is, therefore, evident. 
 
F CCAMLR and CRAMRA: Lessons learned 
 
If bioprospecting continues to be carried out in the Antarctic, there will soon come a 
time when a comprehensive bioprospecting convention will be required. This 
convention will undoubtedly contain innovative provisions dealing with issues 
specific to bioprospecting.  It is also possible, however, to rely on provisions and 
approaches from other Antarctic resources related conventions, namely CCAMLR 
                                                 
427 Birnie and Boyle, above n 237, 17. 
428 Deborah Shapley, The seventh continent: Antarctica in a resource age (1985), 239. 
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and CRAMRA, to provide direction. While this thesis argues that neither CCAMLR 
nor CRAMRA as they currently stand are adequate to cover the legal implications of 
bioprospecting, each may be considered to contain useful provisions which might be 
important to incorporate into any bioprospecting convention. These are presented 
below. 
 
For CCAMLR, Burke notes that its two vital concepts are ‘the precautionary principle 
and the ecosystem approach.’429 The precautionary principle is ‘where decisions 
should be taken that have a low risk of long-term adverse affects.’430  This approach is 
often referred to in the context of Antarctic environmental matters and it is generally 
of importance when there is scarcity of, or uncertainty associated with, scientific data 
related to a proposed activity.  This is the current situation with information and data 
associated with Antarctic biodiversity, and, therefore, the precautionary approach as 
advocated by CCAMLR would appear to be appropriate in a bioprospecting 
convention. 
 
An ecosystem approach is an ambitious one which requires a commitment to 
protection of the environment and its associated species.  The ecosystem approach is 
complex, involving many factors and mandating that consideration must be given to 
the relationship of species and between species. It also requires that consideration be 
given to the impact on the ecosystem resulting from the removal of any organism, for 
any reason. The ecosystem approach was an innovative one when CCAMLR was 
negotiated.  Today, it has come to be common place in environmental regulations.  It 
should, therefore, be part of any bioprospecting regulation but may be impossible to 
achieve in practice. 
 
With CRAMRA, the Antarctic Treaty System seemed to produce ‘the blueprint of a 
closed access model for economic activity’431 in the region which might now be used 
as a model for the regulation of Antarctic bioprospecting.  Bush noted that: 
 
                                                 
429 Burke, above n 107, 137. 
430 Ibid. 
431 See van der Lugt, above n 8. 
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‘Commercial interest in prospecting for unknown biochemicals of possible medical or 
other use is a relatively low impact activity that can be carried out in the context of 
existing scientific programs.  Without doubt the regulatory starting point for this activity 
will be the open access regime for scientific research spelt out in the Antarctic Treaty.’432 
 
While this has proved to be the case to date, any increase in the level of the activity 
may force the parties to prepare a closed access regime specifically addressing the 
utilization of living resources. This would, however, go against any argument for a 
global commons or CHM arrangement. Antarctic mineral activities were prohibited 
unless permitted and conducted in accordance with CRAMRA. The same should be 
true for any bioprospecting in the Antarctic.  This too, may be difficult to enforce in 
practice as any third party states are under no obligation to comply with a legal 
instrument that they have not signed. 
 
CRAMRA stated in its Article 2, that it is an integral component of the Antarctic 
Treaty System, reiterating and incorporating the Article IV Antarctic Treaty provision 
on sovereignty. Like the minerals negotiations, any discussions on living resources of 
Antarctica will certainly include consideration of the contentious sovereignty issue. 
Importantly, CRAMRA addressed access to and benefits from Antarctic resources 
and also provided a solution for dealing with confidential data. If CRAMRA had been 
ratified as planned, it would have allowed mineral exploitation ‘without the explicit 
assignment of national property rights and sovereignty to Antarctic territory-this 
would be “something new” in the development of an entire continent’433 and certainly 
requires consideration in the context of bioprospecting. CRAMRA included rules 
regarding inspection, monitoring, penalties and sanctions which also require 
consideration in the context of any bioprospecting regulation. 
 
It is important to note that the political framework in which CCAMLR and 
CRAMRA were negotiated has changed and fundamental global changes in politics 
and policies have changed since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty.  This sets a scene 
where any discussions of Antarctic bioprospecting might take place different from the 
stage set during negotiations of the Antarctic Treaty. Any lessons learned from past 
                                                 
432 Bush, above n 247, 140. 
433 Bernard Herber ‘The common heritage principle: Antarctica and the developing nations’ (1991) 
50.4 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 391, 398. 
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negotiations will now have to be reinterpreted to reflect different political and societal 
thinking from 2005 and beyond. 
 
G The Protocol’s Approach 
 
The strict environmental protection mechanisms first laid down in CRAMRA and 
now contained within the Protocol, should be the approach taken with any 
bioprospecting instrument. The Protocol regulates environmental impact from all 
human activity in the Antarctic. It proclaims Antarctica a natural reserve, recognises 
the intrinsic value of the region, and gives scientific activity priority over all other 
activities. While the Protocol is to be applauded for its success to date and while it 
may provide adequate protection against adverse environmental impact from 
bioprospecting, it is arguable whether it should be the primary or sole legal instrument 
used to regulate it, especially given that it lacks access and benefit-sharing provisions. 
It lacks the ability to address issues regarding resource exploitation, a topic which it 
was never intended to address. The proclamation of the region as a natural reserve, the 
prioritization of scientific activity and the recognition of the intrinsic value of 
Antarctica could be incorporated into any specific bioprospecting regulation, or 
bioprospecting, like any other Antarctic activities would be subject to regulation 
under a specific convention on bioprospecting and subject to the strict environmental 
protection provisions of the Protocol. The Protocol could, on the contrary, be cited in 
support of a moratorium to be imposed on bioprospecting in the Antarctic.  It is not an 
adequate instrument, in itself, to regulate commercial activities such as natural 
resource exploitation.  Currently, discussions about Antarctic tourism recognise that 
while the provisions of the Protocol must be adhered to, they are not sufficient to 
regulate tourism itself.  A separate accreditation scheme for non-government activities 
(tourism) has been proposed within the Antarctic Treaty System and any such scheme 
may be an example of how all non-governmental activities in the region could be 
regarded and regulated.  This proposal may have implications for bioprospecting also. 
 
Bioprospecting whether carried out in the context of National Antarctic Programmes 
or within privately funded and supported expeditions, currently has to follow the 
necessary steps for approval, as provided in the Protocol, and also within the national 
guidelines of Antarctic Treaty state parties.  There has also been discussion as to 
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whether environmental protection is a customary rule of international law.  This final 
point is briefly considered below as it has implications for the regulation of 
bioprospecting. 
 
1 Environmental protection as a rule of customary international law 
 
Treaties do not, ipso facto, bind third party states, unless the intention to do so is 
clearly expressed and the state concerned expressly accepts the benefits or obligations 
that arise. This acceptance is, however, relatively unusual. Academics debate, 
however, if international law now imposes a general obligation of conservation and 
sustainable use of natural resources and the natural environment, as there now exists a 
wide body of global and regional treaties concerned with conservation and 
environmental protection.434  If so, this would mean that those states which have 
ratified the Protocol, and all other states regardless of their involvement in the ATS, 
would be obliged to protect the Antarctic environment. 
 
Whether the Protocol may simply have codified emerging customary state practice 
has not been formally discussed. The actual practice and opinion juris of those states 
not party to the Antarctic Treaty and/or the Protocol may reflect the belief that 
environmental protection is a customary norm for the Antarctic region. The obligation 
to protect the Antarctic regions unique biodiversity, whether from bioprospecting or 
any other act or activity, may be a legal obligation erga omnes. This would imply that 
if an Antarctic bioprospecting convention were negotiated, even those states that did 
not sign the convention and did not sign the Protocol might still be required to operate 
in the Antarctic region within the strict environmental protection guidelines that are 
laid down within the Protocol or which could be prescribed within any bioprospecting 
convention.  
 
H Antarctic Bioprospecting Convention 
 
If bioprospecting is an activity with a peaceful purpose, that supports scientific 
investigation and cooperation in the Antarctic, and is an activity that, when carried out 
properly, does little damage to the Antarctic environment, then it should be allowed to 
                                                 
434 Birnie and Boyle, above n 237, 88-89. 
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continue in the Antarctic. The question then becomes how do we manage and regulate 
this activity within the Antarctic Treaty System? It can be argued, that because of the 
issues regarding resource use and sovereignty and because of the activities potentially 
to benefit all mankind, bioprospecting requires a legal instrument devoted exclusively 
to it. Exactly what format such an instrument would take requires further debate and 
discussion, however, a first draft of the key provisions is presented below. 
 
Any attempt at negotiating a convention must adequately address the legal 
implications, summarized above, within the framework of the ATS, recognising the 
internal conflicts amongst Antarctic Treaty Consultative state parties and external 
conflicts as discussed throughout this thesis. Suggested approaches to such a 
convention would include the precautionary approach to living resource use, the 
establishment of robust access and benefit-sharing provisions, administrative 
provisions for database creation, development and management, and ultimately the 
establishment of a scientific committee with responsibility for sustainable 
management of any use of Antarctic biota.   
 
Any stand alone legal instrument would also require Antarctic Treaty parties to 
consider overlapping international conventions and regimes, such as UNCLOS, the 
CBD, and TRIPS. 
 
Of fundamental importance is the Antarctic Treaty’s Article III obligation for free 
availability of scientific information and results, and the Article IV obligation to 
compromise on sovereignty. Both of these articles should be reiterated in a 
bioprospecting convention. Ignoring the sovereignty situation could result in an 
escalation of internal conflicts amongst the Treaty parties which might, in the end, 
bring down the Antarctic Treaty System. Such a result would inevitably invite 
involvement of the international community. The form of any new convention must 
consider the emerging view of the international community, including consideration 
of common heritage of mankind arguments and the regulation of the Antarctic region, 
or at least the biota of that region, as part of the global commons. Failure to 
adequately address these issues could re-ignite debate about United Nations 
involvement in the Antarctic or could see other non-state actors, such as commercial 
companies, with a greater role. 
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With these points in mind, the following key provisions are presented for inclusion in 
an Antarctic Bioprospecting Convention. 
 
1 Key provisions of an Antarctic Bioprospecting Convention  
 
Like most of the opening text of major treaties, the preamble of the Antarctic 
bioprospecting convention would lay down broad principles and grand ideas.  The 




Noting that bioprospecting is occurring in the Antarctic region; 
Convinced of the benefits of bioprospecting; 
Recalling the obligations under the Antarctic Treaty, CCAMLR, the 
Protocol and the other component parts of the Antarctic Treaty System; 
Recognizing the values of the region, including its intrinsic and 
scientific values; 
Note that Antarctica shall forever be used for peaceful purposes only 
and shall not become the scene of international discord. 
 
More importantly the key provisions of any convention must begin with the object of 
the convention and must contain a clear definition section.  These key provisions are 
presented as articles I and II, respectively. 
 
Article I (draft) 
The objective of this convention is to regulate all phases of bioprospecting in 
relation to Antarctic biota. 
 
While it is recognised that only the initial phases of bioprospecting may be carried out 
in the Antarctic region, importantly the objective of the convention must state that the 
Antarctic Treaty parties wish to be involved in all phases of the process, from search 
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and discovery, through to commercialisation of a product or process.  So that while 
they clearly will regulate the phases of the activity that may take place in the 
Antarctic, Antarctic Treaty parties must maintain some level of involvement in the 
entire process, in order to have a stake in benefit-sharing.   
 
A definition of bioprospecting must be full and finally agreed to and must be included 
in the bioprospecting convention.  It will also be important to include the legal 
definition of other terms, such as what is specifically meant, inter alia, by ‘biota’, 
‘living resources’ and ‘biodiversity’.  For these terms, the Antarctic Treaty System 
could rely on exiting international legal instruments, such as the CBD, which contain 
relevant and useful definitions that have already been agreed to by a majority of states 
also involved in the Antarctic Treaty System.  Here, a suggested definition of 
bioprospecting, as presented and defended in Part I of this thesis is utilized for the 
draft of article II of the Antarctic bioprospecting convention. 
 
Article II (draft) 
For the purposes of the Antarctic Treaty System,  
Bioprospecting means ‘The search for valuable chemical compounds and 
genetic materials from plants, animals and micro-organisms; the extraction 
and testing of those compounds and materials for biological activity; and 
the research and commercial development of those that show activity’.  
 
Any Antarctic bioprospecting convention, which will be an integral component of the 
Antarctic Treaty System, should, like CRAMRA and CCAMLR, restate the Article III 
and Article IV provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. While each of these previous 
conventions restated those provisions with a slight variant, specific to their objectives 
and goals, clearly the purpose was to reaffirm the importance of the agreement by the 
parties to compromise on sovereignty and to promote cooperation. These are 
important in any convention involving the utilization of Antarctic resources. 
 
In the case of bioprospecting, any restatement of Article III of the Antarctic Treaty 
should be accompanied by a clear explanation of the extent of that obligation, 
especially in the context of patenting.  So that, for the bioprospecting convention, the 
reiteration of the Antarctic Treaty Article III obligation might be followed by:   
  137
   
 
Article (draft) 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, including in particular patents in 
relation to an Antarctic-related product or process, will not necessarily breach 
the Article III obligation as stated in the Antarctic Treaty, and reaffirmed here, 
provided that: 
1. The researcher or discoverer had declared that he/she was 
participating in a bioprospecting-related research activity when the 
application for access was submitted, and this declaration was 
confirmed by the National Antarctic Programme and formally 
submitted (at an ATCM) under the exchange of information 
obligation under the Antarctic Treaty. 
2. The researcher or discoverer has declared the source of any 
funding they received in support of any phase of their 
bioprospecting activities. 
3. The original discovery of the Antarctic organism was fully 
described and registered within the Antarctic biodiversity database. 
4. If a patent application is approved and a patent granted, the patent 
holder shall make the Antarctic Treaty System aware, through the 
relevant National Antarctic Programme of the patent number. 
 
A clear provision on access to and benefit from Antarctic bioprospecting must be 
included in the convention.  CRAMRA relied on sponsoring state provisions for 
access to Antarctic mineral resources.  While it may be that this type of provision and 
sponsorship becomes necessary for bioprospecting, the fact that the activity relies on 
the harvesting of relatively minor amounts of biodiversity may mean that the ‘search” 
and ‘discovery’ phase may be implemented simply through access to an Antarctic  
biodiversity database.  That is, access may be provided by way of the database, not by 
providing access for every bioprospector, to the Antarctic region itself. Populating the 
database with biodiversity would be the responsibility of National Antarctic 
programmes, but the database would be the combination of efforts by the National 
Antarctic programmes as a whole. That is, the database would contain biodiversity 
data and information from all consultative state parties conducting biodiversity 
research in the Antarctic region. Samples from the database would be distributed once 
the bioprospecting researcher or team has completed the necessary contract, paid a 
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licensing fee and fulfilled their obligations under the exchange of information article 
of the convention (stated in the draft article immediately above). Any property rights 
assigned would include joint ownership, so that the Antarctic Treaty states retain 
ownership and are therefore stakeholders in any research and development.   
 
While this may sound like a radical idea, it provides a mechanism to protect the 
Antarctic environment, it creates a resource (the database) that can be utilised by 
states that may not have the capacity to send research teams to Antarctica, it allows 
for control over Antarctic biodiversity and such control would provide the awareness 
necessary to assist in benefit–sharing.  
 
Article (draft) 
All information on Antarctic biodiversity shall be maintained, by the Antarctic 
Treaty System, by way of the Antarctic biodiversity database. The database is 
the property and responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative parties and 
the information in the database shall be freely available.  
 
Any use of the information requires: 
1. The user to register with the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat; 
2. The user to pay an access fee (such fee to go to the maintenance and upkeep 
of the database); 
3. The user to enter into an agreement with the Antarctic Treaty System for the 
distribution of any benefit-derived from the use of the Antarctic biodiversity 
database. 
 
This provision and the idea of the database provides an opportunity for the Antarctic 
Treaty System, which fulfils many of its obligations and may ultimately be the vehicle 
required to provide access to Antarctic resources for the benefit of all mankind.   This 
is the most important consideration for the Antarctic Treaty System in the 
development of any regime regarding Antarctic bioprospecting. 
 
Like most major legal instruments, the bioprospecting convention would include 
important administrative provisions, especially concerning membership, amendment, 
and duration. Like the Antarctic Treaty, the bioprospecting convention would be open 
for signature by any member state of the United Nations.  It would, however, be 
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impractical (and also probably highly unlikely) that any such state should be outside 
of the Antarctic Treaty System.  So that there should be provision in the 
bioprospecting convention that it is open for signature by any signatory state of the 
Antarctic Treaty, and the Protocol, and would be subject to amendment by unanimous 
agreement of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative state parties only. Given the fast pace 
of technology, the convention would require review after a relatively short period of 
time, perhaps 20 years and should also be given an expiration date.  For example, the 
convention would expire in 50 years, or sooner by unanimous agreement. 
 
Given that bioprospecting is already underway in the Antarctic region, it is important 
for the treaty system to give consideration to the regulation of the activity which 
could, if addressed properly, provide the system with an opportunity to increase its 
credibility in the eyes of the international community. 
 
I Conclusions  
 
The Antarctic Treaty System has proved to be malleable in the past, and regulating 
bioprospecting may be yet another opportunity for that system to prove its robustness.  
 
There has been little formal debate on bioprospecting in the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Issues regarding commercialization and the use of Antarctic living resources must be 
addressed.  Currently, there appears to be less than a minor or transitory 
environmental impact from Antarctic bioprospecting, so that bodies such as the CEP 
have only touched on what they perceive to be a legal and political issue, and not an 
environmental one. The issues central to the discussions, those involving significant 
legal and policy questions have not been adequately discussed and are likely to 
become troublesome as the bioprospecting industry develops, especially if, or when, a 
significant find is announced, and the economic stakes become real and high!  There 
may not currently be the trained legal experts available within the Antarctic Treaty 
arena, to dedicate their time and energy to consideration of bioprospecting. It is 
essential that the ATS begins the process of engaging a group of legal experts to 
consider the issues. Failure to do so soon might led to the perception that the Antarctic 
Treaty states are deliberately ignoring the issue due to their vested interests. 
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While there are similarities between the mineral resources debate and those involving 
utilization of living resources, so that lessons learned during the negotiation of 
CCAMLR and CRAMRA can be helpful, the issues are not identical.  Not only has 
the arena changed, but commercialisation of living resources involve ethical 
considerations much greater than those involved in mineral exploitation and those 
currently found in fisheries. 
 
Investigation throughout this thesis points to two critical issues that must be 
addressed: the Article III obligation for free availability of observations and results 
and the property rights issues surrounding the Antarctic sovereignty situation.  While 
balancing sovereignty considerations has worked in the past, issues involving 
commercial activities and the utilization of Antarctic resources reignite the 
sovereignty debate. Bioprospecting in the Antarctic involves serious commercial 
interests, with a commercial potential worth far more than mineral exploitation. It is, 
however, a more stable political environment than the late 1950s, so that discussions 
of sovereignty might not necessarily invoke ‘fear of chaos’. This may allow for 
consideration of unique options in the regulation of Antarctic bioprospecting 
including those which could truly be for the benefit of all humankind. In any resource 
related discussion, it is clear, that the underlying sovereignty issue starts to thaw and 
demands reconsideration. 
 
Clarification is needed on the strict legality of patenting of an Antarctic-derived 
product or process. While there is nothing contained in domestic patent law 
specifically regarding Antarctic material and while patenting criteria requires full 
disclosure, patenting may be a breach of the obligation to make scientific observations 
and results freely available.  The requirements of the TRIPS agreement, however, may 
not allow for the withholding of a patent simply because the biological material 
utilised in the invention was initially from the Antarctic region.  Further investigation 
of the impact of TRIPS and other international obligations is required. 
 
Simply doing nothing about bioprospecting is not a wise option. Leaving a ‘gap’ in 
any regulation regarding an activity that is already being undertaken in the Antarctic, 
risks heightened involvement from the international community, in much the same 
way that leaving a gap in any mineral exploitation regime would have inevitably 
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involved outside involvement from the international community.  While doing 
nothing is indeed an option, issues regarding the utilization of Antarctic resources will 
arguably become more frequent in the future as technology opens up a range of 
possibilities and humanity is faced with urgent resource requirements.  So that any 
discussions undertaken now or solutions created regarding bioprospecting, may lead 
to a model for regulation that can be applied in the context of other resources.  
CRAMRA is often referred to as ‘useful’ specifically for this reason. With little 
national policy on bioprospecting at a state level, this may also be an opportunity for 
the Antarctic Treaty System to prepare an arrangement that can provide insight for 
those countries that have yet to develop policy.  
 
Some people may ask ‘Why worry?’  If impacts and levels of bioprospecting in the 
Antarctic region are currently so low why not simply ignore it?  One reason becomes 
obvious when considering the scale of bioprospecting in the United States. In 2002, 
there were nearly 2,000 biotech companies operating there, and at least one new 
biotech company commences operations every single day.435 This incredible 
expansion of the industry will inevitably lead to heightened interests in biota from 
other environments. Antarctica and the Southern Ocean will increasingly become 
targets.  Without a moratorium, inadequate or non-existing regulation, will lead to 
exploitation and inequitable benefit-sharing. It may also impact on the region’s 
intrinsic values and those values it holds for scientific investigation and co-operation.  
 
Roald Amundsen, when he went ashore in Antarctica said ‘the land looks like a fairy 
tale’, while Robert Falcon Scott proclaimed it ‘an awful place’.  The difference 
appears to be one of vantage point. Most of the world would probably consider that 
Antarctica remains a land that looks like a fairy tale.  If we allow resource extraction 
activities such as bioprospecting to turn it into ‘an awful place’ it will be to our great 
detriment.  Therefore, the Antarctic Treaty parties and those with an interest in 
bioprospecting in the region should focus on developing regulation that will protect 
the region, and its living resources, truly for the benefit of all. 
 
 
                                                 
435 Rahuk Dharda, Guiding Icarus: Merging bioethics with corporate interests (2002) xiii. 
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APPENDIX 1: The Antarctic Treaty 1959 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French 
Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, 
 
 Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that 
Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international 
discord; 
 
 Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific 
knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica; 
 
 Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the 
continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of 
freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during 
the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of 
science and the progress of all mankind; 
 
 Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica 
for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international 
harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
 
Have agreed as follows:  
 
Article I 
1.  Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.  There shall be 
prohibited, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of 
military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon.  
 
 
2.  The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or 
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.  
 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that 
end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, 
subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.  
 
Article III 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the 
Contracting  Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and 
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a. information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be 
exchanged to permit maximum economy of and efficiency of operations;   
 
b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions 
and stations; 
 
c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and 
made freely available. 
 
Article IV 
Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:  
 
1.a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;  
2.a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;  
3.prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-
recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica.  
 
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.  
 
Article V  
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste 
material shall be prohibited. 2. In the event of the conclusion of international 
agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and 
the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parties 
whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in 
Antarctica.  
 
Article VI  
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60deg. South 
Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or 
in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under 
international law with regard to the high seas within that area.  
 
Article VII  
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of 
the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right 
to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. 
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Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The 
names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having 
the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of 
their appointment.  
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of 
Antarctica.  
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within 
those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or 
personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers 
designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.  
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of 
Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers.  
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force 
for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in 
advance, of  
 
1.all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all 
expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory;  
2.all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and  
3.any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica 
subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty.  
 
Article VIII  
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and 
without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to 
jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 
1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph 1(b) of 
Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, 
shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are 
nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for 
the purpose of exercising their functions.  
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the 
adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting 
Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually 
acceptable solution.  
 
Article IX  
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present 
Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry 
into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose 
of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest 
pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their 
Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, 
including measures regarding:  
 
use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;  
facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;  
facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;  
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facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the 
Treaty;  
questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;  
preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.  
 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by 
accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to 
participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during 
such times as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of a 
scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition.  
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be 
transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the 
meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article.  
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when 
approved by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to 
participate in the meetings held to consider those measures.  
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from 
the date of entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the 
exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in 
this Article.  
 
Article X  
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with 
the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in 
Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty.  
 
Article XI  
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall 
consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful 
means of their own choice.  
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, 
of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for 
settlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall 
not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to 
resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article.  
 
Article XII  
1. The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous 
agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate 
in the meetings provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment 
shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received notice from all 
such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.  
2. Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other 
Contracting Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary 
Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is 
received within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the 
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modification or amendment in accordance with the provision of subparagraph 1(a) of 
this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the date of 
the expiration of such period.  
3. If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present 
Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate 
in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication 
addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties 
shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the Treaty.  
4. Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved at such a 
Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a 
majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary Government 
to all Contracting Parties immediately after the termination of the Conference and 
shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present 
Article  
5. If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance 
with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article within a period of two years 
after the date of its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting 
Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depositary 
Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take 
effect two years after the receipt of the notice by the depositary Government.  
 
Article XIII  
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be 
open for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any 
other State which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX of the Treaty.  
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by each State in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.  
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary 
Government.  
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the 
date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry 
into force of the Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto.  
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the 
present Treaty shall enter into force for those States and for States which have 
deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for any 
acceding State upon the deposit of its instruments of accession.  
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
Article XIV  
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each 
version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government 
of the United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to 
the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.  
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APPENDIX 2: PARTIES TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM’S 
COMPONENT INSTRUMENTS (December 2004) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
PARTY ATS INSTRUMENT 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Antarctic Treaty           CCAS        CCAMLR               Env. Protocol 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1. Argentina    
2. Australia     
3. Austria  C  -  - C 
4. Belgium     
5. Brazil     
6. Bulgaria   -  C  
7. Canada C   C  
8. Chile     
9. China   -  -  
10. Colombia  C  -  - C 
11. Cuba  C  -  - - 
12. Czech Republic C  -  -  
13. Denmark  C  -  - C 
14. Ecuador   -  -  
15. Estonia  C  -  - - 
16. European Community - -  - 
17. Finland   -  C  
18. France     
19. Germany     
20. Greece  C  -  C  
21. Guatemala  C  -  - - 
22. Hungary  C  -  - C 
23. India  -   
24. Italy     
25. Japan     
26. Korea, Republic  -   
27. Korea, DPR  C  -  - C 
28. Namibia  -  -  - 
29. Netherlands   -  C  
30. New Zealand  C   
31. Norway     
32. Papua New Guinea C  -  - - 
33. Peru   -  C  
34. Poland     
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35. Romania  C  -  -  
36. Russian Federation      
37. Slovak Republic C  -  - C 
38. South Africa     
39. Spain  -   
40. Sweden  -   
41. Switzerland  C  -  - C 
42. Turkey  C  -  - - 
43. Ukraine  -   
44. United Kingdom     
45. United States     
46. Uruguay  -   
47. Vanuatu  -  -  C - 
48. Venezuela  C  -  - - 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Key: 
  ‘First-level’ Party which has Ratified, Accepted or Approved that instrument. For the 
Antarctic Treaty such a Party is termed a “Consultative Party”, and for CCAMLR a 
“Member of the Commission”  
C  ‘Second-level’ Contracting Party to that instrument 
-  Not a Party to that instrument 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Chart created and data compiled by Alan D. Hemmings, originally for the Proceedings of the Bioprospecting in 
Antarctica Workshop: Antarctic Bioprospecting, 2005 (In press).  Used with permission. 
Sources: 
Cohen, H.K. (ed.). 2002. Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System. Ninth Edition. Department of State. 
Washington, DC. 
Antarctic Treaty & Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: 
United States. 2004. ‘Report of the Depository Government of the Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol in 
accordance with Recommendation XIII-2’. XXVII ATCM IP 36. 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals:  
United Kingdom. 2004. ‘Report submitted to Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XXVII by the 
Depository Government for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals in accordance with 
Recommendation XII-2, paragraph 2(d)’. XXVII ATCM IP 1. 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: 
Australia. 2004. ‘Report by the head of the Australian delegation in his capacity as representative of the 
Depository Government for the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
to the Twenty-Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting’. XXVII ATCM IP 65; and 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 2003. Report of the Twenty-
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a station on King George Island.
Peter I Island
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Poland,
Russia, South Korea, Uruguay each have





























































































































  Antarctic  Convergence 
(highest point in Antarctica, 4897 m)
(lowest point in Antarctica, -2540 m)
Twenty-one of 28 Antarctic consultative countries have 
made no claims to Antarctic territory (although Russia and 
the United States have reserved the right to do so) and 
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